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In this dissertation, I argue that

transnational elites within the Gulf Cooperation

Council (GCC) have been integrated within a Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC)
economically, militarily and politically through relationships that transcend the boundaries
of the nation-state. These relationships exist within the context of a global capitalist
structure of accumulation that is dependent on the maintenance of a repressive state
apparatus in the GCC. There have been few attempts to analyze the relationships that
Middle Eastern political and economic elites have developed with global elite networks.
This work fills an important gap in the scholarly literature by linking the political and
economic power of the GCC elites to transnational capitalist class actors in the U.S. and
Western Europe.
The TCC is comprised of actors who derive their wealth and power from ownership
of production or financial activities on a global scale. The embeddedness of GCC elites
within the TCC came with the de-centralization of capital accumulation occurring from the
1970s through the present that has linked regional and local capitalists to the ownership
activities of transnational capitalist firms. The GCC is an important case study for analyzing
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the structure and consequences the current phase of globalization due to its relative
importance in providing resources and financing for transnational globalization. Therefore
this project contributes to our assessment of the role played by transnational elites in the
GCC and the regional and global consequences of their power struggles based in part on a
theoretical framework derived from Neo-Gramscianism.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER

PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................1
Introduction .....................................................................................................................1
Transnational Elite ..........................................................................................................2
Overview .........................................................................................................................3
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework ..............................................................4
Methodology ...................................................................................................................9
Data and Sources ...........................................................................................................13
Case Study.....................................................................................................................13
Is GCC an Indigenous Institution? ................................................................................20
The Structure of the Dissertation ..................................................................................24
References .....................................................................................................................26
II. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A TRANSNATIONAL ELITE IN THE GCC ....29
Introduction ...................................................................................................................29
The Historical Evolution ...............................................................................................30
The Emergence of a GCC Transnational Elite..............................................................35
GCC Transnational Space .............................................................................................42
Sovereign Wealth Funds ...............................................................................................43
GCC Segmented Education System ..............................................................................46
Labor Market.................................................................................................................55
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................59
Appendix I.....................................................................................................................63
References .....................................................................................................................69
III. THE FRAMEWORK FOR CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE GCC
TRANSNATIONAL ELITES AND THE TCC CONNECTIONS.................................72
Introduction ...................................................................................................................72
Nationalization of Oil and the Emergence of GCC Transnational Elites .....................74
Forces of Production .....................................................................................................83
Transnationalization of GCC States ..............................................................................86
The Financial Power of the GCC Elites ........................................................................98
The Historical Background of GCC Financialization ...................................................99
The Essence of the GCC’s Financial Power ...............................................................100
Small Financial Sector, But Important ........................................................................106
The GCC’s Role in Global Financial Institutions .......................................................111
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................118
Appendix II .................................................................................................................121
References ...................................................................................................................136

vii

IV. MILITARIZATION OF GCC TRANSNATIONAL SPACE:
CHARACTERISTICS AND IMPLICATIONS ..............................................................139
Introduction .................................................................................................................139
The Pattern of GCC Military Expenditure ..................................................................142
Militarization, Oil, and the Transformation of Elite Network in GCC .......................147
Militarization and Conflicts among Classes in the Persian Gulf ................................150
Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency: US Military Arms Sales, and GCC State
Repression ...................................................................................................................152
GCC State Repression and Working Class .................................................................160
Capital Accumulation via Arms Deals........................................................................163
Military and Security Power as Tools of Maintaining the Hierarchy of Power in the
Arab World .................................................................................................................165
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................172
References ...................................................................................................................175
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................178
References ..................................................................................................................190
VITA ..........................................................................................................................192

viii

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE

PAGE

1. Freedom Status of GCC states .......................................................................................16
2. Level of Stability in GCC states ..................................................................................17
3. The Level of Stability in the rest of Middle Eastern States ..........................................18
4. The GCC Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) ................................................................44
5. The Educational Background of Major Economic and Political Figures in the GCC ...48
6. Dubai Schools with Western Curricula ........................................................................49
7. Net Migration to the GCC Countries .............................................................................56
8. Net Migration to the GCC Countries .............................................................................75
9. International Oil Corporations (IOCs) in GCC ..............................................................81
10. Important GCC Conglomerates and their Activities ...................................................89
11. GCC Total Oil Supply (Thousand Barrels Per Day) .................................................104
12. Domestic credit provided by financial sectors (% of GDP) ......................................107
13. GCC-SWF Capital Infusions into Financial Institutions ...........................................109
14. US Oil Consumption .................................................................................................149
15. Arab Share of Foreign Population in GCC ................................................................161
16. Freedom Status in Egypt, Bahrain, and Tunisia .......................................................171

ix

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE

PAGE

1. Casual Interacting Variables ..........................................................................................12
2. Trend Line of Net Migration in the GCC Countries ....................................................57
3. Labor Force by Sector and Origin, 1969-2009 ..............................................................58
4. The Economic and Family Ties Between Merchant Families and Royal Families in
GCC ..................................................................................................................................94
5. The Geographical Networks of GCC Conglomerates ...................................................97
6. The Chinn-Ito Index for Financial Openness for GCC and World..............................117
7. Democracy Index .........................................................................................................117
8. Military Deals by Persian Gulf States and The Sellers ................................................146
9. GCC Transnationalization ...........................................................................................184

x

LIST OF CHARTS
CHART

PAGE

1. Percentage of Foreign Workers of Total Population in GCC in 2011 ...........................55
2. Gulf states are increasingly—and almost completely—dependent on oil revenues for
their national budgets .........................................................................................................84
3. Amount of Contributions in NAB by Country ...........................................................114
4. Top Military Spenders in the World ............................................................................143
5. US Imports of Crude Oil .............................................................................................149
6. Terror Attack, Annual Count by Region .....................................................................188

xi

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
GAB

General Arrangements to Borrow

GCC

Gulf Cooperation Council

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

HRW

Human Rights Watch

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

ICC

International Chamber of Commerce

ICTs

Information and Communications Technologies

IFC

International Finance Corporation

ILO

International Labor Organization

IMF

International Monetary Fund

IOC

International Oil Corporation

IOM

International Organization on Migration

IOS

International Organization of Standardization

IWG

International Working Group

MEFTA

Middle East Free Trade Area Initiative

MENA

Middle East and North Africa

MNC

Multinational Corporation

NAB

New Arrangements to Borrow

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NOC
OPEC

National Oil Corporation
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

xii

SWF

Sovereign Wealth Fund

TCC

Transnational Capitalist Class

TCP

Technical Cooperation Program

TNC

Transnational Corporation

TNP

Transnational Practices

TNS

Transnational State

WCO

World Customs Organization

WML

World Muslim League

WTO

World Trade Organization

xiii

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Much of the literature on the Middle East focuses on either institutional
arrangements or culture. There have been few attempts to analyze the relationships that
Middle Eastern political and economic elites have developed with global elite networks.
This work represents a significant departure from contemporary scholarship by analyzing
the extent to which Middle Eastern elites within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are
linked to the transnational capitalist class (TCC) in the rest of the world economy. The
TCC is composed of actors who derive their wealth and power from ownership of
production or financial activities on a global scale. Indeed, the argument advanced here is
that Middle Eastern elites have been integrated within a global transnational class that has
disproportionate power and influence within the world system. Therefore, I will analyze
the intersection between the transnational elites within the GCC and the TCC within a
global social structure of accumulation. I will also show how this global structure of
accumulation is tied to the maintenance of a repressive state apparatus in the GCC.
One can analyze the influence of the TCC on the GCC in a deterministic way. This
analysis is crucial when studying the GCC not only as a model of how the TCC is
embedded in this sub-region, but also as a methodological foundation that can provide a
better understanding of possible impact of the GCC on global capitalism. The following
sections propose a systematic framework of the linkage between GCC-based elites and the
TCC. This study is the first of its kind in the literature on the Middle East, and it is
especially relevant because GCC-based elites continually reflect the TCCs’ goals and
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agendas, which are mainly those of the United States and United Kingdom. Before
explicating the propositions being tested in this dissertation, it is necessary to explain the
definitions and notions pertaining to transnational elites and the TCC.
Transnational Elites
The recent trend in global capitalism may be understood as the integration of
various capitalist classes into a global class – a transnational capitalist class (TCC). This
integration is taking place simultaneously with a fast-paced global integration in the
financial and trade sectors that is partly facilitated by advances in information technologies.
In his book, Transnational Conflicts: Central America, Social Change and Globalization
William Robinson explains the significant role played by transnational and transnationallyoriented elites, and he has coined the term transnational capitalist class to refer to those
elites. Robinson contends:
“As the agent of global economy, transnational capital has become the hegemonic
fraction of capital on a world scale. Here fraction denotes segments within classes
determined by their relation to social production and the class as a whole. The
new transnational bourgeoisie or capitalist class is that segment of the world
bourgeoisie that represents transnational capital. . . .This class is transnational
because it is tied to globalized circuits of productions, marketing, and finances
unbound from particular national territories and identities, and because its
interests lie in global over local or national accumulation.” (Robinson, 2003, P.
39).
In this dissertation, the notions of transnational capitalist elites and Robinson’s
TCC will serve as foundational concepts. This dissertation will (1) synthesize the existing
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definitions of the notion of a transnational class of elites in the literature, (2) offer its own
account of what constitutes the current transnational capitalist elites, and (3) define
boundaries of the TCC and the nature of its activities.
The transnational elites of the Middle East are connected to TCC networks. Some
elites are part of the TCC class due to their ownership or accumulation activities; others
belong to a political class of elites due to their functions within a repressive apparatus of
the state.

These political elites might not own capital, but they are important for

maintaining stability in their own domestic realm, which also helps global capitalists
accumulate profits. This study will attempt to show how Middle Eastern transnational
elites are integral to the project of a transnational capitalist class that increasingly relies on
the various repressive state apparatus within in the Persian Gulf region. At the same time
the transnational elites of the GCC are themselves represented as significant actors within
the larger transnational capitalist class, profiting from this relationship through their
participation in mutual profit-making ventures and through their membership in global
transnational institutions.
Overview
The ruling class and elites of the GCC comprise important sectors of the TCC. This
dissertation, therefore, begins with an attempt to define and analyze what and who
constitutes the transnational elites in the GCC, partly based on some general characteristics
of this class as identified in the literature and synthesized in this dissertation. Next, the
dissertation explores the implications of the TCC, especially pertaining to the interactions
between this class and the ruling class in Persian Gulf Arab states. To the extent that the
GCC’s economy and financial resources are important for Western economies, a better
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understanding of this region’s transnational elites could lead to a better understanding of
some of the political strategies and processes implemented in Western powers’ foreign
policies. As mentioned before, studying the GCC’s transnational elites sheds valuable light
on some of the understudied aspects of today’s global economy.
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
This dissertation is primarily based on historical structuralism. Arguably, the
transnational elites in the GCC are connected to the TCC due to their position within a
global structure of accumulation. Such a position is analyzed in terms of the
financialization and internationalization of GCC capital. Certain approaches that have
emerged based on historical structuralism could help in terms of tracing the features and
functions of such interconnectedness. In the following sections, I will address those core
insights that are useful for this research project. In each chapter I will further elaborate by
linking those insights to other literatures that are related to the specific argument of the
chapter; for instance, the literature on militarization in Chapter 4. Generally, the analysis
in this dissertation primarily employs David Harvey’s approach to studying historical
structuralism, in conjunction with Robert Cox’s neo-Gramscian theory of politics.
Harvey’s approach may be understood as an example of what is called, somewhat broadly,
neo-Marxian theories and/or neo-Marxism. Neo-Marxism, according to Cox, emphasizes
the relationship between three factors: “social forces,” “forms of state,” and the “world
order.” In particular, the world order refers to the “current organization of International
Relations,” which includes the relationship among states, international law, and
international institutions. More specifically, the contemporary world order has been
organized with the establishment of a series of influential institutions including the United
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Nations (UN), as well as those institutions that emerged under the Bretton Woods
Agreement, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Bank of
International Settlements. This dissertation will also use the concept of “forms of state”
to analyze the internationalization of GCC states based on class-based analysis. “Forms of
state” refers to the evolution of states through their relationship with various social forces
released or suppressed within a capitalist system. In this context, neo-liberalization (as a
structure that has released certain forces in the international system) entails “challenging
traditional forms of state sovereignty” (Harvey, 2005, P.3). Finally, in terms of the social
forces present in the process of capitalist production, Harvey notes that “Neoliberal
rhetoric, with its foundational emphasis upon individual freedoms, has the power to split
off libertarianism, identity politics, multiculturalism, and eventually narcissistic
consumerism from the social forces ranged in pursuit of social justice through the conquest
of state power” (Harvey, 2005, P. 41). All these key concepts will be employed in this
dissertation research to better understand the role of regional transnational elites in the
GCC.
In terms of the financial aspect of current capitalism, this research recognizes that
globalization, itself, has been experiencing notable transformations. One significant
differentiating factor among the various stages of globalization has been the different
patterns (as well as levels) of functional integration in the global economy that are
promoted by the by the process of transnationalization. Evidently, the pattern of functional
integration at each time is also influenced by the existing and dominant mode of production
at that time. The economic integration during colonialism had different characteristics from
the globalization that emerged after the Second World War. The same may be said about
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the Bretton Woods system and the post-Bretton Woods system within the post-War
context. Robert Wade has identified three important implications of the Bretton Woods
system related to the restrictions on capital flows and the fixed exchange rate, which were
the cornerstones of the system. The first implication was in the realm of international trade;
namely “[the] backing of the main international currencies by gold tended to check
persistent trade imbalances”. Second, the Bretton Woods system was a system in which
“private international capital flows were small,” by default and by design. The third
implication was that main economic parameters in the system proved to be steady (Wade,
2006, P. 116).
None of these three elements may be found on the same level in the post-Bretton
Woods system; and the difference may, in important parts, be explained by various
structures of global functional and financial integration – a structure that was shaped, inter
alia, by collective decisions of powerful economic classes in order to "generate conditions
more favorable to the transnational elite agenda" (Robinson, 2005, P. 13).
The collapse of the Breton Woods system resulted in an ever-increasing amount of
international private capital. This, in turn, has made the financial sector a significant sector
(if not the most significant sector) in the global economy. Accordingly, the power struggles
of the TCC within this sector may be viewed as a new and powerful politico-economic
phenomenon that had not existed in the earlier patterns of globalization. Thus, in order to
understand the notion of transnational elites and their impact on the global economy, it is
necessary to analyze the dominant economic paradigm in terms of production, financial
integration and trade. In order to explore this paradigm, which constitutes the foundation
for actions of the transnational capitalist class, this study uses two insightful analyses by
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Robinson (on the notion of “transnational elites”) and by Cox (on the current phenomenon
of “financialization of production”).
According to Robinson, we have been witnessing the transformation of the role
played by elites within the new pattern of the global economy. While the previous pattern
of the global economy was based on the notion of accumulation (in a nationally-oriented
sense of the term), the new pattern of the global economy is moving towards a
transnationally-oriented arrangement in which transnational elites play a key role. The
nationally-oriented context of elites’ activities often followed “policies that would protect
local agents from global competition” (Robinson, 2010, P.1). In contrast, the new
generation of transnational elites’ activities is based on the integration of “local circuits
into new transnational circuits of accumulation” (Robinson, 2010, P. 1). Partly based on
what Robinson has identified as the key changes within the capitalist class structure, this
dissertation aims to offer a new account of the transnational elites of the GCC that
strategically, organizationally, and financially are more internationally-oriented than
locally-oriented. My theoretical framework, therefore, shares much with Robinson’s
understanding of the evolution of transnational elites. I borrow less from those authors
who are sometimes called skeptical internationalists or from those who view globalization
as a more or less consistent phenomenon over a long history. I agree with Robinson, who
sees:
“. . . globalization as a qualitatively new epoch in the ongoing evolution of world
capitalism, characterized above all by the rise of truly transnational capital and
the integration (or re-articulation) of most countries in the world into a new global
production and financial system”. (Robinson, 2010, P. 2)
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The liberalization of financial markets that took place in the post-Bretton Woods
era has been an important force in what is sometimes called an unfettered globalization.
The qualitatively different structure of today’s financial markets is indeed a hallmark of
post-Cold War globalization. The far-reaching consequences of these new markets, which
will impact generations to come, cannot be overstated. As Cox argues, we have been
witnessing the spectacle of financialization of production (mis)represented as a new mode
of production. Yet, the new mode of production reveals similar crises as the former ones.
According to Cox, the financialization of production refers to:
“[T]he extent to which non-financial transnational corporations have become
more dependent on an accumulation of financial assets, and on relationships to
institutional financial investors, to maintain their dominant position within the
contemporary global production system. . . .[T]his process started aggressively in
the U.S. but has been adopted and expanded as a model for corporate behavior
elsewhere. As a result, today’s corporate profits are much more firmly tied to the
financial sector.” (Cox, 2012, pp. 5, 188)
Following a more in-depth analysis of the above theoretical frameworks, this
dissertation aims to trace and analyze the financial connections between the Persian Gulf
Arab states, on the one hand, and Western banking systems, on the other. This research
intends to offer an example of how to apply the above theoretical framework to the facts
of a real case study, with the hope that these transnational elites and their internal and
external financial relations are better understood.
Thus, this research will explore evidence of an interrelationship and mutual
dependence between GCC elites and a transnational capitalist class. Such a crucial link
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between GCC-based elites and TCC can be demonstrated by examining their joint
economic and political ventures on a global scale. The methodology that I use provides
empirical support for clarifying such mutual dependency.
Methodology
In order to understand the causal relationship between the TCC and GCC-based
elites as well as the contribution of the TCC in this significant node of the global economy,
this inquiry applies the process tracing and historical explanation methods.

This

methodology links the history of the formation and expansion of the GCC to changes
within global capitalism that coincide with a growth of a transnational capitalist class.
Through a detailed empirical analysis, this study exams the extent to which the interests of
the political and economic elites within the GCC intersect with the interests of the
transnational capitalist class. In order to provide support for this assertion, it is necessary
to find evidence that the transnational elites within the GCC are interconnected with the
profit-making activities of the TCC, and that the TCC depends on the GCC for a significant
flow of financial and/or productive profits and investment activities. It may well be the
case that the GCC is more responsive to particular sectors of transnational capital and less
responsive to others. If that is the case, or if the GCC is at times completely disconnected
from the interests of the TCC, that should also be revealed in this historical narrative.
In order to investigate the extent of the relationship between the GCC and the TCC, this
study will use the process-tracing method as unearthed by Alexander George and Timothy
Mckeown (1985). Briefly, the method investigates the causal relationships that are
contextualized within case analysis. With process-tracing and historical explanations, the
proposition is often tested based on "relevant, verifiable casual stories resting in differing
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chains of cause-effect relations whose efficiency can be demonstrated independently of
those stories" (Tilly, 1997, P.48). Accordingly, as David Laitin points out, the processtracing method attempts to combine statistical explanations and historical narratives. In
other words, historical narratives are to "address the questions of process," while the
statistical part "addresses questions of propensities" (George and Bennett, 2005, P. 205).
This method will provide a strong analysis for the propositions presented for two
primary reasons. First, the process-tracing method is useful for analyzing “macrohistorical economic phenomena.” In this dissertation, the case study (GCC) is being
analyzed in terms of certain domestic, regional, and international historical processes.
Second, as it is addressed in the case-study section, the large body of the literature on GCC
suffers from a lack of careful attention to the significant relationship between TCC and
GCC-based elites, who indeed determine important social and political situations. I will
use some current scholarly work on Middle Eastern studies, but by and large, this
dissertation takes a different approach in analyzing its case study. According to Alexander
George and Andrew Bennett; "process tracing is particularly useful for obtaining an
explanation for deviant cases, those that have outcomes not predicted or explained
adequately by existing theories" (George and Bennett, 2005, P. 215).
This method offers a valuable approach for tracing the consistency of the influence
of the transnational capitalist class within different economic modes of the global economy.
In particular, as it is described above, the struggle and agenda of transnational elites has
been evolving. In this sub-region, the evolution of concerns started in a strategic location
and moved toward assuring policies to provide uninterrupted access to oil. It still continues
with new interests in the financial activities that revolve around secure cycles of
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petrodollars. In fact, such evolution is based on the evolution of the transnational capitalist
class' struggles on the global level. Accordingly, such historical phenomena could be
explained by historicism and historical explanations. However, in order to fully understand
the dynamic of such contexts, I aim to explore key causal relationships between different
actors/factors that are contextualized in the history of the political economy of GCC (for
instance using certain socioeconomic parameters and the evolution of trade agreements).
To do so, the process-tracing method is required along with historical explanations. To
avoid ambiguity, throughout the following section I will discuss the process-tracing
method as it will be applied in this dissertation.
According to Alexander George and Andrew Bennett there are a variety of processtracing methods. One way to use process tracing is in an "atheoretical" manner or using it
as a tactic to provide a chronic account for a "detailed narrative." However, the possible
concluding remarks could provide promising grounds for an emerging theory or the
development of a theory. The other way to use the method is to utilize "analytical causal
explanations" within a theoretical framework. In this way, a theoretical framework is the
starting point of research inquiry. As another use of process-tracing method, some
researches apply the method for a more general explanation to move up the "ladder of
abstraction" (George and Bennett, 2005, P. 210-211).
This dissertation is theory-oriented and does not use narratives as a starting point.
Peter Hall pays attention to the significance of "theory-oriented process-tracing." Hall's
proposition of process-tracing emphasizes providing a more accurate explanation when it
is testing theories. In other words, the process-tracing method could provide a framework
in which theories could fit into the world where we have a variety of interactions and
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effects. If the analyses show inconsistencies in the theoretical framework, the theoretical
framework will be modified or/and developed. As a result, I do not intend to test a theory.
Rather, I attempt to develop an approach.
The process-tracing method tries to "identify the intervening causal process - the
causal chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable (or variables) and
the outcome of the dependent variable" (George and Bennett, 2005, P. 206). In order to
analyze the economic behavior and influence of the TCC in the GCC states as well as the
position of this sub-region and its elites in the global economy, this dissertation investigates
such contexts through the interaction between sets of variables that are shown in figure 1.

Pattern of
Globalization

Agents of
Globalization
Transnational Capitalist Class
(TCC)
GCC-based
Transnational
Elites

U.S. and U.K-based
Transnational
Elites

Domestic
Factor
s

Domestic
Factor
s

Figure1: Casual Interacting Variables

By applying the above model in this dissertation, I intend to elucidate the mutual
dependency between GCC-based elites and the TCC. This dependency has been largely
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ignored by scholars who are working on the Middle East. Accordingly, the far-reaching
consequence of transnational elites in the GCC, and sequentially the implications of the
current characteristics of the GCC for the global economy, are investigated through the
interactions between the above variables, including the pattern of globalization
(mainly, financialization of production), agents of globalization (both state and non-state
actors), GCC, U.S. and U.K-based transnational elites (who played an important historical
role in the GCC and are significant part of the TCC), and domestic factors in GCC states
(such as labor politics and trade strategies of each state), as well as domestic historical facts
in the United States and United Kingdom (mainly those that are related to policies
regarding petrodollars). The above model will be fully clarified in the last chapter.
Data and Sources
In order to explicate the facts and process systematically, this dissertation will use
certain sources and data for its statistical procedures. Foremost, it uses governmental
resources such as United States Trade Representative (USTR) archives, mainly for
analyzing trade agreements. On the other hand, this study will use international
organizations' resources such as those that are provided by IMF, WTO, and World Bank.
The other resources are domestic resources of GCC countries, such as "Gulf Center of
Development Policies." Finally, this study may use some data resources that are available
in articles and books.
Case Study
This dissertation focuses on the GCC in order to study the phenomenon of
transnational elites because the Persian Gulf sub-region appears to be among the most
important sub-regions in terms of the world’s economy, finance, geopolitics and energy.
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As it will be further discussed, the sub-region poses some challenges to certain mainstream
understandings of Middle Eastern studies. Therefore, it is important to clarify the analytical
distinction between liberalism and historical-structuralism.
In short, advocates of globalization argue that free trade has a positive correlation
with national and regional development and growth. In the same vein, Bhagwati adds that
free trade, which leads to the integration of the participating countries into the global
economy, provides more domestic freedom as well.

Bhagwati’s pro-globalization

approach follows closely the classical liberal faith in the efficiency of the market system.
He writes: “[i]t is precisely the growing awareness that globalization creates a web of
relationships that introduce such complexity, and hence prudence and pause in the policy
choices of nation-states that has led to the charges that globalization and democracy are at
odds” (Bhagwati, 2007, P. 8).
Liberals argue that the deepening integration of states within global capitalism has
the potential to make these states and societies more free. This school of thought also
assumes that the capitalist marketplace is organized and developed through the individual
decisions of market players, instead of being constructed politically and economically by
powerful class forces that rely on both economic consolidation and political coercion to
secure their power. Therefore, the key argument of liberals is that the problem with the
Middle Eastern states is they are not fully integrated into the capitalist world system, but,
instead, are governed too much by political authorities and not enough by the market.
However, the liberal scholars could not provide an accurate explanation of the
maintenance of this status quo in the GCC. In other words, the market economy has been
dramatically developing and expanding in these states while they have not experienced any
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significant changes in term of authoritarian trends of their states. More importantly, and
as this study will argue, such maintenance is highly protected by liberal democracies in the
West. In fact, the most significant factor, as historical structuralism addresses, is the role
played by influential classes. In other words, the main issue is that the protection of the
interest of the TCC is dependent on GCC-based elites and authoritarian development in
this sub-region.
Accordingly, in contrast to liberal claims, in the GCC little evidence seems to exist
showing that a greater level of economic integration has led to greater domestic freedom.
In other words, political coercion in the Middle East is central to global capitalist profits
and the social structure of accumulation in this phase of global capitalism in particular.
Arguably, the TCC has grown more dependent on authoritarian institutions in the Middle
East over time. Thus, economic liberalization does not equate to political liberalization but
instead sometimes requires it’s opposite (i.e. authoritarian structures that provide
maximum space for transnational class interests to profit). Accordingly, greater integration
of the Persian Gulf Arab states into the global economy and the removal of trade barriers
have solidified the position of the regional transnational elites, which in turn has stabilized
authoritarian regimes in the sub-region.
The issue of stability of the sub-region’s monarchies deserves closer attention. As
mentioned before, global capital has increasingly viewed the maintenance of the status quo
in the Persian Gulf sub-region as a primary concern. In the words of Adam Hanieh, a key
strategy of global capital has been “prioritizing the status quo and seeking to block any
possibility of regime change” (Hanieh, 2011, P. 176). This is not surprising given the
conventionally accepted notion that capital often seeks security, without much concern
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about what the source of that security may be. The more-than-accidental relationship
between the authoritarian status quo in the Persian Gulf sub-region and the highly
globalized economic systems of this sub-region is a serious challenge to the neo-liberal
account of global dynamics. Table 1 below helps to illustrate the seemingly paradoxical
situation in the Persian Gulf sub-region, if one is to accept the neo- liberal perspective.

Economic
Freedom
Country
Index Ranking

PR

CL

Status

Freedom
Rating

Oman

68.1

45

6

5

NF

5.5

Qatar

71.3

27

6

5

NF

5.5

Saudi
Arabia

60.6

82

7

7

NF

7

Kuwait

63.1

66

5

5

PF

5

UAE

71.1

28

6

6

NF

6

Bahrain

75.5

12

6

6

NF

6

GCC

68.28

5.8

Table 1: Freedom Status of GCC states
(PR: Political Right, CL: Civil Liberty, NF: Not Free, PF: Partly FREE) Source: Freedom
House and the Heritage Foundation, 2013

In the Freedom House categorization, when a freedom rating for a country is
between 5.5 to 7.0, the country is considered as “Not Free.” According to Table 1, the
Persian Gulf Arab states are among the top 24 percent of “Not Free” countries. On the
other hand, with the average Economic Freedom Index of 68.28, these countries are among
the top 24 percent of the world’s free economies. It may be added that Polity IV Project
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also categorizes the sub-region's six monarchies as autocracies (rather than constitutional
monarchies).
As for the issue of stability, Table 2 provides the Failed State Index for all the
countries within the GCC. The Failed State Index is often relied on as a relatively accurate
indicator of the level of stability in various countries. In 2012, this Index was measured
for 178 countries “based on their levels of stability and the pressures they face” (The Fund
for Peace, 2012, P. 3).

Country

Failed State
Index

Ranking

Oman

51.7

137

Qatar

48

142

Saudi Arabia

73.4

100

Kuwait

58.8

128

UAE

48.9

140

Bahrain

62.2

125

GCC

57.16

Table 2: Level of Stability in GCC states
Source: www.failedstatesindex.org, 2012
According to Table 2, the Persian Gulf Arab states are among the top 27 percent of
the most stable countries in the world (where the lower rank means more stability). The
high level of stability holds true today, even despite the recent “Arab spring,” which has
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shaken the sociopolitical structure in the rest of the Arab world. To better grasp the
significance of stability within the GCC, it is useful to consider the immediate neighbors
of the GCC members and how they score when it comes to stability. Table 3 provides the
figures based on the same Failed State Index. According to these numbers, the rest of the
Middle East is among the 19 percent most unstable countries in the world.

Country

Failed State
Index

Ranking

Egypt

90.4

31

Iran

89.6

34

Cyprus

66.8

115

Iraq

104.3

9

Israel/West Bank

82.2

61

Jordan

74.8

90

Lebanon

85.8

45

Syria

94.5

23

Turkey

76.6

85

Yemen

104.8

8

Average

89.98

Table 3: The Level of Stability in the rest of Middle Eastern States
Source: www.failedstatesindex.org, 2012
Arguably, one of the outstanding questions concerning the nature of these
authoritarian regimes is how they have managed to juxtapose a traditional ruling system
with certain forces of modernization that are often considered to be causes of instability in
non-democratic regimes. Many authors and commentators have correctly paid attention to
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the domestic factors leading to the considerable level of stability in these six countries. Yet,
the picture remains incomplete unless one takes into account the international factors,
which are often channeled through the transnational elites.
Russell Lucas observes that; “[a]mong Middle Eastern monarchies, regime-led
state formation and nation building have produced a flexible form of rule that has survived
the challenges of rapid development and international conflicts” (Lucas, 2004, P. 103). On
the other hand, some scholars have pointed to the nature and composition of oppositions in
these monarchies in order to explain their stability. For instance Gurdun Kr¨amer argues
that in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco, the oppositions have had goals other than the
overthrowing of the system – or so-called regime change. As mentioned before, however,
domestic political structures are not the only factors at play here. A key argument of the
dissertation is that domestic politics of the GCC countries should not be viewed as
deterministic factors – as it may be suggested in Innenpolitik theories. In other words, the
domestic level of analysis falls short of offering a robust analysis of this sub-region.
It may also be noted that, in the GCC monarchies, domestic politics have often been
shaped in important and enduring ways by external factors. These factors have led to the
creation of the current Social Structure of Accumulation (SSA). Thus, the so-called
domestic situation is deeply colored by the larger more global context. This domesticinternational dynamic for the GCC countries goes back decades, and arguably in the case
of a number of GCC members, to the time they became independent states. In 1964, for
instance, William Luce pointed out that the Persian Gulf “was inherently a political vacuum
that must be filled by British, and perhaps U.S., power in order to remain stable” (Fain,
2008, P. 152).
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This is echoed by F. Gregory Gause, who argues that “the success and failure
of monarchy in the Arabian Peninsula in the twentieth century had more to do with the
position of Arabian countries in the regional security picture and the international political
economy than with their particular domestic characteristics” (Lucas, 2004, P. 110). This
dissertation agrees with these propositions, and builds its analysis, first and foremost, based
on the position of these six countries in the international political economy order based on
the mutual dependency of GCC-based elites and the transnational capitalist class. Among
many factors that may be used for this study in international political economy, this
dissertation focuses on the TCC in the GCC for two reasons. First, the role of TCC in
general and the GCC transnational elites in particular is relatively understudied in the field
of IPE. Second, for the reasons that will be further elaborated in the course of this
study, the transnational elites of the Middle East play a disproportionally more important
role in shaping regional and domestic politics in their countries compared to many other
regions of the world.
Is GCC an Indigenous Institution?
The [Persian] Gulf Cooperation Council is not an indigenous institution, resulting
from the organic forces at works in the sub-region. One way to analyze the creation of and
the ensuing dynamics within the GCC is to view it as a regional bloc. In fact, the GCC is
sometimes described as a trading bloc.

Some scholarly works emphasize the

domestic/indigenous contexts in the creation of regional blocs. However, in the case of the
GCC, the domestic dynamics have not been as significant as they may be in other regional
integration. In other words, the creation of the GCC is more rooted in the position of this
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sub-region within the global order of capital rather than the domestic arrangement of scale
economies and production-sharing networks.
In fact, it is important to explore the intersection of domestic class actors
and transnational class actors in the creation and expansion of the GCC. For instance, GCC
is a response to the interests pursued by regional class actors, but those actors are
increasingly integrated into global capitalist relationships. This would allow an
investigation from a fresh angle of an international body that, in the words of Hanieh, has
a position of “centrality to the hierarchies of the world market” and manifests par
excellence the “two immanent tendencies of capitalism – the internationalization and
financialization of capital” (Hanieh, 2011, P.177). Accordingly this internationalization
and financialization is highly promoted and protected by the institutional, political, and
economic connections between transnational elites of the Middle East and the TCC. The
regional integration of the GCC states and the international integration of the GCC are part
of the internationalization of GCC capital.
The internationalization of capital in the GCC is rooted in the process of how the
transnational elites of GCC constitute both an extension of a regional class grouping and a
transnational class faction. Accordingly, one method to examine the GCC’s transnational
elites (who significantly but not completely overlap with the sub-region’s ruling classes)
is to trace the institutional facts. For instance, the active role of these authoritarian states in
several international institutions could offer a clue to the ties between the GCC’s
transnational elites, on the one hand, and the global TCC, on the other. In terms of
international trade, all the GCC members are the members of the World Trade Organization
(with Qatar being the host for the current Doha Round of negotiations) as well as some
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other free trade organizations and agreements. For instance, Saudi Arabia is also a member
of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), International Organization of
Standardization (IOS), and World Customs Organization (WCO). On the other hand, the
conclusion of a “Framework Agreement for Trade, Economic, and Technical
Cooperation,” along with bilateral agreements between the Persian Gulf Arab states and
the United States, indicate a high level of interconnectedness between these economies and
U.S.-based transnational elites. Moreover, the WTO membership of these countries has
facilitated a movement towards the Middle East Free Trade Area Initiative (MEFTA).
In terms of military institutions, four members of the Gulf Cooperation Council Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates - are participants in NATO’s
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. This military relationship in particular introduces a new
strategic linkage between the GCC’s transnational elites and the global capital, a linkage
that goes well beyond pure business interests. In his book, Arab Spring, Libyan Winter,
Vijay Parshad discusses this military relationship, and he coins the term the “Arab NATO”
(Prashad, 2012, P. 181). Evidence of this qualitatively different angle of collaboration may
be found in the extensive U.S. military presence in Qatar and in the words of Secretary
Chuck Hegel, who recently promised in Bahrain that the Pentagon “will better integrate
with GCC members to enhance missile defense capabilities in the region” (Defense
News, 2013).
However, it is important to remember that what is at stake here is not only the
military or security aspects of the Arab NATO, but the economic relationship facilitated,
and protected, under the umbrella of this military connection. Such economic relationship
is determined by the crucial position of GCC-based transnational elites in regards to the
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transnational capitalist class. In fact, one key element of this dissertation study is to further
investigate the economic rationale of selling very expensive military equipment on a large
scale to the GCC states from the perspective of the region’s transnational elites, as well as
that of the global capital. The military purchases, second only to oil and energy
transactions, appear to be a key component of the significant business activities between
the GCC capitalist class on the one hand, and the global TCC on the other. According to
Doug Stokes and Sam Raphael, U.S. military intervention is a significant angle of
American “grand strategy.” This military intervention could be indirectly projected, such
as in the case of the GCC militarization. In fact, the United States’ role as a hegemon
requires secure and reliable access to strategic resources, especially to oil resources. As
will be shown in this dissertation, petrodollars play an important role as the new strategic
resource. In fact, GCC markets operate as authoritarian vehicles for global market
accumulation, not the same thing as "liberal markets," but useful to liberal markets and
globalization due to their authoritarian policing of market structures.
According to Secretary Hegel, the United States has provided its “most advanced
fighter aircraft throughout the region” (Defense News, 2013). In other words, some of the
most advanced military technologies in the world have been given to these six countries.
Yet these military transactions have long-term non-military aspects as well. In particular,
due to the weakness of such non-military/non-authoritarian forms of power in the Persian
Gulf Arab states as education and national cohesion, the military ties render the GCC
countries dependent on continuous external and technical assistance by Western powers.
This dynamic has furthered the interdependence between the ruling elites in the GCC and
the United States.
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In summary, while this dissertation is clear that scholars should not neglect
domestic factors within Persian Gulf Arab states, it focuses on non-domestic elements as
the more influential, and yet under-studied, aspects of the regional politics in this part of
the world. Furthermore, this dissertation contends that studying the sub-region’s
transnational elites provides a balanced platform to analyze the international factors that
influence the behavior and composition of the TCC as well.
The Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation will include five chapters. This introductory chapter introduces
the theoretical framework as well as the central notions and propositions of the study. The
second chapter discusses the concept of GCC transnational elite within the new phase of
globalization in order to provide the groundwork for the third and the fourth chapters. The
differences between the former stage of global capitalism and the new form is discussed in
more detail in the context of the GCC transnational elite. Although there are important
similarities between these stages, the differences are crucial for a better understanding of
the transnational elites. In addition, the second chapter discusses the historical processes
that led to the current position of the GCC sub-region petrodollars in the global market.
The third chapter focuses on the transnational ties between GCC elites and the TCC,
in particular the role played by the U.S. and the U.K-based transnational elites and their
interactions with their counterparts in the GCC, institutionally and historically. As will be
shown in the data, the United States and United Kingdom have been and remain the most
important partners with the GCC’s transnational elites. The fourth chapter focuses on the
GCC in the context of international political economy and a number of domestic factors,
including labor politics and the domestic implications of foreign direct investments.
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Following a discussion of the GCC’s history in the context of globalization studies, this
chapter offers a broad picture of the GCC’s transnational elites and considers their
backgrounds and their use of power, which is an important root causes behind many aspects
of the economic and geopolitical status quo in the Persian Gulf sub-region.
Due to the geostrategic importance of the Persian Gulf, the state of the status quo
in this sub-region has direct impact on the larger Middle East and indirect impact on the
global production networks. Two factors are important in this regard. The first is the
significant role played by the region’s petrodollars controlled by the GCC’s transnational
elite in the Western financial markets. The second factor is the visible participation of the
GCC members in a number of influential global institutions, mainly in the area of finance
and trade, but increasingly in military institutions as well. Chapter Four considers the
militarization of GCC transnational space and some of these broader global implications
of the policies and priorities of the GCC’s transnational elite. Chapter Five concludes the
dissertation with a brief discussion of how the GCC national economies have been
integrating into the global economy through the GCC transnational elites. Using the
findings of each chapter, it identifies the main implications of this economic integration.
While one should not disregard domestic factors within Persian Gulf Arab states,
this study focuses on non-domestic elements as the more influential, and yet under- studied
aspect of the regional politics in this part of the world. It further maintains that studying
the sub-region’s transnational elites provides a balanced platform for analyzing both the
international factors and the more significant domestic factors that shape the economic and
political developments in the region.
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CHAPTER II
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A TRANSNATIONAL ELITE IN THE GCC
Introduction
During the earliest stages of the GCC’s recent economic growth consultant and
journalist Michael Field traveled to the Arabian Peninsula. He described his experiences
in his book, The Merchants, The Big Business Families of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States
(1984). A keen observer of socioeconomic structures, Field wrote, “[T]he merchant
families are part of the Arabian establishment. They dominate Arabian commercial life
and they have been responsible for as many economic innovations as the governments.
They have established most of the new Arabian investment banks, light industries and high
technology service companies. In the Gulf States, which have a tradition as trading
communities, the merchants are the most valued constituents of the ruling families; their
senior members are consulted on most important domestic political issues. In both
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states the merchants serve the ruling families in
government” (Field, 1984, P. 11).
In this chapter, I provide an overview of the dynamics of capital accumulation
within the current economic structure of the GCC. One integral part of these dynamics has
been the evolution of the relationship between the GCC states and the Western powers,
mainly the United States and the United Kingdom. Therefore, I use the first section of
this chapter to examine the strategies adopted by Western powers for dealing with the
GCC states and the emerging GCC transnational elites, and some of the reasons and
interests behind these strategies. The second component of this analysis deals with the
domestic setting of the GCC states in order to explore the other side of the structure
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of capital accumulation, as well as the role and characteristics of the GCC transnational
elites.
The Historical Evolution
Major world powers have long identified the GCC as an important geostrategic
location. Great powers have also sought to carve out new markets for themselves, as well
as to control important trade and military routes throughout this region. For example,
according to L.G. Potter, “the principal impetus for initial British entry into the Gulf was
a combination of a search for markets and an effort to deny European rivals supremacy in
the region” (Potter, 2009, P. 278). In fact, the Persian Gulf and its Arab states have long
been among the most significant geostrategic regions for great powers. Beginning with the
early sixteenth century, for around two centuries, the Persian Gulf was part of “Portugal’s
Asian Empire” (Potter, 2009, P. 278). The geostrategic appeal of the region along with
the economic interests in finding new markets attracted the Dutch and the Ottomans as
well. More recently, the context of the great power competition in the Middle East has
changed from a colonial to a post-colonial one. Even more recently, the post-colonial
intrusion of great powers into the region has been shaped by a globalization of the
transnational capital, in which, “a key aspect in the globalization is transnational class
formation” (Robinson, 2001, P. 533).
Following the demise of classical imperialism and during the post-colonial
era the legacy of imperialism has reemerged in various informal economic activities. A
key feature of these economic activities is that they “are not regulated, monitored or
controlled directly or indirectly by the states” (Routh, 2011, P. 211). Such informal
economic activities, partly facilitated by a series of international institutions such as the
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), have
accelerated new patterns of structural involvements of the great powers in other regions’
affairs. In the past few decades arguably the most noticeable economic structure that
“informal imperialism” has manifested in its various political, social and economic aspects
has been the “transnational space.” Under the current mainstream process of capitalization,
the transnational space has appeared as the most preferential climate for transnational
capital. For example, W.I. Robinson regards it to be “[t]he hegemonic fraction of capital
in a world scale” (Robinson, 2003, P. 39). This space also lends itself quite well to the
informal economic activities, especially those that rely on cheap labor and raw materials.
In the Persian Gulf, Great Britain was the first great power that recognized the
usefulness of local elites for advancing its imperialist goals in the region. This is one of
the reasons that decades after the apparent end of the British colonial presence in the
region, that country still exerts a strong influence on almost all of the smaller Persian Gulf
Arab states. From the earliest stages of British imperialism, the United Kingdom
designed the structure of its relationship with the “protected” states of the GCC in such
a way that informal imperialism was embedded in the GCC elites:
“[w]hen Britain thought it necessary to replace a sitting shaikh, it preferred to
work behind the scenes and within the ruling family. In 1923, Britain engineered
the abdication of Shaikh Isa b. Ali Al Khalifa in Bahrain and his replacement by
his son Hamad b. Isa in order to institute what it believed to be long-overdue
reforms in the country. In 1965, British officials encouraged members of the
ruling Qawasim family in Sharjah to depose Shaikh Saqr b. Sultan, a thorn in the
British side because of his admiration for pan-Arab nationalism and ties to Gamal
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Abdel Nasser and the Arab League. In 1966, Britain prodded Shaikh Zayid b.
Sultan Al Nahyan to remove his long-serving brother Shakh who was clearly
unsuitable to govern an oil-era state. In 1970, Britain encouraged young Sayyid
Qabus b. Sa‘id to overthrow his father as Sultan of Oman. (Potter, P. 283)
In the early 1970s, after Great Britain reduced its military and security engagement
in the Persian Gulf, the United States began to fill the vacuum by relying on surrogates (or
“key allies”) to ensure that oil would be delivered to the West without interruption. Iran
and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia were the key U.S. regional allies during the 1970s.
However, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 abruptly terminated Iran’s partnership with
America, which then relied more heavily on Saudi Arabia to advance its oil interests
(Potter, 2008, P. 295). Following the Iranian Revolution, in a major strategic change for
both the United States and the region, President Jimmy Carter issued the Carter Doctrine,
in which, for the first-time, the U.S. announced that it would use its own armed forces to
protect the “global” (i.e. the West’s) access to oil, instead of relying on the allies in the
region. According to Carter, “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian
Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of
America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military
force” (Carter, P. 27). The Carter Doctrine paved the way for the contemporary mode of
American militarism in the region; and due to its connection to oil from the outset, the
Doctrine is closely tied to the deeper integration of the region into the global economy.
Therefore, the Carter Doctrine can be viewed as a dividing line that marks the deeper
integration of the region into the globalized structure of transnational production. This
integration was consistent with the familiar pattern in oil-rich regions in the global south,
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where, according to D. and Raphael S. Stokes, “transnationalization is bolstered by
militarization” (Stokes, 2010, P. 3). Not surprisingly, the combination of American
strategy and the GCC’s acquiescence with it has led to the repeated use of force and the
strong presence of repressive state apparatus in the GCC region.
Following the implementation of the Carter Doctrine, the level of integration
between the West and the Persian Gulf region – with the important exception of Iran – has
increased dramatically. Subsequently, the nature of the integration has shifted from
international ties to transnational ties. In other words, there has been a deepening of
military, economic and social ties between the two sides that took place before the end
of the Cold War. Even though the end of the Cold War has often been seen as a more
dramatic transformation toward further transnationalization, the GCC region was already
well advanced in transnationalization when the Soviet Union collapsed. However, the
transformation intensified after the collapse, partly due to the very fact that the Soviet
Union no longer existed in the 1990s; therefore, it no longer stood as a barrier to the
transformation. On the other hand, after the long-term suppression of the leftist and
nationalist movements in the Persian Gulf, no significant domestic voices were in place
to call for regulation of capital so that local socio-economic structures could emerge.
Western military powers had supported the suppression of anti-capitalist voices in the
region long before even the Iranian Revolution. In fact, as an element of the Carter
Doctrine, the Rapid Development Force (RDF) was formed in order to protect the U.S.
interests in the region and to fight against any threats to those interests. The most notable
threats identified and targeted by RDF were the leftist and nationalist movements that
had the potential to bring about a regime change (Stokes, 2010, P. 91).
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To counter such movements, generous military support was offered to the ruling
elites. For instance, Saudi Arabia, the most powerful GCC state, has remained as “one of
the least free countries in the world, with political and economic power held by a very
small ruling elite. Because this rule largely rests upon American military support and
such support is contingent upon the free flow of oil, U.S. and Saudi interests have
remained deeply entwined throughout the postwar era” (Stokes, 2010, P. 88).
Throughout the process of transnationalization of capital an emerging tendency
appears to be the creation of local elites w h o have fewer and fewer ties with domestic
institutions. P. Mair believes that, in this context, the ruling legitimacy will gradually
decline while the “citizenry are becoming effectively non-sovereign” (Mair, 2006, P. 25).
It is, in fact, the nature of transnational globalization that creates non-sovereign citizenries
who are subjugated to transnational rulers. Thus, it is not surprising that the resulting
delegitimized elites need to be protected by military force, given potential socioeconomic
unrest that ensues within such an unstable state-society relationship. As a result of this
scheme, the United States continues “to put significant effort into protecting the region’s
oil infrastructure and bolstering the capacities of pro-U.S. elites to stabilize their respective
territories and repress challenges to U.S. interests” (Stokes, 2010, P. 100). To summarize,
as a consequence of both deepening economic integration and geopolitical calculations,
the role of the Persian Gulf – both as a region and as a collection of states – remains
crucial today for shaping the global balance of power within capitalism. Currently, the
decisions made by the GCC states help shape the nature of global foreign trade, investment,
and politics. For instance, the rivalry between the United States and China over acquiring
more and more economic benefits from the region has become a key component within the

34

overall economic and political dynamics of the region, and the positions that individual
GCC states take in relation to this rivalry influence not only regional but also global
economic, political, and, potentially, even military developments.
There are two dimensions to the way decisions made by the GCC states affect
global trade, investment, and politics. First is the GCC states’ own economic decisions
and behavior; second is the international economic context of those decisions and
behaviors. T he following section discusses how the GCC states’ economic behavior,
heavily influenced by the transnational capitalist principles, has evolved toward
transnational economic activities.
The Emergence of a GCC Transnational Elite
Historically, the capitalist economic structure of the GCC states has been developed
through the particular transnational ties between the GCC and the rest of the world
economy. In order to investigate the nature and impact of transnational economic
interactions between Western powers and the GCC states and the evolution of these
interactions, it is necessary to consider what, exactly, the institution of “state” entails within
the GCC countries.

In fact, the influences of old and well-established commercial

merchant families have been quite significant in the region’s political hierarchies from
the before the foundation of modern states in the Arabian Peninsula. In terms of the
historical structure and political dynamics of the societies, Lawrence Potter observes that
the “. . .tribes were the key to forming modern states in the Arabian Peninsula, and the
dynasties presently ruling there are all of tribal origin” (Potter, 2009, P. 2). These tribes
were originated based on family and blood ties. The resulting political structure has been
what M. Field observed some three decades ago about the significant role of merchants as

35

important actors in ruling “families.” As a result, important families and influential
wealthy individuals within these families have become the most significant actors in the
interactions between the West and the GCC states. Many of these families have been
both merchants and rulers at the same time. For the most part, the merchant-ruler
combination still applies to most GCC ruling families today.
On the other hand, unlike many other monarchies where the ruling family came to
power by controlling a pre-existing state, the GCC ruling families themselves created
the very institutions that govern the modern state over which they reign. Accordingly,
there is a quite blurred line between the institution of “royal family” and that of “state” in
the GCC countries.

Moreover, the mode of GCC governance appears to create a

modern/traditional dichotomy: a modern state with tribal origins. This dichotomy has
manifested in numerous ways in the process of capital accumulation. In particular, the
dichotomy provides gaps and “breathing spaces” that have facilitated the emergence of
the GCC-based transnational elites.
One of the central arguments presented in this thesis is that the roles played by the
transnational elites of the GCC are crucial to any analysis of the socio-economic and
geopolitical dynamics of this region. The GCC elites, almost all of whom come from
wealthy, politically influential families, are by far the most important agents in the political
economy of the GCC. During the past few decades they have also become important
players in global capital accumulation.

The GCC elites are directly connected to

transnational economic activities as a “class-in-itself,” meaning that these elites are
important for facilitating the global accumulation of profits. In other words, in modern
times the relationship between the Western powers and the GCC states has been
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contextualized in the development of global capitalism and the current pattern of
globalization of transnational capital; the relationship resembles that of intercorporate –
rather than international – affairs, and it is highly influenced by struggles within the TCC.
Moreover, “[g]lobal capitalism is not a collection of ‘national’ economies but the
suppression through transnational integration of ‘national’ economies understood as
autonomous entities related through external exchanges to other such entities” (Robinson,
2001, P. 533). However, the GCC transnational elites have penetrated the process of
decision making to the extent that the class is politically subordinate to the TCC.
It is common among many scholars who work on the GCC to regard the GCC elites
as nationally and/or internationally-oriented actors. It is perhaps true that, at the beginning,
the “elites” in the Arabian Peninsula had been internationally oriented. During the past
two decades, however, any international characteristic of these elites has dramatically
changed towards a transnational orientation. Arguably, what ushered in this new
transnational character of the GCC elites was the role of oil and its commercialization in
the region.
Natural resources such as oil have existed for a long time in this region; and the
ability of the local GCC elites to profit from exploiting them goes back to the time when
these elites were international elites. What has happened more recently, however, is
that the GCC elites have developed a much more embedded relationship with the global
TCC through such arrangements as expanded investment linkages (especially in finance
and oil). Therefore, these elites no longer simply function as reliable producers of
oil that is sold in the world markets. Instead, the GCC elites are the key piece of an oil
production and financial supply chain that renders them partners with Western TCC firms.
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Nevertheless, one of the most significant characteristics of these elites remains the fact that
their economic activities have always been, and continue to be, based on the sale of oil.
The emergence of transnational actors in the GCC region is not a phenomenon that
happened in isolation from the general process of transnational globalization. Neither has
it been separated from the particular development of transnationalization that has taken
place in the Persian Gulf. In terms of transnational globalization, it appears necessary to
analyze the concept based on transnational practices (TNPs) - practices that different
actors, including states, are engaged in throughout the process of globalization.
Understanding of the notion of transnational globalization is crucial in analyzing the GCC.
Elaborating this conception of globalization, Sklair writes:
“The transnational conception of globalization postulates the existence of a
global system. Its basic units of analysis are transnational practices (TNP),
practices that cross state boundaries but do not originate with state agencies or
actors. Analytically, TNPs operate in three spheres, the economic, the political,
and the cultural-ideological. The whole is the global system. While the global
system is not synonymous with global capitalism, what the theory sets out to
demonstrate is that the dominant forces of global capitalism are the dominant
forces in the contemporary global system.” (Sklair, 2000, P. 69)
Increasingly, the GCC economy has been steered toward transnationalization, with
the TNPs p l a y i n g a significant role within this region. TNPs are the “practices that
cross state boundaries but do not necessarily originate with state agencies or actors” (Sklair,
1998, P. 2). For structural reasons, TCC interests are tied to TNPs rather than to local
economic activities. A significant part of the political economy of the GCC countries is
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based on the economic activities of TNCs, rather than any domestic or national industrial,
high-tech or service sections. The direct link between the GCC states and TCC is,
therefore, obvious, as it is the members of TCC that control transnational corporations and
TNPs. On the other hand, TCC has to exert more and more power on national institutions
in order to protect and enhance its role and protect its interests.
The GCC states continue to play a significant role in the process of
transnationalization. In particular, an understanding of the notion of a transnational states
is necessary in order to properly understand the extent and the nature of TNPs in the GCC.
Robinson offers three (interrelated) propositions for the concept of state based on
“historical materialist conception of state.”
“1) economic globalization has its counterpart in transnational class formation
and in the emergence of a transnational state (henceforth, TNS) that has been
brought into existence to function as the collective authority for a global ruling
class; 2) the nation-state is neither retaining its primacy nor disappearing but
becoming transformed and absorbed into this larger structure of a TNS; 3) this
emergent TNS institutionalizes a new class relation between global capital and
global labor”. (Robinson, 2001, P. 158)
The transnationalization that has taken place in the GCC region relies on three
historical facts. The first is the presence of enormous oil and gas resources, which in turn
have invited a host of transnational corporations to the region and led the politics and
economy of the GCC to be shaped, to their very core, by transnational practices. The
“transnationalization” has occurred in two (related) directions. First, there are the
transnational practices by outside entities in the GCC region, and second, there are the
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transnational practices of the GCC elites in other regions of the world. Meanwhile, as the
political economy of the GCC has been increasingly shaped by TNPs, so has its
economic culture. Therefore, notions of production, wealth, economic activity, profit,
labor and capital, as well as social justice, are understood (or ignored) according to the
perspective of TNPs.
The second pertinent historical fact is that religious extremism has become a major
source of the legitimization of the ruling families. In the early 1960s, the World Muslim
League (WML), and, even most importantly, King Faysal, then-ruler of Saudi Arabia,
concluded that nationalism and socialism, along with secularism, were significant threats
to Islam. As a result, religion emerged as a significant instrument at the disposal of the
state to suppress anti-capitalist voices. Accordingly, the nationalism of the Nasser era
gradually gave way to various forms of pan-Islamism (Prashad, 2008, pp. 260-61).
Therefore, only conceptualizations of nationalism that included strong elements of religion
could legitimize the GCC capitalist classes as they tried to justify their rule over their
traditional societies. Religious-based conceptualizations of nationalism could, therefore,
remove

many

domestic

obstacles to establishing the capitalist principles that were

necessary for global capital accumulation.
The third relevant historical fact is the formation of a new set of class relations.
Some four decades ago Fred Holiday predicted the collapse of these authoritarian regimes
due to the exploitive economic relations that would trigger high level of dissatisfaction
among the lower classes in these six states. This prediction, however, did not materialize,
mainly because of the formation of the current class relations.
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The current nature of the working class in these states appears to be much more
complicated than what the classical framework of analysis allows for.

In all GCC

countries, a relatively high percentage of the population consists of foreign working class
who do not have any political voices whatsoever. These foreign workers often have
no stable living condition, social security or economic perspective. As a consequence the
neoliberal labor politics that has been adopted by GCC states had led to the emergence of
transnational labor class. In fact, the emergence of a transnational labor class could assist
GCC- based capitalist class to defuse the pressure they might receive from local laborers.
This would insulate the state against domestic pressure that could redirect the economic
structure towards national objectives rather than those of the TNPs.
At the same time, in none of these countries has the Huntingtonian prediction of the
middle class as the engine of socioeconomic change been realized. Indeed, a general
analysis of the middle class is rarely an accurate way to identify the characteristics of
society or to predict its behavior. For instance, in terms of literacy, which is a major
consideration for analyzing the middle class, there are many factors that can contextualize
the process of education. These factors impact the resulting middle class and the direction
and strength of the “political will” they would wield to bring about democratic changes.
The difficulty with general middle-class analyses arises, in part, from the lack of accurate
measurement indicia. For instance, it is unclear what level of schooling and college
education in the GCC would be sufficient to create a viable push for democratic processes.
On the other hand, in these countries it appears that the middle classes, by and large, believe
that their economic well-being depends upon the ruling class. The GCC middle classes rely
heavily on the rent channels that are provided and sustained by the royal families to
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maintain the status quo. This structure has been put in place over the past several decades.
As a result, a high percentage of indigenous people in the GCC are “increasingly being
distanced from the forces of production and thus sidelined into becoming a rentier
class dependent on government subsidies, rather than a distinct proletariat or middle class”
(Davidson, 2013, P. 6). This phenomenon, of course, has been contextualized within a
global context in which the “TNS seeks to create and maintain the pre-conditions for the
valorization and accumulation of capital in the global economy, which is not simply
the sum of national economies and national class structures and requires a centralized
authority to represent the whole of competing capitals, the major combinations of which
are no longer "national" capitals” (Robinson, 2001, P. 167).
The renting channels that are controlled by the GCC transnational elites could
bring about a new class formation through a series of what I call “semi-redistribution
policies.” I use the term “semi-redistribution” because of the very fact that such policies
have not decreased the gap among social classes in any notable way. As result, we
may refer to the GCC states as transnational rentier states. Th i s term refers to the
political context in which these states have been transnationalized. The term also
indicates the fact that, due to the rentier nature of the states, societies are prone to be
subjugated to the decisions of the elites, including those decisions aimed at further
transnationalization in this structure.
GCC Transnational Space
In the following sections I explain the “GCC transnational space” that has been
promoted by the GCC-based transnational elites and the TCC. To do so, it is necessary to
understand the major components of this transnational space. The first is the GCC
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Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) that are significant financial institutions (reliable sources
for TNPs) controlled by royal families. The second institution is GCC educational system
that is heavily influenced by capitalist principles. The third major component is the GCC
labor market.
Sovereign Wealth Funds
The first significant institutions are Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs). According
to the International Working Group (IWG) of Sovereign Wealth Funds, SWFs can be
defined as “special-purpose investment funds or arrangements that are owned by the
general government. Created by the general government for macro-economic purposes,
SWFs hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and they employ
a set of investment strategies that include investing in foreign financial assets” (Sultan and
et al., 2012, P. 49).
The GCC-based SWFs is arguably a clear manifestation of the “super national
economic and political institutions that begin to acquire the characteristics of a
transnational state” (Robinson, 2001, P. 533). In the GCC the empirical evidence indicates
that the conventional way of understanding SWFs may be misleading. Foremost, the
process of decision making in the GCC through SWFs transactions is, by and large, limited
to the royal families. On the other hand, the stated purpose of SWFs is to improve national
economies by preventing the Dutch Disease or by preserving the benefits of natural
resources for the future generations (e.g. through the use of the proceeds from those
resources in improving the economic infrastructures of the country). In the GCC,
however, it is not clear how much of these funds are invested in infrastructural
development. This uncertainty arises in part from the fact that “they publish no accounts,
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provide inconsistent aggregate asset figures to the media, and say nothing about their
investment strategies.”

Moreover, these funds made a “very public contribution to

propping up ailing U.S. banks during the acute phase of the 2008 global financial crisis”
(Schwartz, 2012, P. 519). Meanwhile, the Persian Gulf Arab states’ SWFs are controlled
by individual actors rather than public entities. As a result of this model of management,
these funds appear to have become an important sources of capital for personal
investments. Table 4 provides some basic information on significant SWFs in the GCC
region. It shows the enormous financial capacity of the GCC-based SWFs.

Country
UAE- Abu
Dhabi

Sovereign Fund Name

Assets as of
2012 (in Billion $) Inception

627

1976

Oil

532.8

n/a

Oil

Kuwait Investment
Authority
Qatar Investment Authority

296

1953

Oil

100

2005

Oil

UAEInvestment Corporation of
Dubai
Dubai
UAE-Abu
International Petroleum
Dhabi
Investment Company

70

2006

Oil

58

1984

Oil

Saudi
Arabia
Kuwait
Qatar

Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority
SAMA Foreign Holdings

Origin

UAE-Abu
Dhabi

Mubadala Development
Company

48.2

2002

Oil

Bahrain

Mumtalakat Holdings

9.1

2006

Noncommodity

Oman

State General Reserve Fund

8.2

1980

Oil & Gas

Table 4: The GCC Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs)
Source: SWF Asset Allocation Report 2012, Conducted by Sovereign Wealth Fund
Institute, Inc.
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GCC-based SWFs are playing a crucial role in transnationalization of capital and
(re)consolidation of the GCC transnational elites’ power in TCC. For instance, in his book,
New Post-Oil Arab Gulf, Sultan claims:
“KIA [Kuwait Investment Authority], which was established in 1953, is well
known on the international scene for its 7.1 percent stake in Daimler Chrysler
dating back to 1969 and its 3.3 percent share in British Petroleum (BP). More
recently, KIA made headlines by becoming the largest investor in the Industrial
and Commercial Bank of China ($720 million) in 2006, followed by a combined
$5 billion investment in Citigroup and Merrill Lynch in late 2007/early 2008,
among other investments.” (Sultan, 2012, P. 55)
Interestingly, the mainstream centers of the transnational capitalist class have
applauded the GCC states’ economic policies. According to an article produced in 1997
by the Middle Eastern Department of the IMF, “The GCC countries have already
completed most of the crucial stages of liberalization and financial reform.”

This

liberalization was succeeded by the creation of many SWFs in the GCC that play an
important role in returning petrodollars into the global financial market and by reinvesting
it in mostly Western countries. At the same time, these funds have appeared as a reliable
source of capital for many GCC-based financial sectors that play a decisive role in
financing the private sector of global economy by injecting large sums of cash into the
system, mainly during the periods of financial crisis, such as the one in 2008. Furthermore,
the position of the GCC elites in the TCC has been strengthened by the segmentation of
production according to neoliberalism. T he GCC elites play a significant role in the
global economy of oil and the financial transactions of petrodollars.
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GCC Segmented Education System
The second important institution is Education. The education system is not only
important as an institution itself. It also provides a good case to study that manifests the
class relations in a transnationally oriented structure of GCC. On the one hand, many of
the GCC elites are educated in top ranking private schools and colleges in the West.
This is not surprising, as the TCC members have “similar life styles,” including the
“pattern of higher education” (Sklair, 2000). On the other hand, the GCC states
embarked on ambitious educational programs that resulted in the establishment of many
Western-style schools and universities in the GCC.
It has been argued that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that
it will sustain democracy” (Lipset, 1959, P. 75). In other words, many scholars of
political change believe that democracy and economic development have a positive
correlations with each other. They maintain that an economic development that increases
levels of industrialization, higher education, and urbanization can help create the degree of
national stability necessary for a democratic system to emerge and survive. However,
despite this mainstream theory of democratization, in the GCC states solid economic
development, rapid urbanization and the dramatic rise in the number of educational
institutions have produced the exact opposite result: democracy is largely absent within
these nations, and the authoritarian regimes enjoy a high degree of stability.
The GCC education systems that were originally designed by the TCC play a
significant role in the survival of repressive state apparatuses in the GCC countries.
Arguably, one of the most significant aspects of the relationship between the GCC elites
and TCC is the educational ties between the two, which has led to further cohesion between
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them. The educational ties link the GCC elite firmly to the “social clubs” embedded within
the TCC, while, at the same time, they use rents earned from their privileged status to either
pay off, repress, or ideologically incorporate the majority of their populations.
The importance of the non-organic educational system in this region
cannot be overstated. The non-organic educational system ties the GCC elites to particular
educational opportunities that are distinct and apart from their societies. This artificially
imposed educational system has been embedded and become more and more sophisticated
in the past few decades. To provide insight into the educational background of the GCC
transnational elites, and how that background is irrelevant to the history and culture of this
region, Table 5 provides some information about a number of most influential economic
and political figures.
In terms of the domestic educational system, there are currently many Westernstyle schools in these countries.

These schools have emerged in parallel with the

immigration of many Western nationals to the GCC for high-paying job opportunities.
There are quite a number of formal

and

informal

affiliations

between

Western

educational intuitions and the GCC educational institutions. A main motivation for
these formal and informal affiliations appears to have been economic advantage to the
Western institutions. Table 6 lists some of the Western or Western-style educational
institutions in the one of the most globalized cities in the GCC, namely Dubai.
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Table 5: The Educational Background of Major Economic and Political Figures in the
GCC1
1

See the expanded version of Table 5 in appendix
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Source: Business Press and Personal Websites
School Name

Level

American International School Dubai

K-12

American School of Dubai
British National Curriculum School
Cambridge High School Dubai
Cambridge International School Al Quoz
Cambridge International School Dubai
Cambridge International School Dubailand
Cambridge International School Jumeirah Village

K-12

Curriculum
Arabic,
Canadian, US
US

K-12

UK

K-12

Arabic, UK

K-12

UK

K-12

UK

K-12

UK

K-12

UK

Collegiate American School

primary

US

Community West First School Dubai
Deans International School
Deira International School
Deira Private School
Kings College Dubai
Kings School Al Barsha
Kings School Dubai
Kings School Nad Al Sheba
Latifa School for Girls
Lycee Francais International Dubai
Lycee Francais International Georges Pompidou

primary

UK

Common Core
Standards
NC, FS1-Y2

K-12

US

AP, SAT

K-12

UK

IB, IGCSE

primary

UK

NC

K-12

UK

NC GCSE, A-Level

K-12

UK

primary

UK

NC FS KS1 KS2

K-12

UK

EYFS, NC

K-12

UAE, UK

AS, A-level, GCSE

primary

French

Lycee Francais International Meydan
Lycee Georges Pompidou Ecole primaire Dubai
Lycee Libanais Francophone Prive
Millfield School Dubai

Qualifications
MOE UAE, US HS
Diploma
AP, HS diploma
A-level, IGCSE
A-level, IGCSE

secondary French
Arabic, English,
primary
IB
French
primary
French
K-12

French
UK

Table 6: Dubai Schools with Western Curricula2
Source: DubaiFAQs guide to Dubai
This phenomenon is not at all limited to Dubai. The spread of non-local educational
systems in the region is yet another manifestation of the peculiar nature of the state in these
six countries. Not only have the GCC elite, by and large, received their education from
institutions that are geared towards the needs and interests of TCC, but the local population
also receives a type of education that endorses, and even glorifies, the educational

2

See the expanded version of Table 6 in appendix
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background of the ruling elite. It is difficult, therefore, for a graduate of these
domestic western-style institutions to question the credibility of ruling elites who are
graduates of Harvard, MIT or the London School of Economics.
The rise of foreign educational systems in the region coincided with the shift
towards transnationally oriented economic institutions. The only part of the educational
system that remains locally-oriented is the formal and informal religious education that
the GCC transnational class uses to try to gain legitimacy for their rule. The growing
chasm between these two styles of education has had serious consequences in various
areas, especially the violent extremism in the region – a subject which is beyond the topic
of this dissertation. It is sufficient to say that the “mainstream” educational institutions in
today’s GCC states rely on a class-based paradigm of development instead of serving as a
sustainable and organic infrastructure for growth and production of knowledge within the
GCC societies. At the same time, the impact of Western-style educational institutions on
the societies remains limited.

While in certain aspects, such as praise for Western

technology, these educational systems have been quite successful, in other respects the
GCC societies remain quite traditional. This creates yet another point of contrast and
potential friction with most of the ruling elite, who are often immersed in Western ethos.
This kind of educational system is primarily geared towards enabling and
protecting the interests of TCC members. As a result, it is not surprising that in many GCC
countries what we may call an institutional dual-personality exists. On the one hand, a
highly modernized and impressively globalized economic system is easily recognizable in
these countries.

On the other hand, a deeply traditional socio-political culture that

philosophically rejects many of the tenants of modernism continues to thrive beneath
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modern skyscrapers. The tension between traditional and modern perspectives is arguably
no greater anywhere than in the Muslim world. As Barry Rubin observes, “. . . no area in
the world resists - at least explicitly - globalization to an extent equaling that of the Islamic
Middle East” (Rubin, 2003, Yale Global Online). Not only globalization but also the socalled Westernization and modernization have been the target of serious criticism by many
traditional voices in the Muslim world. At the same time, some of the most advanced
institutions of the modern global economy have taken deep roots in this region’s economies
and politics, to the extent that one may argue this institutional dual- personality is the
essence of GCC polities. In such a system, the most the educational systems have been
able to do is facilitate upward mobility towards getting closer to the privileged TCC
members (or what we may call “politics of contiguity” to the sources of power and
wealth) rather than causing any major structural change in the socio-political status of
these states and societies.
In fact, the GCC’s educational systems are by design at the service of the
transnational space rather than local economies. Indeed, such educational systems could
significantly raise the level of literacy within the GCC societies. Yet, this is the type of
literacy that is not likely conducive to any democratic change; and that is why general
middle-class analyses and assessment of the so-called “democratic indicia,” such as
literacy, do not mean much when it comes to these peculiar state-societies. (I avoid the
term nation-state for two reasons: first, the notion of nation in the context of this region
is quite problematic, and it remains doubtful whether nations in the Western sense of the
term exists there; second, in the GCC region states are by far the dominant force compared
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to the societies. Therefore, I will use the term state-society instead of nation-state to refer
to these polities).
One indication of the inefficiency of the existing educational systems in bringing
about organic and viable changes is the fact that an increasing number of graduates from
these educational systems ultimately migrate and seek jobs in W estern countries or in
other capitalist economies. This phenomenon occurs precisely because these graduates
are first and foremost “global citizens” in the sense promoted by the mainstream
globalization paradigm. They feel much more at home in London and New York than they
might in their own societies. On the other hand, there are significant numbers of foreigners
who are now enrolling in the GCC schools, both private and public. For instance, “only
15% of the 374 graduates that enrolled at King Abdullah University of Science &
Technology [a university with one of the largest endowments in the world] were Saudi
nationals. Similarly, in academic year 2007-08, only 51% of Qatar Education City’s
student population comprised Qatari nationals as opposed to the 70-75% target of the
Qatari Foundation” (GCC Education Industry, 2010, P. 23). This high percentage of
foreign enrollment in the educational institutions of the region also attests to the fact that
these institutions are responsive to the educational needs of a “global” – i.e. TCC or TCC
aspirant – audience, and not the needs of the indigenous populations.
It is significant that in the same country where the King Abdullah University of
Science & Technology, one of the world’s most technologically advanced universities, has
been established, the anti-West voices are arguably the most vocal. In 2012, the Grand
Mufti of Saudi Arabia declared, “It is necessary to destroy all the churches of the region”
(Broomhall, 2012, Arabian Business). His declaration may not have much significant
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impact in practice, especially in a country where there is not much freedom of religion to
begin with. However, the declaration indicates the religious leader’s extreme opposition
to the mentality of those Saudi elites who are advocating one of the largest transfers of
technology in human history from the West to Saudi Arabia.
The traditional societies of these states are not comfortable at all with
modernization and Westernization. The history case of Iran illustrates another powerful
example of this rejection of modernization by traditional religious powers. During the
reign of the Shah, where fast Westernization and transfer of technology spawned within
deeply traditional forces an uncontrollable resentment towards the system, which led to
the Islamic Revolution of 1979. There is a certain level of truth in Rubin’s observation that
“the two factors that supposedly make globalization attractive are those of benefits and
cultural synthesis” (Rubin, 2003, Yale Global Online). However, the current pattern of
globalization, at least in the GCC region, revolves around the benefits to the TCC rather
than broader societal benefit, and it does not lead to cultural synthesis. The absence of
broader societal benefits can be found in some statistics reported in an EY study:
Only 29% of employers feel that education prepares students with necessary
technical skills and only 19% agree that it prepares young people with the right
attitude for work…72% of young people stated that parents and family are the
primary source of information about jobs.” (Perspectives on GCC Youth
Employment, 2014, P. 5)
The GCC countries offer generous social welfare systems in which education is
free, and many other social security benefits are offered. At the same time, these social
welfare systems are important means for (re)consolidation of the power of the ruling
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families and for the stability of the GCC transnational rentier states. For instance, the
accesses to the benefits are not equally provided to all. Instead, different citizens, based
on their family backgrounds and religions, have different levels of access to the
government-distributed benefits. This allows the state to channel its financial support
towards parts of the society that support the royal rule. It is not surprising that the
welfare systems in these countries are almost completely controlled by the ruling
families rather than an independent bureaucracy such as the de-centralized welfare
structure of resource wealth distribution (i.e. the Nordic model). In other words, resources
are in the hands of the royal families who decide who should have access to it and how
much access they should have. Within the domestic economy that emerges around these
transnational rentier states and their welfare systems, therefore, it is not surprising
that, for young people, connections are more important than educational background
in finding jobs.
Thus, the other aspect of the GCC’s governmental design of the educational system
is the peculiar nature and objectives of the GCC welfare systems.

Similar to the

educational systems, the welfare systems have not been designed in such a manner that
they would reduce the gaps among different social classes. At the same time, the life-style
of the ruling elites and the wealthy exacerbate the sense of social injustice among lower
classes. Thus, the concept of poverty becomes a relational concept rather than a certain
economic index that can be measured based on fixed mainstream parameters, such as
income or access to food and other life necessities. Accordingly, despite the unprecedented
economic growth and despite the relatively positive economic indexes, the highly uneven
economic statuses of different groups of citizens have created a cause for resentment. This
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resentment among the lower classes, in turn, has fueled various destructive forces ranging
from socioeconomic corruption to radicalism. In particular, corruption has been a natural
response to domestic economic systems where some are included in while others excluded
from having access to the proceeds from shared natural resources.
Labor Market
It is important to note again, that the arrangements of social classes in the GCC
countries are complicated. The arrangements become somewhat clearer when viewed as a
transnationally- oriented structure rather than the traditional nationally-oriented
framework. The following chart produced by journalist Ahmed Al Omran indicates that
unusually high percentages of the population in the GCC countries consist of foreign
workers.

Chart 1: Percentage of Foreign Workers of Total Population in GCC in 2011
Source: Borrowed from : http://www.timeskuwait.com/Times_Kuwait-3rd-highest-inexpats-numbers-in-GCC
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The dependency of the private sector in most of the GCC countries on foreign
workers has been dramatically increasing in the past few decades. Table 7 below
provides the “net migration” 3 to the GCC countries from 1980 to 2013.
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Table 7: Net Migration to the GCC Countries
Source: World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator)

According to the World Bank: “Net migration is the net total of migrants during the period, that
is, the total number of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants, including both citizens
and noncitizens. Data are five-years estimates”.
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.NETM?page=6)
3
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Figure 2: Trend Line of Net Migration in the GCC Countries
Source: World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator)
Figure 2 shows the trend line of net migration.

Despite the increasing

migration of foreign laborers to the GCC countries, which has propelled the extraordinary
economic development in the region, the living conditions of these labor forces have not
improved. The World Report 2014 by the Human Rights Watch cites many unacceptable
living conditions that foreign labors have to endure in these countries, ranging from
“unpaid wages,” “physical abuse,” “passport confiscation,” and “unsafe housing” to
“exploitation” and “servitude” (World Report, 2014). Obviously, the extent of these
problems differs from one country to another. However, the economic structures of all
GCC countries depend on cheap labor: “[f]or transnational capital, working class
immiseration is just another way to reduce cost margins as firms expand their cross-border
investment” (Cox, 2012, P. 15).
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Finally, population growth remains an important challenge for these countries – a
challenge that can exacerbate the level of inequality in the future. In a project conducted
by The Economist in 2010, it was estimated that the GCC countries will face 30%
population growth until 2020 (The GCC in 2020, 2010, P.1). Such a rapid growth requires
states to produce many more new jobs. As mentioned before, currently, considerable
percentages of the GCC working class are immigrants. (See Figure 3 below.)

Figure 3: Labor Force by Sector and Origin, 1969-2009
Source: Borrowed from https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dp/2011/1101mcd.pdf, P.5
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Even if the GCC states prove successful in the extremely difficult task of creating
so many new jobs, it is doubtful that these jobs will benefit the indigenous populations or
whether these populations would agree to fill these job positions. This is because the
current labor politics in the GCC region favors transnational labor class - who are poorly
paid and need not be protected by national regulations and policies. Moreover, the GCC
societies have benefited to various degrees from social welfare systems and from low-skill
foreign workers for so long that it i s quite unlikely that the indigenous populations will
compete with foreign workers for low-paying, low-skill job openings. Therefore, the
transnational structure of capital accumulation that is the essence of the GCC political
economies does not provide for the local population. Consequently, the job market cannot
absorb the future population growth in a way in which locals would have a standard level
of living as good as their ancestors have had.
Conclusion
“My Grandfather rode a camel, my father rode a camel, I drive a Mercedes, my son
drives a Land Rover, his son will drive a Land Rover, but his son will ride a camel” (The
National UAE, 2010). This observation by Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum, the
former vice president of UAE, illustrates how the ascendance of transnational activities
have derailed any organic political and socioeconomic structure within the Gulf States. In
other words, the modern political economy of the GCC is dominated by transnational actors
whose business activities are more compatible with the global structure of transnational
capital accumulation rather than advancing any national (or regional) economic interests.
This chapter has attempted to shed light on several aspects of the political economy
of the transnational elite in the GCC states. It is the promise of globalization that economic
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integration as well as cultural interactions can provide a ground for sustainable economic
development. At the same time, many studies of democratization tell us that
enhancement of learning and education within societies is an important stepping stone
towards democratic change. However, where the middle class and the working class are
essentially excluded from the process of decision making and the economic interactions
are micromanaged by the ruling elites, both of the above propositions are dubious.
In the GCC region, these elites are well-educated and successful in their
transnational business activities. They speak the “language of the world” (i.e. West), and
they share the “globalized (i.e. capitalist) mentality.” But when it comes to the national
and local levels of analysis, these elites, as loyal custodians of the interests of the TCC,
must play the role of controllers and shock-absorbers in their societies, insulating the TCC
from local unrest. This, in effect, has created a “race to the bottom” for further transnationalization of local economies combined with suppressive politics. What is missing,
in the words of Robert Wade, is a “strategic management of [international] trade, so as
to curb the race-to-the-bottom effects of export-led growth, and foster domestic industry
and services that would provide better livelihood and incomes for the middle and working
classes” (Wade, 2008, P.20). On the other hand, the image of transnational globalization
in the region cannot be completely understood without examining the crucial role of the
GCC-based transnational elites. This chapter provides insight into the unusual combination
in the GCC countries of the low level of development in the infrastructure of the local
economies, on the one hand, and the high level of development in transnational economic
activities. The next chapter will extend the scope of the argument advanced in this
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chapter by analyzing the transnational ties between GCC transnational structures and
those of global transnational capital accumulation.
This chapter also considered the relationship between the amount of wealth in this
region and the authoritarian nature of the ruling regimes. To understand this relationship,
one should not focus only on domestic factors. The relationships between the GCC
transnational elites and TCC have shaped the current domestic contexts for authoritarian
regimes in important ways; and because the continuation of these regimes is in the
interest of the transnational structure of capital accumulation, it is unlikely that any
democratic change materializes in the foreseeable future. As the chapter explored, the
GCC-based elites have been evolving from a national/international context to transnational
context. Accordingly, any state-centric approach or state-society frameworks that are
based upon the mainstream understanding of the notion of “state” cannot provide an
accurate understanding of many fundamental processes in the GCC region.
It is important to note that one of the recurring geostrategic aspects of the Persian
Gulf region has been the emergence of political vacuums during various historical
periods. In the early modern history of the Persian Gulf, this vacuum was filled by the
British Empire. After the British had to relinquish their power in the region in the 1950s,
the United States filled the vacuum. In Persian Gulf in History, Gary Sick writes:
“Throughout, U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region were simple and consistent,
conceived from the start in global, strategic terms: first, to ensure access by the
industrialized world to the vast oil resources of the region; and second, to
prevent any hostile power from acquiring political or military control over those
resources” (Potter, 2008, P. 295).
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In the context of this political vacuum the nature of the power that the GCC states
have is unclear. Some scholars argue that energy resources available in the GCC region
are the primary reason that the global economy should keep this region as stable as
possible. On the other hand, the geostrategic location of the GCC region is a significant
factor. While there are some truths in these assertions, the nature of state power in the
GCC countries cannot be understood without contextualizing the GCC’s transnational
elites in the TCC. It can be argued that, with the dramatic increase in the power of the
TCC in the GCC region over the past two decades it has been the transnational structure of
capital accumulation that has filled the political vacuum in that region. Accordingly, one
cannot analyze the GCC states without the significant role of its transnational elites, who
have created in the course of many decades a number of transnational rentier states.
These transnational rentier states have heavily influenced various aspects of the GCC
countries’ institutional settings including the economic, political, social, and educational
institutions.
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Appendix I: Expanded Versions of Table 5 and Table 6
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Table5: The Educational Background of Major Economic and Political Figures in the
GCC
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Table 6: Dubai Schools with Western Curricula

NAME

TITLE

ORIGIN COMPANY

INDUSTRY Education

Mahmood Hashim Al Kooheji

CEO

Bahrain Mumtalakat

Finance

Staffordshire University, Henley Business School

Qatar Al Jazeera

Media

Imperial College Business School, Tepper School of Business

Sheikh Ahmed bin Jassim Al Thani Director General
Hayat Sindi
Omar K Alghanim

Medical researcher KSA Diagnostics for All Science King's College London, University of Cambridge
Alghanim
CEO
Kuwait
Industry New York University, Harvard Business School
Industries

Abdullatif al-Othman

Governor and Chairman KSA SAGIA

Finance

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Sheikha Hanadi Bint Nasser Bin
Khalid Al Thani

Businesswoman

Qatar

Finance

London Business School, University Of London,

Mohammed Jameel

President

KSA

Retail

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Dr. Abdulrahman Al Zamil

Chairman

KSA

Bader M. Al Sa’ad

Managing Director Kuwait

Dr. Nasser Marafih
Dr. Khaled bin Abdulaziz Al
Ghoneim
Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem

CEO

Qatar

CEO

KSA

Chairman

UAE

Dr. Sultan Al Jaber

CEO and MD

UAE Masdar

Ala’a Eraiqat

CEO

UAE

Mishal Kanoo

Deputy chairman

Sheikha Al Bahar

CEO

Maha Khalid Al-Ghunaim

Chairperson and
managing director

Kuwait GIH

Dr. Naif Al-Mutawa

Founder and CEO

Kuwait

Abdul Latif Jameel
Group
Al Zamil Holding
Company
Kuwait Investment
Authority
Qatar Telecom
STC - Saudi
Telecom Company
DP World

Industry University of Southern California
Finance

Miami University

Telecoms George Washington University
Telecoms Carnegie Mellon University
Industry Temple University
Coventry University, California State University, University of
Energy
Southern California

Abu Dhabi
Finance George Washington University
Commercial Bank
Bahrain Kanoo Group Industry University of St. Thomas, Texas, American University
National Bank of
Harvard Business School, Stanford University and Duke
Kuwait
Finance
Kuwait
University
Finance

San Francisco State University

Teshkeel Media Culture and
Long Island University, Columbia University, Tufts University
Group
Society
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CHAPTER III
THE FRAMEWORK FOR CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE GCC
TRANSNATIONAL ELITES AND THE TCC CONNECTIONS
Introduction
In this chapter, I analyze the relationship between GCC elites/states w i t h i n their
own domestic and regional economies, and within the transnational capitalist class (TCC).
I will examine the historical stages through which GCC transnational elites have
established their positions within the TCC. I argue that the ascension of GCC elites/states
to global power i s based on control of the upstream section of their oil industry. In 2013,
GCC states produced 24 percent of global crude oil4. In terms of the ownership power
in oil industry, the upstream section, which consists of economic activities revolving
around exploration and production of crude oil is more important than the downstream
section that involves marketing and distribution activities. After the nationalization of oil
industries, GCC elites have been able to establish themselves as important actors in the
TCC global network by controlling the upstream section of almost a quarter of global oil
production.
The functional embeddedness of GCC elites/states in TCC is not, however,
merely a result of the role of GCC transnational elites in global upstream oil section.
GCC elites/states have also framed transnational states with an array of agents and actors
that include, above all, the capitalist entities of other members of the TCC. In this chapter,

4

Based on the data available here: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/middleeast/12302-the-oil-resources-of-the-gcc-states
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I will discuss the significant role of royal families, GCC conglomerates, powerful merchant
families, and Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) to shed some light on the network
established by GCC elites/states within TCC. This will be analyzed in particular based
on different characteristics of GCC capitalist network, including geographical
connections, business connections, and family ties. This, in turn, will show that, contrary
to widely held views, the embeddedness of GCC transnational elites in the TCC is broader
than the GCC elites/states' role in the global oil industry.
In order to better comprehend the relationship between the GCC transnational elites
and the TCC one must first understand to the structural position of the GCC in the global
structure of accumulation, especially the role of oil - and to a lesser extent natural gas - in
the global production network. The GCC is one of the crucial nodes of global oil supply.
While the production of oil is a highly complicated process, I narrow the analysis in this
chapter to an overview of the global oil production network that connects the GCC with
oil firms outside the region. In that regard, it is useful to discuss the upstream and
downstream oil activities as they involve the whole spectrum of exploration, development,
production, refining and marketing, all of which connect the GCC elites directly to Western
oil firms—which are engaged in refining, marketing and distribution of oil. The analysis
of the upstream and downstream activities also allows us to examine where the oil profits
made by the GCC elites eventually end up-i.e., the global financial and investment
institutions where the interests of the GCC elites and the Western capitalist classes meet.
With respect to oil, one watershed moment in the political economy of the GCC
was the “nationalization” of the oil industries. Although the GCC transnational elites may
not legally own the oil resources, they have extensive powers over these resources. The
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powers of the GCC elites over oil are similar to the power and control the board members
and high executives in the corporate world exert over corporate resources, even though
these board members and executives too do not legally own the corporation under their
control. The GCC states officially control the upstream oil activities, but the profits have
flowed freely to the GCC conglomerates which have used these profits to expand their
economic and political power throughout the region. Therefore the demarcation between
GCC states and GCC private sector conglomerates is more artifice than reality.
Nationalization of Oil and the Emergence of GCC Transnational Elites
Nationalization did in fact increase the power of GCC elites vis-à-vis the
multinational oil corporations in the upstream activities of global oil industry.
Nationalization had resulted in a significant and prolonged period of conflict between the
GCC states and the transnational oil firms who initially were threatened by nationalization.
However, many of the IOC firms eventually adopted and profited from this new postnationalization relationship by focusing on control of downstream oil activities. This
division of labor eventually led to cooperative ventures between the GCC states and the
transnational oil corporations. Such arrangement has shaped after a period of heightened
tension between the GCC states and the IOCs. The reason behind the uneasy transformation
of GCC oil industries is the fact that during the 40s, 50s, and 60s, the so-called Seven
Sisters controlled the whole chain of oil supplies, including the downstream and upstream
activities. However, this unilateral dominant position came to an end in the 70s and 80s,
partly as a result of nationalization movements in GCC states. The following table indicates
the ownership structure of GCC oil industries before the period of nationalization.
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Table 8: Ownership of GCC Crude Oil Production Before Nationalization
Source: http://modernhistoryproject.org/mhp?Article=FinalWarning&C=8.4
After nationalization of the GCC oil industries during the 70s and 80s, the GCC
states became the “owners” of the oil facilities used for oil production. However, once
nationalization took place in a GCC country, the International Oil Corporations (IOCs)
were forced to move into a different level of oil industry, hence IOCs’ focus on the
downstream section and, in particular, on the process of oil delivery to refineries.
Nationalization of oil industries resulted in a new business arrangement between the GCC
elites/states and IOCs: GCC states became producers of oil and IOCs were now contracting
with those states for marketing and distribution. The accommodation between the GCC
states and the IOCs occurred, then, after a period of tension and opposition gave way to
greater cooperation.
One significant historical episode that influenced the relationship between IOCs
and NOCs in the GCC in particular was the Arab Oil Embargo. During that episode, and
with the leadership of

Saudi Arabia, many GCC states started to use oil as a political
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weapon. The consequences were so far-reaching and problematic for the GCC that it led to
the realization among the GCC elites that use of oil as a political weapon is not an efficient
policy in the long run. However, the episode facilitated the IOCs’ recognition of the new
and significant role of GCC states in their respective oil industries. Despite the fact that the
Oil Embargo damaged Western economies,

non-Arab producers such as Iran and

Venezuela increased their production and eventually the global oil supply re-oriented in a
way in which Western countries were ensured a reliable access to oil for the foreseeable
future. It is noteworthy that, even though the Oil Embargo had been declared by
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), two of the funding members
of OPEC-i.e. Iran and Venezuela- did not join the Embargo. In response to the Embargo,
the IOCs established a network of concessionaries -both in downstream and upstream
sectors- so that if one part of the network became inactive or blocked, the other parts could
compensate. This new pattern proved to be quite successful as the recent instances show:
when Iran and Iraq where under comprehensive economic sanctions, Saudi Arabia
increased its production and made the global oil supply stable.
At the same time, however, GCC elites/states became fully conscious of the fact
that they were powerful agents only through business cooperation within the TCC. On the
other hand, the essential security umbrella for many GCC states and especially for the
Saudi royal family heavily depend on U.S. support. In the case of Saudis, these ties go back
as far as the agreement between President Roosevelt and Ibn Saud. Furthermore, the
historical U.S. geostrategic ties to the GCC states was eventually accompanied by greater
ties between the GCC elites and the TCC, an accommodation that followed the initial
conflict and tension brought on by GCC nationalization.
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To sum up, nationalization of the GCC oil industries, the 1973 Oil Embargo, and
the creation of OPEC created a new institutional arrangement in global oil industries where
the IOCs lost their power as sole controller of oil prices and OPEC emerged as an important
player. Furthermore, instead of disconnecting IOCs from GCC states, nationalization
facilitated functional integration between IOCs and GCC elites in which the economic
embeddedness of GCC bourgeoisie in TCC began. Meanwhile, the symbolic effect of the
Oil Embargo on Western MNCs and the recognition of GCC’s dependency on U.S. security
support by GCC elites/states transformed the conflictual relationship between GCC and
IOCs to a cooperative one.
The cooperative interaction between IOCs and GCC elites/states can be observed
in both downstream and upstream sections. After the nationalization of oil industries, GCC
elites/states became the sole owners and controllers of GCC upstream oil section. Unlike
the ill-fated Iranian Oil Nationalization that ended up in the 1953 coup, Saudi Aramco
made a gradual transition in its ownership that reduced the potential conflicts between
Saudi Arabia and IOCs. At the beginning of the process of nationalization, the agreement
between GCC states (such as Qatar or Saudi Arabia) and IOCs allowed the producing
countries to take for instance 25 percent of the share in operations, "which would rise each
year by five percent until it reached 51 percent [with compensation] paid to the
companies...for the “adjusted book value” of the facilities, not for the oil resources." The
companies would also assist in marketing the oil (Marcel, 2006, pp. 28-29). Today,
however, in places like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the upstream section of oil industries are
fully nationalized. The Saudi state-owned oil company, Aramco, has monopolized the
upstream oil section in that country and replaced the two global giants that had engaged in
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the upstream section before, namely Shell and Total. With more than $7 billion in revenue
and some seven decades of experience in the Saudi oil sector,
Shell has been a particularly important factor in Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, as a
result of the monopolization of the upstream sector by Aramco, "Shell's efforts to become
a part of Saudi's upstream oil segment have been frustrated and there are no signs of a
dramatic near-term change in state policy" (BMI Company Analysis Reports, 4/2009, P.
1181, Lexus and Nexus).In other words, the GCC oil elites have been able to consolidate
their control over the means of production in upstream sector of oil industries. The stateowned oil companies became a vehicle for protecting the private interests and for
promoting the structure of capital accumulation for the GCC elites.
In terms of downstream oil industries, some former executives of IOCs became the
board members of Saudi Aramco. For instance, the current board includes Sir Mark
Moody-Stuart (former Chairman of Royal Dutch Shell), Peter Woicke (former Managing
Director of the World Bank and Chief Executive Officer of the International Finance
Corporation), and Andrew F. J. Gould (Chairman, BG Group plc). David Kultgen, the
general counsel and corporate secretary of Saudi Aramco, is a U.S. lawyer, and has a key
position in Saudi Aramco. According to Aramco’s website, Kultgen “has concentrated on
transactional and trade law. He participated as a member of the in-house negotiating teams
responsible for several of the company’s downstream joint- venture investments, both in
Saudi Arabia and internationally, and was part of a Saudi Aramco team that supported the
Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources in the negotiation of energy-related issues
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during the Kingdom’s successful accession to the World Trade Organization"5.
Involving TCC members in Saudi Aramco and other parts of GCC oil industries made a
harmonious shift

oil industries possible in the aftermath of nationalization, as

nationalization was replaced by gradual transnationalization and the further embeddedness
of GCC elites within the TCC.

5

Borrowed from Saudi Aramco official website, available here:
http://www.saudiaramco.com/en/home/about/governance/leadership-team/david-b--kultgen.html
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Table 9: International Oil Corporations (IOCs) in GCC Source: Based on the information
available here:
http://www.virginia.edu/igpr/APAG/apagoilcompany.html
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Unlike the upstream section in which GCC states/elites became significant players
in the global oil industry, the downstream of the global oil industry is still dominated by
IOCs. In addition to the strong network in marketing and distribution that had been
established by the Seven Sisters, the technological advantage of IOCs over national oil
industries gave them the upper hand in downstream oil industries. In the GCC, and through
several joint ventures and concessionaires in the downstream section -which include
marketing and refinery sections, IOCs have been the main economic actors. Table 9
indicates just a few important business involvements of IOCs in the GCC.
The IOCs’ activities have been limited to the downstream part of the oil industries.
Saudi Arabia’s dependency on IOCs is still part of the picture, although the giant Saudi
Aramco has now started investing in the downstream section as well. Nevertheless, the
GCC oil industry constitutes a relatively small portion of the global downstream oil
industry. In the transportation sector, which is considered a mid-stream sector, Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait currently have three large tanker operators that are among the top 30
tanker transporters in the world: Vela International Marine (Saudi Arabia), National
Shipping Co of Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait Oil Tanker Co (Inkpen & Moffett, 2011, P.427).
All in all, the GCC states are not major actors in the global downstream oil industry.
The refinery capacity of Saudi Arabia only consists of 2.9 percent of the total global
refinery capacity. Kuwait has only 1 percent and the UAE 1.20 percent of the total global
refinery capacity while the U.S. stands at 18.4 percent and China controls 14.6 percent of
that capacity (BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2015, P. 16). Meanwhile the
GCC downstream section depends heavily on the technological assistance and skilled
workers (and mainly engineers) of foreign firms. Without these joint ventures, GCC states
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are arguably unable to continue their downstream activities by relying merely on their
indigenous capabilities.
The new economic ties between the GCC elites and the TCC transformed the oil
nationalization movement from a “threat” to the global oil industry to an “opportunity” for
foreign capital and the further integration of the GCC into the transnational class. From
the 1980s onwards, by controlling the upstream sector of oil industries the GCC elites were
able to expand their business activities to other sectors and to create GCC-based
conglomerates.

Nearly all these conglomerates depend on the support, skill, and

technology of the broader global business network controlled by the TCC. Today, these
conglomerates are crucial nodes of TCC capital accumulation. More importantly, many
economic activities that are considered as state economic activities are performed by these
conglomerates. This arrangement closely relates to the rentier characteristics of these states
or in Hanieh's words: "The Gulf capitalist class has emerged rapidly and in “hothouse”
fashion - from state-supported and family-based trading groups in the 1960s and 1970s to
the domination of a few massive conglomerates in the contemporary period" (Hanieh,
2011, P. 2). The following part of this chapter will analyze the process by which GCC
capital penetrated other sectors of both the GCC economies and the global economies. In
turn, the economic ties between the GCC transnational elites and the TCC have grown
stronger and more complicated than before.
Forces of Production
In the following, I will discuss the dominant forces of production within the
structure of capital accumulation in the GCC. The previous parts of the dissertation dealt
with the fact that oil has been central to the “global structure of accumulation” for the GCC
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capitalist states. This section focuses on the penetration of GCC capital to other types of
economic activities in order to show the interconnectedness between the GCC capitalists,
both within themselves and also with the TCC. Such interconnectedness is a pre-condition
for the cohesion of the GCC capitalist class. In turn, this interconnectedness is the
manifestation of the emerging role of GCC elites/states in the centralization of global
capital accumulation by TCC through transnational economic practices.
Oil is clearly a significant commodity in relation to global class struggles. In
particular, two impacts of oil should be taken into account. On the one hand, the GCC is
the "largest producer as well as exporter of petroleum and plays a leading role in the world
in general and OPEC in particular" (GCC Economic Overview, Gulfbase.com). On the
other hand, as the following chart indicates, the national revenues of the GCC countries
heavily depend on oil and natural gas resources.

Chart 2: gulf States are increasingly—and almost completely—dependent on oil
revenues for their national budgets
Source: Borrowed from:
https://www.gulfpolicies.com/media/files/Khaleej_2013_Grand_Research_Final.pdf
(P.99, In Arabic)
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From the 1970s onward all the GCC states have earned large amounts of petrodollar
surplus. Given the magnitude of these surpluses, the GCC states have not been able to
invest or spend them within the GCC. In turn, the GCC elites started investing in other
economic opportunities. The two major economic sectors that the GCC elites engaged in
have been the construction industry and the global financial sector. Up until the end of
2009, the GCC state- owned construction companies had been involved in 87 megaprojects - projects worth $150 million or more - within the GCC but not in their home
country, 40 of which involved "pan-GCC Groups." These 40 projects involving pan-GCC
groups account for 75 percent of the total project value. In this mode of GCC capital
accumulation, the UAE arguably plays the most active role given the number of its
construction projects (Hanieh, 2011). Meanwhile, the construction industry manifests the
struggles within regional classes. In other words, these kinds of investments have been
growing through increasingly complex economic ties among the GCC- based elites rather
than through the relationship between the GCC elites and TCC. Therefore, the construction
industry manifests the cohesion among the members of the GCC capitalist class. However,
in many sectors within the construction industry such as communications, IT services, final
products, and professional engineering skills the whole GCC construction industry depends
on the technological support of Western multinational corporations. Unlike the oil supply
system, the GCC construction industry is not an important node for global capitalism.
Nevertheless, with the UAE’s crucial role in the construction industry and the Saudis in oil
industry, "[The Persian Gulf] Capital is hierarchical-structured around a Saudi-UAE axis,
with other capital connected in a subordinate fashion to this core" (Hanieh, 2011, P. 2).
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In addition to the revenues from the construction industry the oil revenues have
opened another venue for the GCC capitalist class to accumulate profit. This in turn has
furthered the financialization of the GCC political economy. This financialization and the
financial activities of the GCC transnational elites are more consequential, as far as this
research is concerned, than the GCC construction industry because, unlike the construction
industry that has increased the regional cohesion within the GCC elites, the financial
activities often revolve around the economic ties between the GCC elites and the TCC. As
will be discussed in the following parts, the construction industry is controlled by a network
of merchant families close to the royal families. When it comes to the transnational
financial activities, however, the main actors are members of the royalty.
Transnationalization of GCC States
This section of the chapter aims at analyzing the nature of the relationship between
GCC elites, GCC states and GCC conglomerates. GCC states undertake rentier activities
but also engage in many transnational capital accumulation activities that are vital for
global capitalism. The structure of the 'state' in the GCC is not separate from the
socioeconomic structure of the GCC bourgeoisie. In order to better understand the position
in this structure of GCC merchant families (who are an extension of GCC royal families),
it is essential to consider the notion of a transnational rentier state. The term transnational
rentier state used in the previous chapter to describe the GCC states is in part meant to
disclose the structural weaknesses of the institutional settings in the GCC countries.
Explaining the GCC states only based on their rentier characteristic, however, may lead to
an unwarranted analytical leap. One commonly cited understanding of the notion of rentier
state in the Arab world is suggested by Hazem Beblawi that “the state or the government,
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being the principal rentier in the economy, plays the crucial role of the prime mover of the
economic activity” (Beblawi, 1987, P. 386). Beblawi does not reject the role and existence
of a “ruling class” when he introduces the notion of a rentier class that controls the wealth
of the rentier state.

However, Beblawi appears to reduce the notion of rentierism to a

social function. In contrast, while I do not reject the rentier characteristic of GCC states, I
argue that rentierism does not explain all the key characteristics of states in the GCC. In
particular, one must understand the whole structure of rentierism in association with the
demand of the GCC bourgeoisie for securing the process of capital accumulation. In order
to achieve that goal, the GCC transnational elites need a secure transnational space for
transnational capital accumulation. The result is a particular form of transnational rentier
states.
There is, of course, a 'rentier class' in the GCC. This class is maybe best understood
by viewing it as a transnational rentier class with its interests more based on transnational
practices rather than on traditional state-centric economic activities. This transnational
rentier class is the primary shaper and mover of the GCC economic structure. The social
structure that Beblawi focuses on is merely a reflection of the economic structure of
material production of GCC transnational elites. In other words, it is above all the dynamics
of capital accumulation by the GCC transnational elites that determines the social, political,
and economic systems of GCC. From the 1970s onwards, many smaller businesses that
had interaction with the oil industries merged together and became a conglomeration of
business networks. This process in the GCC has led to a fast growth of construction and
service firms that are naturally the extension of the GCC elites' capital accumulation based
on the considerable surplus value of oil revenues. These radical capitalist expansions in
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turn have changed the balance of power among different players in the GCC and today the
global conglomerates are part of the GCC ruling system, as Adam Hanieh sharply puts it:
"The Gulf capitalist class has emerged rapidly and in “hothouse” fashion—from
state- supported and family-based trading groups in the 1960s and 1970s to the
domination of a few massive conglomerates in the contemporary period. Most
significant—and the key characteristic of the region’s political economy
examined in this book—is the pronounced internationalization of Gulf capitalism
over the past decade. Large Gulf conglomerates now conceive their profit-making
activities across the entire GCC rather than solely within its individual memberstates. They own stakes in a wide variety of industrial, financial, and retail firms
located throughout the region." (Hanieh, 2011, P. 2)
The following table includes some important GCC conglomerates that perform a
variety of economic activities. In a number of scholarly works, and especially those based
on the rentier school of economics, these economic activities are simply considered state
economic activities. There is some evidence to support such a view. Most importantly,
almost all these conglomerates are owned and controlled by the members of the GCC
transnational elites - the same network that also created states to protect and promote its
own interests. However, it may be oversimplifying to ignore the rising corporate power in
the political economy of GCC. To provide some perspective with respect to this corporate
power, Table 10 shows ten conglomerates in GCC that monopolized many aspects of GCC
economy.
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Table 10: Important GCC Conglomerates and their Activities
Source: The Official Websites of Each Conglomerate
The above conglomerates are in essence capitalist agencies that maintain two kinds
of social relations: they interact with the GCC capitalist class and connect the GCC
transnational elites to TCC. For instance, the Fakhro Group, which is owned by Fakhro
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family of Bahrain, has business arrangements with such global corporate players as
Dongfeng Motor Corporation (a Chinese giant corporation), McDonalds, LG, Sony,
OKI, Ericsson, Budget, Avaya, Aastra, Softex, MK Electric Co., Brand Rex Ltd., Morley
IAS, Honeywell, ABB, GAC logistics, and Mobil6.
As another example, the Kanoo International Property Broker's main economic
activity is to provide services for global consumers who are purchasing properties with the
"specific focus on the UK."7 One subsidiary of the Kanoo group, also based in Bahrain, is
Maersk Kanoo, which serves as agent for Maersk group, a Danish conglomerate
represented by Kanoo group in the GCC. The globally oriented approach of Kanoo is
evident on their website, which states "[m]ainline services from the United States, Europe
and the Far East call at Jebel-Ali port every week. The port serves as a transit point for the
Middle East and is a dedicated feeder network that offers coverage to all ports in the Gulf."8
In its Arabian Equipment Rentals enterprise, Kanoo Group has partnership with Sykes
group in the United States. The largest insurance company in the GCC, AXA Gulf
Insurance, is a subsidiary of Kanoo group. This company is also a part of the overseas
operation of the French multinational corporation, AXA. Dallah group, which was
established by the Kamel family, is known as an “Islamic conglomerate.” It engages
in many Islamic economic and financial activities including Islamic banking and Islamic
insurance. In terms of economic activities, Dallah is one the most diversified

6

http://www.fakhro.com/

7

http://kanoo.com/partners/kanoo_property.aspx

8

http://kanoo.com/partners/maersk.aspx
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conglomerates in the region. Another conglomerate in the region belongs to the Bin Laden
family, which is one of the merchant families in Saudi Arabia closest to the Royal Court.
Given the atrocities and devastations that Osama Bin Laden, a member of this family,
caused in the Muslim world and in the West, it is not surprising that controversial claims
and allegations have been leveled against the Bin Laden conglomerate. Some maintain
that the family has had secret ties with the Western capitalist class despite its continued
support for Osama Bin Laden. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 shed some light on some of the
family’s previously quiet business ties. For instance, on October 26, 2001, Kurt
Eichenwald published an article in the New York Times, entitled "Bin Laden Family
Liquidates Holdings With Carlyle Group." The article states that, "the Saudi family of
Osama bin Laden is severing its financial ties with the Carlyle Group, a private investment
firm known for its connections to influential Washington political figures. . . ."9 This action
was probably taken in response to the 9/11 attacks.
The Al-Ghurair group, based in the UAE, has spread its economic activities in four
continents and around twenty countries. Its economic activities include such diverse
sectors as "Foods, Construction, Resources and Properties, with additional sector
participation in Energy, Printing, Retail and Education."10
Jafza, a subsidiary of Dubai World group, "is a dynamic base for thousands of
businesses, from over 100 countries, sustaining over 135,000 jobs and attracting more than

9

http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/26/business/bin-laden-family-liquidates-holdings-with-carlylegroup.html
10

http://www.al-ghurair.com/en/the-group/
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20% of the UAE’s foreign direct investment; all the while exceeding 50% of Dubai’s total
exports, with a phenomenal value for trade of $69 billion."11
The Al-Futtaim family from the UAE has an interesting history. The family’s
business was struggling during the 1940s and 1950s. At the time it had certain political
conflicts with Al-Makoutm family, the ruling family of Dubai. The conflict resulted in the
exile of Hamed al-Futtaim, a prominent member of the family. However, they later
managed to regain their economic position by cooperating with the al-Maktoum family.
Al-Futtaim Private Company LLC, through its subsidiaries, owns and operates
commerce, industry, and services businesses. It uses a network of showrooms to distribute
passenger and commercial vehicles manufactured by Toyota, Lexus, Hino, Honda, Volvo,
Chrysler, Jeep, and Dodge. It also sells construction equipment, and provides used car
sale, rental, and leasing services. The company distributes Panasonic, Toshiba, Sanyo, and
AFTRON products that are offered through a network of re-sellers, mass merchandisers,
channel partners, and retail outlets of branded stand-alone stores. It provides solutions to
the building and construction industry in the UAE and lower Gulf region. Additionally,
the company represents retail brands including Marks & Spencer, IKEA, ACE, Toys “R”
Us, and Intersport, as well as offering fashion, sportswear, watches, and jewelry products
through a network of its retail outlets. The company also serves investment banking, equity
broking, and fund management sectors through specialist companies, joint ventures, and
associations. Its logistics, travel, advertising, training, IT and systems, ship and rig
repair, and materials -testing services support the company’s core business verticals. It

11

http://jafza.ae/about-us/our-history/
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also offers development, procurement, construction, and leasing services for real estate
projects. The company was formerly known as Al-Futtaim Group. Al-Futtaim Private
Company LLC is based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.12
The above examples of conglomerates are all owned by prominent Arab families,
some of which are themselves members of the royal families; the rest are connected to
GCC royal families. For instance, the chairman of Kingdom Holding Company, Prince alWaleed Bin Talal, who is dubbed “the richest Arab in the world,” is the grandson of Ibn
Saud, the founder of Saudi Arabia. Likewise, the chairman of Dubai World is Ahmed bin
Saeed Al Maktoum, who is the uncle of the ruler of Dubai, Mohammed bin Rashid Al
Maktoum. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the merchant families who control the significant
GCC conglomerates have economic or family ties with the GCC royal families. The black
lines in the Figure represent familial ties.

12

http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=13011365
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Figure 4 13: The Economic and Family Ties Between Merchant Families and Royal
Families in GCC
Sources: Based on data and information in the websites of mentioned conglomerates,
business press, and scholarly resources 14
13

Most probably there are more connections than the figure is indicating. These connections are
based on the reliable resources and sufficient to indicate the fact that GCC economy is merely a
family business, controlled by GCC capitalist class.
14

Rush, Alan. Al-Sabah: History & Genealogy of Kuwait's Ruling Family, 1752-1987. Garnet &
Ithaca Press, 1987. Hertog, S., Luciani, G., & Valeri, M. (Eds.). (2013). Business politics in the
Middle East. Hurst Publishers. Sabri, S. (2001). The House of Saud in commerce: A study of royal
entrepreneurship in Saudi Arabia. Sharaf Sabri. Gause, F. G. (1994). Oil monarchies: domestic
and security challenges in the Arab Gulf states. Council on Foreign Relations.
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The above network indicates the economic and familial ties between the GCC
merchant families, who control the GCC conglomerates, and the GCC royal families. The
network does not include the economic and familial ties within the GCC royal families and
the similar ties within the merchant families. In fact, there are many economic and familial
ties within the GCC royal families that are rooted in the old relationships between the ruling
tribes in the Arabian Peninsula. For instance, the Saudi ruling family of Aal Saud, the ruling
Al- Sabah family of Kuwait, and the ruling Al-Khalifa family of Bahrain all “belong to
Onaiza tribe and have originated from the central part of the Nejd" (Sabri, 2001, P. 22).
Some of the key merchant families are connected to each other through both economic and
familial ties:
“The Hijazis merge[d] with. . .the non-Arabian. . .immigrants. These people are
Hindus and Indian Muslims, Persians and Hawala - 'wonderers.’ The members
of the last group are Sunni Muslims who left Arabia several hundred years ago,
lived in Iran and became partly Persianised and have since returned to the Arabian
side of the Gulf. Needless to say the Hawala, who include the Kanoo, Almoayed
and Fakhroo families of Bahrain, are nowadays at pains to the brevity of their stay
across the water. They are regarded by all parts of the population as being very
much more Arabian than the other long- standing immigrants”. (Field, 1984, P.
75)
Generally speaking, the religious belief and tribal background of important families
determine their position in the hierarchy of political and economic power in the GCC. For
instance, the Sunni background of such groups as Kanoo and Fakhro has helped them to
establish their business position in Bahrain. Interestingly, the majority of Bahrainis are

95

Shia, but the ruling family is Sunni. It is true that the merchant families that control the
GCC conglomerates have limited influence on politics. However, they have sufficient
access to the royal families based on economic or family ties to become important part of
GCC capital accumulation.
The above-mentioned conglomerates also connect the GCC capitalist class to TCC.
The generous financial and political support of the GCC royal families facilitated the
growth of interconnectedness between GCC conglomerates and other markets all around
the globe. Figure 5, which is based on Table 9 above, clarifies the geographical
interconnectedness.15

15

For more details on GCC conglomerates economic ties with multinational and transnational
corporations see the Appendix.
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Figure 5: The Geographical Networks of GCC Conglomerates
Source: Based on Table 1
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The Financial Power of the GCC Elites
The GCC’s recent state of political economy suggests a growing tendency within
the GCC elites to promote economic diversity beyond oil - in particular, they seek to
develop the financial sector of GCC capitalism. Although oil remains the lynchpin, the
clear preference is now the global investment sector. The GCC elites have invested their
wealth in a wide variety of businesses and with other dominant capitalist actors. Overaccumulation along with financialization have resulted in new and strong ties between the
GCC transnational elites and the TCC.
These new economic ties have resulted in the dramatic expansion of local
bourgeoisie who are quite powerful on the regional level. The previous section discusses
how the GCC conglomerates strengthen the economic ties between the GCC bourgeoisie
and multinational corporations.

One result has been the growth of local, regional

conglomerates, semi-factories and construction facilities that are completely dependent on
the skills and technology of the foreign bourgeoisie.
This section will look more closely at the financial activities of the GCC
transnational elites, which manifest a new phase of economic connections between the
GCC elites and the TCC. To a certain extent, financialization in the GCC indicates more
crucial and stable ties between the GCC elites and TCC. While the important merchant
families in the region control the GCC conglomerates, it is the royal families themselves
who directly engage in important businesses with Western financial firms using the
financial power of SWFs controlled by these royal families.
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The Historical Background of GCC Financialization
This study focuses on the financial ties of the West-GCC relationship. New
partnerships independent from oil and gas have been developing over the past decades that
render the significance of changes in the global energy market relatively less important.
The growing significance of the GCC petrodollars in the “financialization of production”
has been central to this process. The term "financialization of production" is in part, the
manifestation of increasing reliance by TCC firms on global financial assets to buttress
profit margins. The U.S. foreign policy in the GCC is colored by the economic interests
of the U.S. capitalist class. In turn, the common interest of the GCC elites and the TCC in
terms of capital accumulation have led to the structural penetration of financial
globalization into GCC’s political economy. This structural shift has been formed by the
dominant social strata within global capitalism and in the Arabian Peninsula, i.e., the GCC
transnational elites.
Accordingly, analyzing the characteristics of the GCC elites in terms of financial
globalization is crucial to better understand the status of these transnational elites within
the TCC. Any discussion of the GCC elites without paying attention to the rise of global
finance would be an oversimplification. Thus, it is important to analyze the financial
characteristics of the GCC states themselves in their interactions with Western countries,
the global private sector, and certain global institutions. Using this framework, one can
trace the position of the GCC transnational elites within the global financial system. This
section will also examine the GCC states’ domestic financial system and, in particular, the
extent to which the GCC’s financial systems depend on the GCC oil sectors.
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The Essence of the GCC’s Financial Power
Structurally speaking, two impacts of oil should be taken into account: the need of
industrial powers to have reliable access to oil and gas and the simple fact that extraction,
processing and export of oil and oil derivatives bring a large amount of capital surplus. In
the previous section, I discussed in detail the need for industrial powers to retain access to
oil and gas. This section addresses the characteristics and power dynamic of the capital
surplus, which gives considerable power to the agents who control oil. In the case of the
GCC states, those agents are the royal families. (See Chart 2.)
The GCC transnational elites have invested their considerable surpluses in the
global financial sectors, and the rise of electronic platforms for financialization of
production has greatly helped them in this regard. In addition to access to oil revenues, the
structural forces that emerged within the TCC have also directed the GCC elite
towards engaging in financial activities.
The earlier pattern of the West-GCC oil relations was mostly about the demand for
oil itself, where the dominant paradigm of global production was industrialization. In the
current phase of industrialization, petrodollars remain a substantial, if not inseparable, part
of the new mode of accumulation, i.e. financialization of production. A notable distinction
between the previous mode of accumulation and the new one is the growing
significance of financial activities of the TCC that could bypass the interests of states - at
least the interest of states in the Realist paradigm that conceptualizes the “state” as an
autonomous entity. Using financial activities, the GCC has been considerably more
successful in advancing and protecting its own business goals. Furthermore, technological
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changes have allowed a “digital techno-economic paradigm” rooted in Information and
Communications Technologies (ICTs).
For the new mode of accumulation, oil is not merely a fuel that is necessary for
manufacturing, transportation, or providing the basic needs of human societies. The oil
revenues in the form of petrodollars are also used at the heart of the global private financial
sector. The previous chapters briefly discuss some financial transactions of oil revenues
by the GCC, notably SWFs. This chapter explores how petrodollars feed the global
financial sector and private financial firms.

Before further analysis, however, it is

necessary to consider a series of historical facts that have led to the current financial
position of the GCC in global capitalism.
The collapse of Bretton Woods strengthened the ability of TCC actors to expand
their capital investments and financial ties on a global scale, with the support of states and
at the expense of the working class. In post-Bretton Woods era we are witnessing a process
of state and TCC-led global financialization that was a response to a crisis of the previous
capital accumulation regime (a persistent falling rate of profit). In the GCC, the state had
never functioned in a classical sense and states have been always dominated by the ruling
classes of the region. But the efforts of the TCC, working with powerful Western states
led by the United States, has been deregulating the global finance that contributed to
broader global alliances between the TCC and the GCC elites/states. State functions did
not diminish; they were redirected for the benefit of transnational capitalist actors who felt
that the previous Bretton Woods arrangements were too restrictive and undermined profits.
Most TCC interests previously supported the Bretton Woods system until the
contradictions of that system proved difficult to sustain profits. Then they aggressively
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lobbied states to reduce costs by policies that weakened labor, reduced regulation, and
employed tax breaks, tax havens and the use of global institutions like the IMF and the
World Bank, as well as U.S. state power to expand opportunities for foreign investment
and financialization at lower costs. The eradication of autonomous functions of states in
the West led to the emergence of “neo-liberal states” that are supporting the embedded
relationship between the GCC transnational elites and other capitalist states/classes.
At the same time, the process of neo-liberal financialization has been accelerated
by the formation of a new techno-economic paradigm that is based on digital technologies.
New technologies have helped reduce the pressure of labor markets on the TNCs by
making the large part of global labor market more competitive than ever. With the lack of
state intervention or an empowered working class, an attractive environment became
available to the TNCs, inviting them to shift their resources to the financial sector. At the
same time, the private financial sector had the great advantage (compared to private
industrial sector) that states could conveniently support them without inviting the objection
of powerful labor unions. In the United States, one indication of this state support may be
found during and after the recent financial crisis, where the government embarked on the
so-called ‘national bailout’ of certain financial institutions. According to David Harvey,
“The term ‘national bailout’ is. . .inaccurate, because they’re not bailing out the
whole of the existing financial system – they’re bailing out the banks, the
capitalist class, forgiving them their debts, their transgressions, and only theirs.
The money goes to the banks but not to the homeowners who’ve been foreclosed
on, which is beginning to create anger. And the banks are using the money not to
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lend to anybody but to buy other banks. They are consolidating their class power.
(Harvey, March/13/2009, counterpunch)
The distinction between national and global financial circuits is becoming more
blurred and diffuse. Therefore, state policies have transnational implications, including the
U.S. “bailout” of financial firms, which included transnational firms and actors from a wide
range of nationalities, such as investors within the GCC. Thus, the GCC was becoming a
much more integrated part of transnational capitalist activities, represented by the
investment of petrodollars in the most globally competitive transnational banks.
Following the 2008 financial crisis, GCC SWFs were utilized by Western banks as a
conduit for investment. It is especially important to note that GCC capital in primarily
U.S. banks and in the Eurodollar market was an important countervailing source of revenue
for U.S. banks during the 1980s debt crisis in Latin America. In other words, the GCC
SWFs have become significant sources of support for the TCC to alleviate the pressure of
financial crises on global capital accumulation.
In the GCC a similar structure emerged although with certain differences. In this
regard, the main distinction between the GCC states and Western capitalist states is the fact
that there is no clear line between the state - i.e. the royal families - and the relevant nonstate actors - wealthy merchants. As discussed before, the family-oriented states of the
GCC has legitimized an institutional setting in which influential actors can be both
merchant and politicians at the same time. In contrast, in the United States, business actors
and political actors are often connected through complex institutional channels, such as
lobbies, power clubs and fundraising platforms. In the GCC states the connection between
economic and political actors is often arranged around important families through ties of
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kinships and cross-marriages. These patterns create an easy path for development of
‘transnational practices’ and for further capital accumulation with no significant pressure
from the society.
Similar to domestic dependency on oil revenues, the international economic
activities of the GCC have pretty much been operating with the financial backbone of
energy resources. According to the following chart, in the past few years, the GCC’s oil
supply has been more than 20 percent of the world’s total supply. At the same time, an
overwhelming percentage of the GCC states’ general revenue depends on absolute and
semi-oil revenues (82 percent of UAE’s, 90 percent of Bahrain’s, 93 percent of Saudi
Arabia’s, 87 percent of Oman’s, 70 percent of Qatar’s, and 94 percent of Kuwait’s).16
Furthermore, the amount of the GCC’s petro-dollars has increased “to levels greater than
the absorptive capacity of producer national economies can accommodate" (Ehrlich, 1980,
P. 97).

Table 11: GCC Total Oil Supply (Thousand Barrels Per Day)
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

16

https://www.gulfpolicies.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1475&Itemid
=455, in Arabic
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The large oil supply-see table 11- and the inability of the GCC’s economic
structures to absorb these revenues have brought revenue surpluses to this sub-region.
Therefore, it is important to analyze the structural responses of GCC transnational elites to
these surpluses. According to one of Deutsche Bank’s reports on internal GCC financial
markets, “[i]n a global comparison, finance in the GCC has remained small” (Deutsche
Bank, 2012, P. 9). GCC-based financial markets are not important when compared to
global centers of financial activities such as London or New York. The transnational
financial activities of the GCC elites in other regions are considerably higher than their
intra-GCC activities. In particular, the GCC elites have used their financial power to help
maintain the hegemonic position of the U.S. dollar in the global economy. According to a
report produced by Deutsche Bank:
“In the GCC economies, the overall volume of assets managed by institutional
investors is large and compares with global institutional assets. Their total value
stands at an estimated USD 3.6 tr, which corresponds to around 370% of GDP in
the region, i.e. significantly above the global average of institutional assets to
GDP of around 230%. GCC institutional assets amount to 2.5% of the institutional
assets under management globally, two-and-a-half times the region’s share in
global GDP. The distribution of this very high volume of institutional assets in
the GCC follows a pattern that underlines the continued strong presence of the
state and wealthy families in the region: More than two-thirds of all institutional
assets are held by state-sponsored vehicles. . .69% of the institutional assets in
the region are administered by state-sponsored investors, including 45% held
by sovereign wealth funds, 19% in official reserves, and 5% by other
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government-sponsored enterprises.” (Deutsche Bank, 2012, P. 20, [“footnotes
omitted”])
One main distinction between financial systems in the West and those in the GCC
is the fact that the GCC financial system is heavily dependent on oil revenues, and as such
is not a separate, independent sector of the economy. Similar to other sectors of the GCC
economies, the GCC states do not seem to show infrastructural diversification even after
decades of so-called development. All the sections of the economy are still dependent on
oil. Therefore, what is shifting in the GCC is not merely financialization, but along with
the GCC investments in the industrial private sector, we observe the use of oil revenue in
the global financial sector by GCC transnational elites. It is worth noting that both kinds
of investments - financial and non- financial - are materialized through the economic ties
between the GCC bourgeoisie and the TCC.
Small Financial Sector, But Important
The GCC does not have an independent financial sector, unlike its energy sector.
In other words, the GCC financial sector heavily relies on the oil sector. The other issue is
the size of the GCC-based financial systems in contrast to the size of global financial sector.
The GCC financial section is generally speaking small. But, when it comes to the role of
SWFs in TCC financial institutions, GCC finance plays a crucial role. The SWFs have seen
a significant growth trend of investments in TCC financial institutions. To better
understand the weakness of GCC-based financial sector, Table 12 shows the percentage of
domestic credit provided by the financial sector in GCC, which is considerably lower than
the total amount in the world.
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Country Name

2013
-7.876053

Saudi Arabia
United Arab Emirates

NA

Oman

36.155621

Kuwait

52.841319

Qatar

73.854542

Bahrain

78.35019

GCC Average

48.240334

European Union

145.1

OECD members

202.7

East Asia & Pacific

149.8
166.2

World

Table 12: Domestic credit provided by financial sectors (% of GDP) 17
Source: World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/topic/financial-sector
Thus, the GCC financial sector is not powerful in comparison with the Western
financial sector. However, this does not mean that the GCC is not an important player
within financial globalization. In fact, the GCC-based SWFs that are controlled by
individual GCC elites-royal families have been playing an important role in supporting

17

Domestic credit provided by the financial sector includes all credit to various sectors on a gross
basis, with the exception of credit to the central government, which is net. The financial sector
includes monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other financial corporations
where data are available (including corporations that do not accept transferable deposits but do
incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits). Examples of other financial corporations are
finance and leasing companies, money lenders, insurance corporations, pension funds, and
foreign exchange companies. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.DOMS.GD.ZS
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Western financial institutions during difficult times such as during and after the 2008
financial crisis. The support of non-GCC financial institutions by the GCC financial
powers was not limited to Western firms. Instead, it seems that during this last global
financial crisis, the GCC intended to become a significant financial player on the global
scale.
But despite its global motivations the GCC has not been able to improve its financial
sector. This failure has been one of reasons why the GCC has not suffered from the
implications of financial crisis. On the one hand, the GCC’s petrodollar surplus has
compensated for the deficit in economic sectors that had been influenced directly by the
crisis. On the other hand, there is no properly designed financial sector that could influence
the whole economy of the GCC countries. Instead of propping up domestic economies, the
GCC’s petrodollars were transferred to important global financial corporations. The
following table shows important transactions involving the GCC during the financial crisis.
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Date

Target
Company

10/31/2008

Barclays

10/16/2008

Credit Suisse

1/15/2008

Citigroup

Sovereign Wealth Fund(s)

Investment size in US $
(Percent stake in target)

Abu Dhabi Royal Family; Qatar
Holding; Challenger Universal US $11.8 billion (31.5 %)
(Qatar)
Qatar Investment Authority
US $2.2 billion
(QIA)
GIC(Singapore), KIA (Kuwait),
Prince Alwaleed bin Talal (Saudi US $12.5 billion (9.3%)
Arabia)
Korea Investment Corporation
(S.Korea), KIA (Kuwait), Mizuho
Corporate Bank (Japan), et al. US $6.6 billion (14.5%)

1/15/2008

Merrill Lynch

11/27/2007

Citigroup

Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority (ADIA)

US $7.5 billion (4.9 % stake)

11/7/2007

Apollo

Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority (ADIA)

9% (amount not disclosed)

10/30/2007

Och-Ziff

9/20/2007

Carlyle Group

Dubai International Capital
(DIC)
Mubadala (Abu Dhabi)

US $1.26 billion (9.9%)
US $ 1.25 billion (7.5 %)

Table 13: GCC-SWF Capital Infusions into Financial Institutions
Source: Barrowed from Table 2, Review of SWF Capital Infusions Into Financial
Institutions
(May 2006- June 2009),
(Sauvant et. al., 2012, P. 45)
Arguably, more important than the amounts of money transferred from the GCC to
these financial corporations is the crucial role that has been played by the GCC elites in
saving the process of financial globalization by exerting substantial political and economic
power. This is parallel with what happened within the Western capitalist systems through
the same financial institutions that the GCC had investments in. According to Joseph
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Stiglitz, the "political action committees and employees of securities and investment gave
$156 million in political contributions in the 2008 election cycle. Goldman Sachs,
Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and Credit Suisse gave $22.7 million and
spent more than $25 million combined on lobbying in the period" (Stiglitz, 2010, P. 343;
note that in 2009 Merrill Lynch was officially acquired by Bank of America). During the
same election period, Barclays, Apollo Global Management and Carlyle Group spent more
than $4.5 million on lobbying.18 While the content of these lobbying activities may not be
all clear, one obvious outcome has been the overall support of the U.S. government for the
U.S. financial sector, instead of placing further restrictions and regulations on financial
activities that brought about the crisis in the first place. The state provided generous loans
to the private sector under the rationale that institutions such as AIG were “too big to fail.”
As for the GCC’s involvement, it may be added that they started investing in Western
corporations when these corporations were on the edge of collapse - that is, at a time when
no other business actor seemed interested to invest in financial firms. These investments
may be explained by an interest in protecting class power and in further re- consolidation
of the TCC and capital accumulation.
The above-mentioned financial activities show the depth of the financial ties
between the GCC transnational elites and TCC. The real significance of the GCC financial
sector is its role in protecting and promoting the interests and position of the GCC
transnational elites - a position that can be elevated by protecting the financial interests of
the TCC.

18

data are available at http://www.opensecrets.org/
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The GCC’s Role in Global Financial Institutions
David Harvey describes the 2008 financial crisis "as a class event in which a certain
structure of exploitation broke down and is about to be displaced by an even deeper
structure of exploitation" (Harvey, March/13/2009, counterpunch). The previous
discussion regarding the GCC’s financial involvements in the 2008 crisis suggests that
Harvey’s description may have some merit. As Harvey had predicted the outcome of the
crisis, neo-liberalism has successfully survived the crisis if we consider it as a "class
project." Eventually, the financial firms could convince the necessary decision-makers
about the validity of the discourse of "too-big-to fail." The two aspects of Harvey's
explanation - the “class project” nature of neo-liberalism and the deeper structure of
exploitation - are arguably manifested in the transaction between the GCC transnational
elites and their TCC counterparts. The role of Saudi Arabia, in particular, has been
considerable within the global financial system in a way in which Saudis' assistance to
capitalist institutions has become crucial.
The GCC also has a significant role within global financial institutions. Saudi
Arabia is among the eight executive members of the IMF along with the United States,
Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, China and Russian Federation. Compared to
the other executive members, Saudi Arabia’s small financial sector is almost completely
framed by external advisory groups such as the World Bank's Technical Cooperation
Program (TCP) and International Finance Corporation (IFC). According to an IMF report,
"IFC is working closely with Saudi public institutions and International Financial
Institutions (IFIs) to undertake global initiatives that benefit private sector activities in
developing countries. So far, these efforts have resulted in obtaining commitments of over
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US$500 million" (Staff Report For The 2-14 Article IV Consultation-Informational Annex,
P. 4). With the leading role of Saudi Arabia, the GCC participates in some significant global
arrangements, mostly through the IMF and the World Bank.
In terms of the IMF, Saudi Arabia agreed to assist in implanting certain financial
strategies such as the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) and the New Arrangements
to Borrow (NAB). Under GAB:
“. . . member countries are enabled to borrow specified amounts of currencies
from eleven industrial countries (or their central banks), under certain
circumstances, at market related rates of interest. As at the beginning of 2002, the
potential amount of credit available to the Fund under the GAB totaled SDR 17
billion (around US $22 billion), with an additional SDR 1.5 billion available under
an associated arrangement with Saudi Arabia”. (Shekhar, 2009, P. 479)
As seen in to Chart 3, Saudi Arabia is the eighth contributor to the IMF among 38
IMF members. GAB was initiated in 1962; however, its framework has been changing
since its inception. GAB is one of the IMF tools for stabilizing the global financial system.
It was used particularly after the recent financial crisis. GAB has been criticized as a
vehicle for re-consolidating the power of the Group of Ten over the Global South. NAB,
on the other hand, has been established in order to increase the power of GAB, and further
protect the hegemonic position of the G-10 within the financial system.
According to another IMF report, "[i]n June 1995, the Group of Seven summit
meeting in Halifax, Canada called on the Group of Ten (G-10) and other countries with the
financial capacity to support the international monetary system to develop financing
arrangements with the aim of doubling as soon as possible the amount of currency available
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under the GAB."19 Because China is the third largest contributor to the IMF, it was believed
at the time that China could "easily arrange coalitions that could block the borrowing
facility if that was in its interests," thereby derailing the IMF efforts to rehabilitate the
global financial system (Heep, 2014, P. 125). Saudi Arabia is not among the G10 states,
but it is one of the G20. Saudi Arabia mad a sizable contribution to doubling the size of
GAB (through the creation of NAB) - a contribution more than the combined contribution
of four members of the G10, including the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland
(see the following chart). This sizable Saudi contribution alleviated some concerns about
China’s potential undermining of the IMF’s efforts. Despite Saudi's generosity, the country
has never been rewarded with decision-making powers in global financial institutions such
as the IMF.

19

https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1997/PR9705.HTM
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Chart 3: Amount of Contributions in NAB by Country
Source: https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/gabnab.pdf, based on the data on
page1, NAB Participants and Credit Amounts, 201
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The Neo-Gramscian understanding of the hegemonic power explains why, despite
Saudi Arabia’s exclusion from the decision-making process, it has made

sizeable

contributions to the IMF. According to Neo-Gramscian theories a mutual acceptance
of the hierarchy of power between the global south and the global north is pivotal in the
establishment and endurance of the hegemonic power. The mutual acceptance of the
hierarchy functions as a shock absorber for the inherent uncertainty within capitalism.
Moreover, one can compare the IMF financial agreements with the Marshall Plan that
pursued two strategic goals at the same time: political intervention and promotion of a
capitalist system. In Soederberg's words, “it becomes clear that the NAB was an attempt to
reproduce the political domination of the IMF in the South. . . .the NAB, like its counterpart
the GAB, is based on a putative interstate consensus. Hence the lack of legal mandate
attached to the NAB and the choice of wording 'Arrangement' not 'Agreement' seemed to
replicate the imposed U.S. leadership" (Soederberg, 2004, pp. 101-102).
It is worth considering once again the outcome of the current financial relationship
between Saudi Arabia (and the GCC) with the IMF. As I argued earlier, the relationship
between the two sides remains, at its core, a class project. The financial arrangement is
intended to guarantee the stability of the GCC authoritarian status quo in return for their
role in stabilizing the global financial sector for the TCC (both through private channels
and via international institutions). The NAB, in particular, has been designed to ensure
financial stability. According to the IMF, "potential participants [in NAB] have agreed to
meet once a year at the time of the Annual Meetings of the IMF to discuss, among other
matters pertaining to the NAB, macroeconomic and financial markets developments,
especially those that could have an impact on the stability of the financial system and lead
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to a possible need for the IMF to seek supplementary resources.”20 NAB is particularly
important given the powerful destabilizing forces unleashed by the new capitalist mode of
accumulation that relies on financial globalization. We observe a new role of the GCC in
stabilizing TCC banks through infusions of capital which link them in mutual profitmaking enterprises with the TCC.
It is not surprising that the outcome of the interaction between the GCC and the
West appears to undermine the mainstream claim that "there is a positive and statistically
significant correlation between democracy, open capital flows and redistributive domestic
social policies" (Dailami, 2000, P. 25). As demonstrated in Figure 6, the GCC region has
experienced relatively high financial openness during the past decade. Financial openness
is a particularly important analytical index because of the deepening financialization of the
global economy that has served to tie a wide range of capitalist interests together in linked
profit-making ventures. Financial openness is a more accurate measure than trade openness
for examining economic openness of a country in the current phase of globalization.
Similar to the argument made in the first chapter on the relationship -or lack thereof –
between overall economic openness and democracy in the GCC, the high level of financial
openness in the GCC supports the stability of authoritarian regimes. Figure 7 indicates the
recent status of the GCC states in terms of democracy relative to the global average. It also
provides scores for financial openness.

20

https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1997/PR9705.HTM
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Figure 6: The Chinn-Ito Index for Financial Openness for GCC and World 21
Source: http://knoema.com/bzftmbe/the-chinn-ito-financial-opennes-index

Figure 7: Democracy Index22
Source: http://www.sudestada.com.uy/Content/Articles/421a313a-d58f-462e-9b242504a37f6b56/Democracy-index-2014.pdf
21

"The Chinn-Ito index (KAOPEN) is an index measuring a country's degree of capital account
openness. The index wasinitially introduced by Chinn and Ito (Journal of Development
Economics, 2006). KAOPEN is based on the binary dummy variables that codify the tabulation
of restrictions on cross-border financial transactions reported in the IMF's Annual Report on
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER)". Available here:
http://knoema.com/bzftmbe/the-chinn-ito-financial-opennes-index
22

http://www.sudestada.com.uy/Content/Articles/421a313a-d58f-462e-9b242504a37f6b56/Democracy-index-2014.pdf
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Given the above scores and the documented ties of financial connections
between the GCC and the TCC, it is reasonable to conclude that the financial openness in
the GCC is essentially a class project to stabilize the status quo of the GCC transnational
elites. In turn, the GCC transnational elites, primarily the Saudis, have been supporting
both international financial institutions and the global financial private sector during
financial crises.
Conclusion
This chapter discussed two significant components of the GCC capitalist class. The
first component is the GCC conglomerates that are controlled by a network consisting of
the GCC royal families and important merchant families. The second component is the
SWF-based financial activities that are mainly controlled by the GCC royal families.
Therefore, the two capitalist agents in the region - the GCC royal families and the GCC
merchant families - control the two key capitalist institutions in the region, SWFs and the
GCC conglomerates, which are the primary shapers and promoters of the GCC
transnational space. They have strong connections with significant multinational
corporations and with the TCC. They control all state institutions that are used for the
purpose of transnational capital accumulation. The GCC states play a significant role in the
process of transnationalization. SWFs that are supposedly “state-owned” institutions are
the nexus of transnational capital accumulation in the age of modern financial activities.
They are private enough to provide a comfortable setting for the global capitalist class to
protect its interests, and they are public enough to avoid the usual regulatory scrutiny
targeting private institutions. As William Robinson puts it:
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“. . .the TNS is a transnational capitalist state because its own reproduction is
dependent on reproducing the circuits of transnational accumulation. This is so
for a majority of the organs that make up the TNS network, in particular, national
states networked into larger international forums, such as UN agencies, the G-20,
the IMF, and the WB. (Robinson, 2014, P. 75)
The other significant role that the GCC states play in terms of transnational capital
accumulation is that their repressive political machines provide stability for its
transnational actors and, above all, for the royal families. Therefore, states are in essence
capitalist entities for the GCC bourgeoisie that maintain the current transnational space
while giving a disproportionate power for capital accumulation to the capitalist class. As
a vehicle to enforce the conditions for accumulation, states repress the working class by
militarized means, which is a classic part of the structure of global capitalism. In the next
chapter I will focus on the repressive characteristics of the states’ machinery within the
GCC.
With respect to the financial activities of GCC transnational elites, the mode of
financialization in GCC is coordinated with international corporations that are
globally significant. This phase of transnational capital accumulation dramatically sped
up during the 2008 financial crisis. During that period, the GCC transnational elites started
investing in failing Western financial institutions that were controlled by members of the
TCC who were already well-connected to the GCC transnational elites. The role played
by the GCC transnational elites to help out their TCC counterparts during the crisis
elevated the power of the former vis-à-vis the latter group.
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Today, GCC’s economy is not merely controlled by family businesses, but also by
conglomerates that are arguably the main economic actors in the region and connect the
region to other regions and global cities. These conglomerates have many joint ventures
with powerful foreign states and corporations. The GCC conglomerates are obviously
dominated by the interests of the GCC royal families. The merchant families have
economic and familial ties with the royal families, who play an aristocratic role in
promoting and protecting the interests of the patron royal families. Arguably, this subclass of merchant families is an extension of the core capitalist class in the GCC -- the royal
families.
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APPENDIX II: The Business Activities of GCC Conglomerates
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Kingdom Holding (Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal)
In 1991, the Prince invested $590 million in Citicorp, which merged with Travelers Group in April 1998 forming
the world’s largest financial institution, Citigroup, with over $1 trillion of assets and around $100 billion of equity.
In 1993, invested $100 million in Saks Incorporated which operates Saks Fifth Avenue department stores, New
York’s upscale fashion retailer, buying approximately a 10% stake.
In 1994, acquired a 50% stake in Fairmont hotel chain. A share swap in 2003 has lead to a 4.9% stake in the
parent company of Fairmont Hotels & Resorts.
In 1994, invested around $345 million acquiring 24% of Disneyland Paris, located outside the French capital.
Current stake stands at 17.3% of the company.
In 1994, invested $120 million to acquire 22% of the Four Seasons Hotels Inc., a Canadian luxury hotel chain. In
2007, the Board of Directors of Four Seasons jointly agreed to the US$ 3.8 billion acquisition deal by Prince
In 1995, acquired a 42% stake in the landmark New York Plaza Hotel for $300 million. In 2001, the stake increased
to 50%. 1995: Jointly control with a group of international investors of Canary Wharf, the largest European real
In 1996, the purchase of the George V hotel in Paris for $185 million and renovating it for $120 million. After
restoring its elegance and prestige, the hotel reopened in December 1999.
In 1997, premier investment in the technology industry acquiring a 5% stake in Apple Computers Inc. for $115
In 1997, invested $10 million in Palestine Development & Investment Ltd. Company (PADICO), engaged in
construction and development projects in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
In 1997, acquisition of a 27% stake in Mövenpick Hotels & Resorts. In addition to Europe, the Swiss hotel chain is
managing and developing hotels in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Qatar, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya. In
In 1997, invested $400 million acquiring 5% of the preferred shares of News Corp., which encompasses Harper
Collins, The Sunday Times-UK, Fox News, Sky, Star TV and many more. In 1999, the investment was raised to $600
In 1997, invested $146 million for 5% of Netscape, later acquired by America Online (AOL) which merged with
TIME/Warner creating the world’s largest media company, AOL Time Warner. Investment was raised to more
In 1997, invested $300 million in Motorola which specializes in wireless communications, semiconductors and
electronic systems, components, and services.
In 1998, the purchase of 100,000 acres in Tushka, Egypt, for agricultural development through Kingdom
Agricultural Development Company (KADCO). Upon completion, total investment will reach $500 million.
In 2000, invested $400 million in Compaq Computer Corp., the world’s second largest computer company. In
2002 Compaq merged with HP creating the world’s leading consumer technology company.
In 2000, invested $100 million in Kodak, maker of photographic films and papers for a wide range of consumer,
entertainment, professional, business, and health-related uses.
In 2000, invested $50 million in eBay Inc., a person-to-person trading community on the Internet. Sellers use the
company’s service to exchange personal items.
In 2000, invested $50 million. The stake was raised to $100 million. In September 2001, the shareholding was
In 2000, invested $50 million in Procter & Gamble (P&G), a world-wide manufacturer of wide ranging products.
In 2000, invested $50 million in PepsiCo, Inc.
In 2000, invested $50 million in Walt Disney, operator of media networks, studio entertainment, theme parks and
resorts, consumer products, Internet and direct marketing ventures.
In 2003, acquired nearly 5% of International Financial Advisors Company (IFA), a leading Kuwaiti investment
In 2004, acquired nearly 5% of Kuwait Invest Holding Company.
In 2004, HRH Prince Alwaleed signs agreement with Dr. Mustafa Ghandoor allowing KHC to acquire a 40% stake in
In 2004, Kingdom Zephyr is the manager of parallel Pan-African private equity funds, Pan African investment
Partners Limited (“PIAP,a Mauritius company) and Pan-Commonwealth African Partners Limited (“PAIP/PCAP”),
In 2005, the venture between Kingdom Hotels International, Fairmont Hotels & Resorts Inc., and Bank of Scotland
Corporate, has completed the purchase of the Monte Carlo Grand hotel in Monaco and the property is to be
In 2005, acquisition of a 96% interest in the 251-room Royal Palm Hotel in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, one of East
Africa’s most vibrant economic hubs. The hotel, which first opened in 1995, is located in the business district of
In 2005, the Kingdom Hotels International, Fairmont Hotels & Resorts Inc., and Bank of Scotland Corporate
venture, has completed the purchase of the Savoy Hotel in London for $400 million. The property is to be flagged
In 2006, Kingdom Hotels International and Colony Capital entered a US$5.5 billion acquisition agreement of
Fairmont Hotels & Resorts combining it with Raffles Hotels & Resorts of Singapore.
In 2007, acquisition of 29.9% if the Saudi Research and Marketing Group (SRMG). The publications that fall under
SRMG include Asharg Al Awsat, Al Eqtisadiah,Arab News,Hia magazine, Al Majalla magazine, Arrajol magazine and
Sayidati magazine. Furthermore, other entities that fall under SRMG are Al khaleejiya for Publicity Advertising and
In 2007, Kingdom Holding Company acquired 12% of the National Air Services Company Limited (“NAS”),a private
Saudi airline company for $100 million. The ownership percentage increased to 37% in 2008.

Source: https://publicintelligence.net/kingdom-holding-company/
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Dallah Al-Baraka Group Profile

International Businesses:
Subsidiary
Banque Albaraka D'algeria
Al-Tawfeek Co. For Investment Funds Ltd.
Banque Albaraka D'jibouti
Misr Arab Poultry Co
Algerian Saudi Leasing Holding Co.
Jordan Islamic Bank
Dallah Albarak Holding Co.
Dallah Al-Baraka
Holding SDN. BHD.
Banque Albaraka Mauritanienne
Islamique
Sardine Canning Co
Al-Towfeek Investment Bank Ltd.
Albaraka Bank Ltd.
Albaraka Bank
BEST Re-Insurance
Beit Et-Tamweel Al-Tunisi Al-Saudi
Dallah Albaraka
Albaraka Bancorp

Country
Algeria
Cayman
Islands
D'jibouti
Egypt
France
Jordan
Malaysia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Mauritanian
Morocco
Pakistan
South Africa
Sudan
Tunisia
Tunisia
U.K.
USA

Source: https://www.albaraka.com/, http://www.dallah.com/
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GCC Businesses
Subsidiary
Albaraka Islamic Investment Bank
Al-Amin Co. For Securities & Investment Funds
Islamic Insurance & Re-Insurance Co. (IIRCO)
Egyptian-Saudi Finance Bank
International Arab Leasing and Finance Company
Albaraka Bank
International Information & Trading Services
Company
Iqraa Co. for Printing and Paper Trading
National Wood Works Co
Albaraka Medical Clinic
Arab Leasing International Finance (ALIF) Ltd
Arab Radio & Television (ART)
Arab Reach Media (ARM)
Dallah Albaraka Holding Company for Umra
Services
Dallah Communications Holding
Dallah Establishment for Contracting and
Maintenance
Dallah Health Service Holding Company
Dallah Hotels and Resorts
Dallah Human Skills Development Co
Dallah Transport Co. Ltd
Dallah-Dowail Co.
Saudi Digital Distribution Company
Saudi Real Estate Maintenance Co
Albaraka Turkish Finance House
Emin Sigorts A.S.
Islamic Arab Insurance Co (IAIC)

Country
Bahrain
Bahrain
Bahrain
Egypt
France, Tunisia, Saudi
Arabia
Lebonan
NA
NA
NA
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Turkey
Turkey
UAE

Source: https://www.albaraka.com/, http://www.dallah.com/
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SABIC
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Company
SABIC Innovative Plastics

Location
Burkville, Alabama, USA

Partnership
A wholly owned affiliate of SABIC

SABIC Innovative Plastics

Cartagena, Spain

A wholly owned affiliate of SABIC

SABIC Innovative Plastics

Mt. Vernon, Indiana, USA

A wholly owned affiliate of SABIC

SABIC Innovative Plastics

Ottawa, Illinois, USA

A wholly owned affiliate of SABIC

CYCOLAC™, CYCOLOY™, and GELOY™ resins

SABIC Innovative Plastics

Selkirk, New York, USA

A wholly owned affiliate of SABIC

PPO™ resin, NORYL®, NORYL PPX® and
NORYL GTX® resins, and high-impact
polystyrene (HIPS)

SABIC Innovative Plastics

Washington, West Virginia, USA

A wholly owned affiliate of SABIC

CYCOLAC™, CYCOLOY™, and GELOY™ resins

Wixom, Michigan

Exatec LLC – A wholly owned affiliate of
SABIC

PC automotive glazing

SABIC Innovative Plastics

Products
LEXAN™ resin
LEXAN™, EXTEM™, ULTEM™, and
CYCOLOY™ resins
LEXAN™, CYCOLOY™, ULTEM™, VALOX™,
XENOY™, XYLEX™, SUPEC™, and SILTEM™
resins, LEXAN™ sheet and film, and
ILLUNINEX™ display film

SABIC Petrochemicals B.V.

Geleen, Netherlands

A wholly owned affiliate of SABIC

Polyethylene (HDPE, LDPE, LLDPE),
polypropylene, ethylene, propylene,
butadiene, MTBE/ ETBE, benzene, gasoline
components, styrene, C9 resin feed, cracked
distillate, acetylene, hydrogen, and carbonblack oil

SABIC UK Petrochemicals Ltd

Teesside, UK

A wholly owned affiliate of SABIC

Ethylene, propylene, benzene cyclohexane,
cracked distillate hydrogen, butadiene,
polyethylene (LDPE)

SABIC Polyolefine GmbH

Gelsenkirchen, Germany

A wholly owned affiliate of SABIC

SAMAC Saudi Methyl Acrylate
Company

Al-Jubail, Saudi Arabia

A 50/50 joint venture with Mitsubishi
Rayon Company

Polyethylenes (HDPE, LLDPE) and
polypropylene
Methyl Methacrylate (MMA),
polymethylmethacrylate (PMMA)

SINOPEC SABIC Tianjin
Petrochemical Co. Ltd.

Tianjin, China

A 50/50 joint-venture between SABIC
Industrial Investments Company and
SINOPEC (China Petroleum & Chemical
Corporation)

Ethylene, propylene, polyethylene (HDPE,
LLDPE), polypropylene, ethylene oxide,
MEG, DEG, phenol, acetone, MTBE,
butadiene, and butene-1
Ethylene, propylene, polypropylene, LDPE,
HDPE, ethylene glycol, acetone,
polycarbonate (PC), ethanolamines (EOA),
ethoxylates, bisphenol A, benzene, normal
butanol, and natural-detergent alcohol
(NDA)
Ethylene, propylene, aromatics (BTX),
ethylene glycol (mono, di, tri), linear lowdensity polyethylene (LLDPE), and highdensity polyethylene (HDPE)

Saudi Kayan Saudi Kayan
Petrochemical Company

Al-Jubail, Saudi Arabia

SABIC (35%), public shareholders (65%)

Sharq Eastern Petrochemical
Company

Al-Jubail, Saudi Arabia

A 50/50 SABIC joint-venture with a
consortium of Japanese companies led
by Mitsubishi Corporation

Shrouq Saudi Japanese
Acrylonitrile Company

Al-Jubail, Saudi Arabia

SOCC Saudi Organometallic
Chemicals Company

Al-Jubail, Saudi Arabia

Specialty Chem Saudi Specialty
Chemicals Company

Al-Jubail, Saudi Arabia

Wholly owned affiliate of SABIC (Arabian
Petrochemical Company – Petrokemya,
99%, and SABIC Industrial Investments
Company 1%)

United Jubail United
Petrochemical Company

Al-Jubail, Saudi Arabia

SABIC (75%), Pension Fund (15%),
Ethylene, polyethylene, ethylene glycol (EG),
General Organization of Social Insurance
and linear-alpha olefins (LAO)
(10%)

Yanpet Saudi Yanbu
Petrochemical Company

Yanbu, Saudi Arabia

Yansab Yanbu National
Petrochemical Company

Yanbu, Saudi Arabia

SABIC (50%), ASAHI Kasei Chemicals
Corporation (30%) and Mitsubishi
Corporation (20%)
A 50/50 joint-venture between Saudi
Specialty Chemicals Company and
Albemarle Netherlands BV

Chemicals

Tri-ethyl aluminum (TEAL)

Tri-ethyl aluminum (TEAL), TPO/PP
compounds, PC compounds, ABS
compounds, and specialty products

A 50/50 SABIC joint-venture with Mobil
Yanbu Petrochemical Company (an
affiliate of ExxonMobil Chemical, USA)

Ethylene, polyethylene, ethylene glycol,
polypropylene, pyrolysis gasoline, and
propylene

SABIC (51%), public shareholders or
owned by others (49%)

Ethylene, propylene, ethylene glycol (mono,
di, tri), linear low-density polyethylene
(LLDPE), high-density polyethylene (HDPE),
polypropylene, butene-1, butene-2,
benzene, toluene/ xylene mixture, and
MTBE

Source:http://www.sabic.com/corporate/en/images/SABIC-annual-report-2014english.pdf
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Saudi Binladin Group:
Projects
Sharm El-Sheikh Airport
Hotel Four Seasons Amman
Kuala Lumpur Airport
Kuala Lumpur Airport
Putra Jaya Mosque
Doha Airport
Al Shuaiba Power Plant
BCS Ready Mix Factory
BCS Ready Mix Factory
Bahra Industrial Complex
Bahra Industrial Complex
Bahra Industrial Complex
Bahra Industrial Complex
BCS Ready Mix Factory
BCS Ready Mix Factory
King Abdul Azeez International Airport
Makkah Holy Mosque Expansion
King Abdul Azeez Endowment Project
Holly Mosque Madeena
Al Qassim - Al Madina - Yanbu - Rabigh - Thuwal Express Way
Al Hada Road - Halwani Bridge
Al Mutamarat Under Pass
Hajj Terminal - KAIA
Jamarat Bridge
King Abdull Aziz Endowment
King Abullah Endowment - Madina
Internal Security Forces Housing - Jeddah
King Abdullah Financial District
Umm Al Qura University
V.I.P Military Hospital - Riyadh
Behra Industrial Complex
King Abdullah University for Science and Technology
Blaise Diagne International Airport, Dakar
Sharjah International Airport
Sharjah American University

Source: http://www.sbg.com.sa/
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Country
Egypt
Jordan
Malaysia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Senegal.
UAE
UAE

Clients
Munshaat for Projects and Contracting Company
Rayadah Investment Company
Princess Nora Bint Abdul Rahman University
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)
Ministry of Education
King Saud University
Egyptian Airports Company
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Defense
Ministry of Finance
Jeddah Municipality
Riyadh Military Hospital
King Abdullah Economic City
Saudi Aramco
EMAAR Properties
Hadramout University of Science and Technology
Department of Civil Aviation Authority - Government Dubai
EMAAR Properties
Dubai Internet City (TECOM)
Sharjah Airport Authority
Majid Al Futtaim
TECOM Investments
Dubai Lifestyle City L.L.C.
SAMA Dubai
MIZIN
Dubai Municipality
Legend Middle East
Roads and Transport Authority
Republic of Yemen
Damascus Governorate
Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan Foundation
Majid Al Futtaim Group
Construction Products Holding Company
EMAAR-IGO
Egyptian Airports Company
Kuala Lumpur International Airport

Source: http://www.sbgpbad.ae/
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Country
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
UAE
UAE
UAE
UAE
UAE
UAE
UAE
UAE
UAE
UAE
UAE
UAE
Yemen
Syria
Syria
Syria
Syria
Syria
Egypt
Malasyia

Alfuttaim
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Client
Saipem Energy Services SpA
Saipem SpA for Sonangol
Saipem SpA for Petrobras
SBM IMODCO for Chevron
SBM Offshore N.V. and
Sonangol for Exxon Mobil
Corporation

Project
Tanker Betatank II to FPSO
Firenze
VLCC Magdeline to FPSO Gimboa
VLCC Margaux to FPSO Cidade de
Vitoria
VLCC Lu San to FPSO Frade
VLCC Mosocean into FPSO
Xikomba
Conventional VLCC to FPSO
Atlantic

FPSO

Single Buoy Moorings Inc.

Conventional Crude Carrier Stena
Contender to FSO Nkossa1

Saipem, ENI/Single Buoy
Moorings Inc.

Conventional medium size crude
tanker to FPSO Mystras II

Fred Olsen Production AS for
Canadian Natural Resources
Limited

VLCC to FPSO Knock Allan

Fred Olsen Production A.S. for VLCC Elgreco to FPSO Knock
Addax Petroleum and Sinopec Adoon
Shuttle tanker to FPSO Deep
Producer I

FPSOcean

Red Band Inc., Fred.Olsen
World’s largest tanker T/T Jahre
Production A.S. for Maersk Oil Viking to FSO Knock Nevis

FSO

FSRU

Mercator Lines
Teekay Shipping (Norway) As
for Occidental Petroleum
Corporation
EuroNav and Overseas
Shipholding Group for Maersk

Tanker to FSO Prem Pride
Shuttle tanker to FSO Falcon
Spirit
ULCC TI Asia to FSO Asia
ULCC TI Africa to FSO Africa

BW Offshore for Murmansk
Commercial Seaport

Tanker to FSO Berge Pioneer

Saipem SpA for Offshore LNG
Toscana

LNG carrier Golar Frost to FSRU
Toscana

Teekay Marine Service AS

Suezmax conventional oil tanker
to Shuttle tanker Navion
Gothenburg
Aframax conventional oil tanker
to Shuttle tanker Navion Bergen

Others

Consortium comprising of
Woodside Energy Ltd., Shell
International, BHP, BP Amoco, Upgrade of FPSO Cossack Pioneer
Chevron and
Mitsui/Mitsubishi
Scandic Shipmanagement

Modification of Golden Arrow – I

Saipem Sp.A.

Upgrading DLB Castoro 2

Torvald Klaveness

Gearless panamax bulk carrier
Balsfjord to self Un-loader vessel

Source: http://www.al-futtaim.ae/content/organigram.asp
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Dubai World (Subsidiaries)

DP World
Bussinesses

Financial
Partnerships

Marine Terminals
World Crane Services
DP World Cargo Services
Container Rail Road Services Private
Limited
Dubai International Financial Center
(DIFC)
Dubai Financial Services Authority
NASDAQ Dubai
UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)
Corporate Governance principles of the
UK
Corporate Governance Code (the Code)
NASDAQ OMX Group

Source: http://www.drydocks.gov.ae/en/portal/orfcus.ofshre.aspx
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Istihmar World
Bussiness Entity
AL BURJ
Barneys Newyork
Bubye
Cirque Du Soleil
Czech Techo Park Brno
Djibouti Palace Kempinski
Dubai Aerospace Enterprise
DW Travel
FORSA
Gorillas' Nest Lodge
Gulf African Bank
Hans Energy
IHI Plc
Inchcape Shipping Services
Intex Shanghai
Jock Safari Lodge
Kerzner
Mazagan Beach Resort
Nyungwe Park
One&Only Palmilla
Padaeng Industry PLC
Pension Insurance Corporation
Perella Weinberg Partners
Retailcorp Brands
Sanbona Wildlife Reserve
Shamwari Game Reserve
Tejari
W Bangkok
W Koh Samui

Sector
Hospitality & Real Estate
Consumer
Hospitality & Real Estate
Consumer
Hospitality & Real Estate
Hospitality & Real Estate
Industrial & Business Services
Consumer
Hospitality & Real Estate
Hospitality & Real Estate
Financial Services
Industrial & Business Services
Hospitality & Real Estate
Industrial & Business Services
Hospitality & Real Estate
Hospitality & Real Estate
Hospitality & Real Estate
Hospitality & Real Estate
Hospitality & Real Estate
Hospitality & Real Estate
Industrial & Business Services
Financial Services
Financial Services
Consumer
Hospitality & Real Estate
Hospitality & Real Estate
Industrial & Business Services
Hospitality & Real Estate
Hospitality & Real Estate

Location
UAE
US
South Africa
Canada
Czech Republic
Djibouti
UAE
UAE
UAE
Rwanda
Kenya
HK/China
Malta
UK
China
South Africa
Asia
Morocco
Rwanda
Mexico
Thailand
UK
US
UAE
South Africa
South Africa
UAE
Thailand
Thailand

Source:
http://www.istithmarworld.com/index/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
=208&Itemid=226
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Economic Zones World: Jafza, TechnoPark, Dubai Auto Zone (re-exporting used
cars to the Asia and Africa).
TechnoPark

Research Partners
Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft (FhG)
Boston University
Arab Science and Technology Foundation (ASTF)
Middle East Desalinations Centre (MEDRC)
DAEDEOK INNOPOLIS
DAEJEON TECHNOPARK
Networking Partners
International Association of Science Parks (IASP)
World Association of Industrial and Technological Research
Organizations (WAITRO)
International Network for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises
(INSME)
International Desalination Association (IDA)
World Technopolis Association (WTA)
Arab Water Council (AWC)
World Business Angels Association

Source: http://www.ezw.ae/en/ducamz/dubai-auto-zone-ducamz.html
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Kanoo Group

Subsidiaries
Middle East Container Repair
AXA Gulf
AkzoNobel
Freightworks
BASF Kanoo Gulf
BASF Kanoo Gulf

Partnership
U.A.S.C, P.O Nedlloyd, Maersk, Hapag Lloyd and Uniglory, plus many other lines
Axa Insurance Company
Dulux, Sikkens, International and Eka
Emirates/DNATA
MASDAR (Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company)
Elastogran

BASF Kanoo Gulf

The Eastern Europe, Africa and Western Asia Region (LR) changes its organizational
structure on April 1, 2000. The major new development is that regional Business Centers
are set up in the cities of Istanbul, Johannesburg, Dubai, Moscow and Ludwigshafen.
BASF’s representatives in Algeria, Egypt, Dubai, Iran, Morocco and Tunisia are served by
Business Center Dubai. BASF FZE in Dubai is founded as a service platform (sales
company) for the Middle East and North Africa.

Hydroturf
Hydroturf
Hydroturf
Hydroturf
Hydroturf
Hydroturf
Hydroturf
Hydroturf
Hydroturf
Hydroturf
Hydroturf
Hydroturf
Crane Industrial Services
Johnson Arabia
Maersk Kanoo
Chapo Kanoo
OBAIKAN
Kanoo Group (SDV)
Kanoo Group (Mol, UAE)
Kanoo Group

Doha Golf Course in Qatar
Shangri-laâ€™s Barr Al Jissah
Resort and Spa, Muscat, Oman
Tower Links Golf Course,
Ras Al Khaimah
Doha Asian Olympic Games, Qatar
Jumeirah Golf Estates, Dubai
Katameya Heights and Dunes, Cairo, Egypt
Saadiyat Island, Abu Dhabi
Dubai International Airport,Dubai
King Abdullah Economic City, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
Madinat Jumeirah, Dubai
Konecranes
Charilaos Apostolides
Maersk Line
Charilaos Apostolides
OITC group, Qatar
bolloré group
MOL Group
Royal Ahrend
Source: http://www.kanoogroup.com/
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Type of Economci Tie
Client
Partnership
Portfolio
Joint Venture
Partnership
Joint Venture

Mega Project
Mega Project
Mega Project
Mega Project
Mega Project
Mega Project
Mega Project
Mega Project
Mega Project
Mega Project
Mega Project
Mega Project
Joint Venture
Joint Venture
Joint Venture
Joint Venture
Joint Venture
Joint Venture
Joint Venture
Joint Venture

Fakhro Group

Source: http://www.fakhro.com/
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CHAPTER IV
MILITARIZATION OF GCC TRANSNATIONAL SPACE:
CHARACTERISTICS AND IMPLICATIONS
Introduction
GCC militarization is rooted in the socioeconomic class structure of the region that
is specifically designed to protect the interests of the GCC capitalist class against
internal instability and threats. At the same time, the militarization strengthens the
economic ties between GCC elites/states and the TCC.

To fully understand this

militarization in its current phase, this chapter is divided into two parts. The first part
explains the military structure of GCC and how it has evolved due to a number of notable
historical events. The second part explains the target of this focus on military and security
power. This focus can be analyzed based on domestic objectives, regional goals, and, to a
lesser extent, global aspirations.
Analyzing the militarization of the Persian Gulf region is an integral part of this
dissertation because GCC militarization is one of the essential components of the GCC
economic transnationalization and the embeddedness of GCC elites within the TCC.
According to Askari et al, "[t]he Persian Gulf is, by some indicators, the most militarized
region in the world. Public dissatisfaction with economic and social progress and the
absence of elective legitimacy has led rulers and governments to rely on force to maintain
power” (Askari et al, 2010, P. 3, footnote omitted). The Global Militarization Index (GMI)
indicates that, on average, the GCC states (except Qatar for which no data was available
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in 2014), are among the top 17 percent of most militarized states (out of 154) in the
world 23.
In this chapter, I will attempt to explain such immense militarization based on a
class- based analytical framework and show how this militarization is merely part of a
broader class- based project that includes the protection of both domestic GCC interests
and wider TCC interests in the Persian Gulf. The militarization of the Persian Gulf is based
on a series of historical circumstances. A traditional explanation focuses on the significant
role of oil and the demand of actors in the global political economy to have secure access
to GCC oil supplies. Accordingly, from the early days of the Cold War the international
energy order was organized around Middle Eastern oil production and enjoyed U.S.
military and security protection. More recent evidence suggests that the international
energy order is more fragmented than what the traditional perspective suggests. On one
hand, with the rise of China and Russia the world economy is witnessing new powerful
capitalist economies with important, albeit different, impacts on the global energy order.
On the other hand, the other regions including the Caspian Sea region, Latin America and
North America, and Africa are becoming more important players in the global oil supply.
Many parts of these regions, especially in the Caspian Sea and African oil rich regions,
have been militarized, lending support to the traditional argument that oil plays a significant
role in militarization.

23

http://gmi.bicc.de/index.php?page=ranking-table&year=2013&sort=rank_asc
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Along with these global changes, the militarization of the Persian Gulf region has
also intensified dramatically during the past decades. From a state-centric perspective,
there may be different reasons for states to increase their military expenditures.
Historically, military expenditure is believed to increase based on the level of perceived
threats by different states (Smith, 1980). Military expenditure by one state can also be in
reaction to the increase of military expenditure by a neighboring state or states (Dune &
Perlo, 2003). In addition, particular cultural and/or ideological aspects of state
policymaking also influence the level of military expenditure (Payne, 1989). Another
significant factor is the militarization of U.S. foreign policy, a structural shift that refers to
the use of military power instead of diplomacy in foreign policy. This shift has had
cascading effects across the globe. In terms of U.S. foreign policy, a large body of literature
on militarization of the Persian Gulf focuses on the direct relationship between the U.S.
militarization and the desire to have secure access to Persian Gulf oil (Bacevich 2013,
Klare 1978).
Despite the fact that the share of U.S. crude oil imports from the Middle East in
general has constantly decreased over the past decades, the amount of U.S. oil imported
from Saudi Arabia has not significantly changed. In 1993, the U.S. crude oil import from
Saudi Arabia was 467,753 thousands of barrels; in 2014 it was 423,066 thousands of
barrels 24. At the same time, around a quarter of global oil supply was still being transferred
through the Strait of Hormuz, over which tension arises occasionally given the adverse

24

http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbbl_a.htm
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relationship between Iran, on the one hand, and the United States and most Persian
Gulf Arab countries on the other. Therefore, oil is still an important reason for
militarization of the Persian Gulf region. So, I agree that the region’s militarization is partly
- but only partly - rooted in U.S. Demand for Middle Eastern oil. However, reducing the
current phase of the militarization of the region merely the U.S. need for secure oil supplies
is an unwarranted analytical jump. This chapter, therefore, aims to analyze a less-discussed
aspect of militarization of the Persian Gulf region: the class-based dimension of the
current GCC militarization. This class-based dimension, however, directly intersects with
the traditional arguments briefly discussed above.
While important scholarly contributions have been made by the traditional
approaches, I believe that a class-based explanation of the militarization in this particular
region would help generate a more comprehensive explanation of many other aspects of
the phenomenon.
The Pattern of GCC Military Expenditure
The business ties between the GCC and the TCC through the military spending
of GCC states protect the emerging transnationalization of capital and the repressive
state apparatus in the region, the latter of which acts to anticipate and to counter the
inevitable economic, political and social polarization engendered by this type of capital
accumulation. The GCC's military expenditure is comparable to that of the states with the
highest military budgets in the world (excluding the exceptional case of the United States,
of course). The below chart shows the military expenditure by state with the highest
military expenses. In 2014, Saudi Arabia, itself, was ranked as the fourth largest military
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spender in the world, even though the country did not seem to face an imminent, notable
threat to its national borders.

Chart 4: Top Military Spenders in the World
Source: Based on data available here:
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database
Unlike other states listed in Chart 4, the GCC states seem to have more difficulty
projecting their military power to shape external affairs. This is partly due to the weakness
of GCC’s soft power in general. Similar to other neoliberal economies, the GCC bloc lacks
a strong nationally-oriented cultural or ideological base, and it is not clear what values the
bloc represents. Two military engagements by Saudi Arabia confirm the limited reach of
the GCC’s huge military power. The first military engagement, the so-called Gulf War,
was led by the United States in 1990 and 1991 in response to Iraq’s conquest of Kuwait
and the threat Iraq subsequently posed to Saudi Arabia’s oil fields. The United States
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deployed "some 540,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines and their equipment
to Saudi Arabia" (Shrader, 2009, P. 263). In addition to the leading role of the U.S. military,
the coalition in that war included many other states, including Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and
the United Kingdom (Tucker, 2014, P. 284). Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States were part
of this coalition. Without the far-reaching support of the U.S. military and the broad
coalition, there was arguably no chance for the GCC to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty and
to end the Iraqi occupation, and the West’s access to Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves would
have remained at risk.
The second case is the Saudi military invasion of Yemen to counter Houthi
rebels in 2015. The Yemeni engagement is more critical for our purpose than the Gulf
War. In Yemen, Saudi Arabia, after decades of purchasing some of the world’s most
advanced military equipment, attacked one of the most underdeveloped and weakest
countries in the world. Nonetheless, despite its considerable technological advantages, the
Saudi military has been relying on "U.S. help [for] planning air strikes on Houthi rebels
in Yemen, in addition to logistical and intelligence support.25" Moreover, the Saudis had
military support from other GCC states (except Oman), as well as from Egypt, Jordan,
Morocco, Senegal, and even some sections of the Yemeni military. Despite the (im)balance
of the military powers in the Yemeni case, however, the Saudi military has failed to deliver

25

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-26/yemeni-bombing-led-by-saudis-isbacked-by-u- s-logistics-spying
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a clear and quick conclusion; and the war drags on causing considerable damage to Yemeni
infrastructure and a drain on Saudi resources.
The limited ability of Saudi Arabia to project its military power exemplifies the
general state of the military industry in the GCC. According to research on "[t]he Gulf
Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War" conducted by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS):
“Saudi Arabia has long been dependent on other nations for virtually all of its
arms and military technology. . . .It can produce some small arms, automatic
weapons, and munitions, but much of the Saudi portion of the work consists of
assembling imported parts rather than real manufactures.26 . . . Saudi military
forces are modern, high technology forces by regional standards, but manpower
is a problem. Motivation, education, and training are, however, serious problems.
. . ." 27 (pp. 13-19)
Similar to other economic and security sectors of the GCC’s political economy, the
considerable spending of the GCC in the military sector has not created a strong national
military power that could act as an external deterrent. The avowed or perceived enemies
of Saudi Arabia, for instance, do not seem to be particularly deterred by its military
might. Instead, the military and security power of the GCC has been fairly successful
in protecting the status quo for the royal families - a model that the Shah had pursued in
Iran prior to 1979 Revolution. The GCC military and security power is to a great extent

26

http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060728_gulf_saudi.pdf

27

http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060728_gulf_saudi.pdf
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robust if one considers it as a protective shield for the transnational elites' class project: a
project that aims at making the GCC an important node of transnational

capital

accumulation for the TCC (and also for GCC transnational elites themselves). It
does not matter if the considerable military expenditures do not pay off on the battlefield
in Yemen, Syria or other places; what matters is that the high spending on weapons act
as a powerful vehicle to keep the GCC elites as an indispensable part of global TCC. The
following figure shows the military-business ties of the GCC states with other countries.

Figure 8: Military Deals by Persian Gulf States and The Sellers
Source: Based on the data available here;
http://csis.org/files/publication/150428_military_spending.pdf
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The GCC militarization is by and large a manifestation and expansion of emerging
ties between the GCC transnational elites and TCC. In other words, this kind of
militarization is part of the process that has embedded the GCC elites within in the TCC.
The following parts of the chapter will further discuss this dynamic as well as the
challenges that it has brought up for both the GCC elites and TCC.
Militarization, Oil, and the Transformation of the Elite Network in the GCC
Following the discovery of some of the largest oil fields in the world in Saudi
Arabia at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Saudi royal family soon recognized
the many opportunities and challenges before them. The economic ties between Saudi
royal family, on the one hand, and Western states and multinational corporations
(MNCs), on the other, are often traced back to the famous meeting between President
Franklin Roosevelt and King Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia in 1945. It was Roosevelt who
first structured an oil-based foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia, a foreign policy that later
served as a blueprint for dealing with other GCC states. The key premise of this oil-based
foreign policy is that the consequential geopolitical players in this region are the
multinational oil corporations. Accordingly, strategies have been devised based on these
corporations’ interests and their business security. However, the emergence of GCC
conglomerates and the rising power of the GCC royal families as well as that of merchant
families also contributed to the domination of corporate interests in GCC-U.S. relations.
One of the key aspects of the meeting between Saudi King Abdul Aziz and
President Roosevelt was the perceived U.S. guarantee of its permanent support to secure
the Saudi royal family's position in return for secure access to Saudi oil fields. A pattern
of dependency of the U.S. economy on Saudi oil began to emerge during the 1941-1945
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period, when Saudi Arabia provided “6 of the 7 billion barrels of oil that fueled the Allied
forces in World War II [while] the United States consume[d] approximately 1/3 of its
known oil reserves." (Klare, 2008, P. 7)28. There is not much information about the
nature and details of the agreements between Roosevelt and the Saudi King; but as for the
significance of that meeting, it suffices to quote Dick Cheney:
“Our strategic interests in the Persian Gulf region, I think, are well-known but
bear repeating today. . . .We do, of course, have historic ties, especially to the
Saudis, but other governments in the region, that hark back with respect to Saudi
Arabia to 1945, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with King Abd al-Aziz
on the USS Quincy towards the end of World War II and affirmed at that time
that the United States had a lasting and continuing interest in the security of the
Kingdom”.29 (Klare, 2008, P. 5)
The meeting was also a starting point for strengthening the relationship between
the GCC and TCC in the context of broader structural militarization. This structural
militarization historically developed to protect energy security and access to oil. The
domestic energy dependency of the West and GCC then pushed for further corporatization
of this GCC-TCC relationship. On the Western side, and despite all its ups and downs, the
dependency of Western industrial power on oil has never really ended. Oil remains a
crucial resource for all aspects of the U.S economy. The U.S. domestic economy and
U.S.-based American TNCs heavily depend on oil. At the same time, the US population
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comprises 4.5 percent of the world population, while its oil consumption accounts for
more than 20 percent of global oil consumption (See T able 14). In addition to
consumption within U.S. borders, U.S.-based TNCs produce oil in other parts of the world
too, in particular in East Asian countries. This global chain of production consumes a
considerable amount of oil each year. Despite all discussion of moving beyond oil into an
era of renewable energies, the global economy remains by and large dependent on oil.
What has changed, of course, is the relative significance of the Middle East in general and
Saudi Arabia in particular in the global energy market.

Domestic U.S. Dependency on Oil

Table 14: US Oil Consumption

Chart 5: US Imports of Crude Oil
Sources: Based on the data available here:
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy- economics/statistical-review-2015/bpstatistical-review-of-world-energy-2015-oil-section.pdf
, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=mcrimus1&f=a
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According to Chart 5, from the 1970s, the United States has

aggressively and

consistently increased its crude oil imports. This corresponds to the beginning of the
structural shift towards neo-liberalization and radical technological developments
pertaining to energy. In turn, new and strong economic ties between the GCC states/elites
and TCC emerged. For the TCC, these ties meant the stability of GCC states would remain
crucial for TCC’s economic activities and global capital accumulation.
Militarization and Conflicts among Classes in the Persian Gulf
The position of GCC royal families has been occasionally, but notably, challenged
from time to time. In each of these episodes, the possible or actual threats to GCC royal
families has led to further militarization of the Persian Gulf. Arguably one of the most
important of these events was the Iranian Revolution. The regime change in Iran was an
alarming sign for the GCC royal families. While the eye of the world focused, for the
most part, on the domestic implications of the changes in Iran, the GCC royal families
anxiously monitored any potential domino effect on other Middle Eastern societies,
especially due to the radical rhetoric of the revolutionary leaders that invited all Muslims
to challenge the pro-Western political regimes all over the Muslim world.
From the beginning of the 1980s, efforts to weaken the Saudi royal family have
been part of an important, albeit not always dominant, discourse in Iranian foreign policy.
It is worth mentioning that what happened in Iran in 1979 did not result in an anti-capitalist
system. The new class arrangement in Iran indicates a new model of indigenous capitalism,
which curiously enough is not connected to Western capitalism in any significant way
aside, of course, from the need for access to an international financial structure. Within this
small capitalist microcosm, there is a class-based tension between the ruling elites in Iran
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and in Saudi royal family. This is the reason why Saudi foreign policy mirrors that of
Iran, in that Saudi Arabia embarked on an aggressive effort to isolate and weaken the postRevolution Iranian regime as soon as that regime was born.
The Saudi royal family viewed the new regime in Tehran as an existential threat
for their ruling status at home. Some of the disadvantaged and excluded minorities in the
GCC, and especially those of Shi’i persuasion, found comfort and inspiration in Iran’s
post-Revolution rhetoric, and perceived or actual ties between them and Tehran became a
new challenge in states/elites’ relations in the GCC. Generally speaking, the stability of the
GCC transnational space required a highly militarized state (elites) relationship. According
to Doug Stokes and Sam Raphael, "the militarization of the oil-rich South ranges far wider
than state infrastructure protection. Indeed, security assistance is geared more around
active counterinsurgency. Training and equipment programs are designed to build local
capabilities for rapid reaction, troop mobility, intelligence networks, night-fighting,
surveillance, and offensive tactics" (Stokes and Raphael, 2010, P. 78).
Added to this growing conflict between Riyadh and Tehran, the fact that, after the
Iranian Revolution, the United States lost its key, strategic ally in the region created a
strategic vacuum that the Saudis conveniently filled. Iran used to be the surrogate proxy
that protected the U.S. interests in the region - or at least it was perceived as such according
to the so-called Nixon Doctrine. After the Revolution, however, the “Carter Doctrine”
was added to the mix, as the Carter Administration decided to send the U.S. military
directly to the Persian Gulf to contain Iran’s Revolution. By default, Saudi Arabia became
the new surrogate proxy - or at least it was perceived as such. This ushered in a new era
where the militarization of the Persian Gulf was not just through competition among
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surrogate powers, but also through the direct U.S. military presence in the region with
consequences far beyond what the United States had anticipated.
Later events solidified the key tenants of the Carter Doctrine, especially in light of
the Gulf War and the 9/11 terrorist attack. This shift could not have happened without the
support of the GCC rulers. In the post-9/11 world, the GCC increased its military
expenditure in response to increased securitization of the Muslim World. According to
William Robinson, "in the post-9/1l period the military dimension appeared to exercise an
over-determining influence in the reconfiguration of global politics. Militarization has
involved not just the major U.S.-led interventions but the adoption by 144 countries of
"counterterrorist" laws and the development of enhanced systems of policing, internal
security, urban militarization, and social control to suppress dissent (and also to make
profits)" (Robinson, 2014, pp. 150-151). Therefore, before further discussion of
militarization of the Persian Gulf, it is necessary to have a brief discussion of how the
notions of "counter-terrorism" and "counter-insurgency" have been translated in GCC
states’ political discourse.
Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency: US Military Arms Sales, and GCC
State Repression
A conceptual starting point in analyzing “counterterrorism” is the Neo-Gramscian
understanding of the notion of hegemony. The third world militarization is part of a broader
structure in which a global hegemony is being established and reinforced based on
dynamics of consent and coercion. With respect to the hegemonic power of the GCC
capitalist class in their respective societies, some evidence suggests that the GCC
bourgeoisie class has had considerable difficulty bringing in the consent element to
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their hegemonic mold. This is partly due to the ongoing, and at times direct, use of military
and security powers to control other social classes. Arguably, Saudi Arabia and other GCC
states have never been able to fully implement a genuine "counter-terrorism" policy for
both structural and tactical reasons. According to the United States Department of Defense,
"[t]errorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and
committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political" 30 (Joint Publication 3-07.2 on
"Antiterrorism", 2010, P. vii).
If we accept this definition as a working definition (while acknowledging all
the difficulties that arise when one is to define the loaded term “terrorism), we will be able
to identify some of the key problems a Saudi counterterrorism policy would encounter.
One crucial fact, of course, is that Saudi Arabia has invested significantly and for a long
period in propagating an ideology that, accurately or inaccurately, is viewed as lending
support to the radical groups. This ideology, often called Wahhabism, is the founding
ideology of the Saudi Arabia and its royal family; but it is in the past few decades the
ideology that has been aggressively exported throughout the Muslim World.

This

expansion now goes far beyond pure ideological propagation and involves complex
economic and financial manifestations. The economic ties are not always clear or
straightforward indeed. For instance, Rotana Group, which reportedly controls “around
45% of all the movie industry and around 75% of all the music” in the Middle East
(Zendrian, 2010, Forbes), is owned by Al-Waleed Bin Talal, a Saudi prince who is
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considered pro-West, but nonetheless belongs to a royal family whose very legitimacy
comes from an anti-West ideology. Interestingly, 18.97 percent of the same Rotana
Group’s stocks are owned by the News Corp.
The ironies of the interaction between Wahhabism and the West are even more
evident in the geopolitical landscape of the region. Saudi Arabia remains, for the time
being, one of the significant U.S. allies in the Middle East, while Wahhabism is almost
universally acknowledged as one of the founding ideologies of Al-Qaeda and, more
recently, ISIS. On the one hand, the Saudis, many of whom sympathize if not adhere to
the Wahhabi ideology, are engaged in economic and military businesses with the Western
countries, and they also make charitable donations to the American educational system (see
the complementary argument at the end of this chapter). On the other hand, offshoots of
Saudi Wahabbism in the form of Al-Qaeda and ISIS espouse a strong anti-American
position and reject Westernization and modernization altogether. At the same time, there
is ideological support for the radical Wahabis by such important Saudi Sheikhs as
Mohamed Al-Arifi (The Muslim Issue, 2014). Indeed, one would presume that a starting
point for counter-terrorism would be removing the very ideology of extremism from
education system. In a stark contrast, GCC states continue to invest in expansion of
Wahhabism into other countries. For instance, a cable released by WikiLeaks tells us:
“During recent [2008 November 13] trips to southern Punjab, Principal Officer
was repeatedly told that a sophisticated jihadi recruitment network had been
developed in the Multan, Bahawalpur, and Dera Ghazi Khan Divisions. . .
.Government and non- governmental sources claimed that financial support
estimated at nearly 100 million USD annually was making its way to Deobandi
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and Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in the region from "missionary" and "Islamic charitable"
organizations in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ostensibly with the
direct support of those governments”.31
Saudi Arabia has also funded Wahhabi schools in Indonesia, the Philippines,
Malaysia, Thailand, India and parts of Africa. Most of these schools are located in the poor
areas where the only option for people to receive an education is in such schools 32. The
question remains how GCC states could effectively challenge the foundational ideology of
terrorism while at the same time continuing to invest in the same ideology. According to
a CRS Report for Congress:
“It is widely acknowledged that the Saudi government, as well as wealthy
Saudi individuals, have supported the spread of the Wahhabist ideas in several
Muslim countries and in the United States and Europe. Some have argued that
this proselytizing has promoted terrorism and has spawned Islamic militancy
throughout the world. Saudi funding of mosques, madrasas, and charities, some
of which have been linked to terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, has raised concern
that Wahhabi Islam has been used by militants who tailor this ideology to suit
their political goals and who rely on Saudi donations to support their
aspirations”. 33 (Blanchard, CRS 4, [Footnotes Omitted])
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Meanwhile, there are some indications that the vast military and security
investments of GCC states primarily target certain groups and ideologies that may
challenge the position of the GCC’s ruling families. In other words, counterterrorism
and counterinsurgency policies within the GCC is better understood by locating these
policies within the domestic class structure of accumulation of capital that the GCC
depends on for its regional share of global corporate profits. Counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency policies have provided more “opportunities” for the GCC to pursue its
own regional class projects, often with supplementary funding injected by t h e TCC via
Western states. Accordingly, the counterterrorism policies of the GCC are developed,
constrained and informed by the links to the ruling elites of the GCC, who use
counterterrorism as a set of tools to perpetuate their economic and political interests and
power. This also means contradictions with the counterterrorism policy, illustrated by the
dependence of the GCC on Wahabbism in maintaining stability.
In addition, the policy of counterinsurgency is based on the interests of the GCC
capitalist class. According to one U.S. government counterinsurgency guide,
"[c]ounterinsurgency (COIN) is the blend of comprehensive civilian and military efforts
designed to simultaneously contain insurgency and address its root causes. Unlike
conventional warfare, non-military means are often the most effective elements, with
military forces playing an enabling role. COIN is an extremely complex undertaking,
which demands of policy makers a detailed understanding of their own specialist field, but
also a broad knowledge of a wide variety of related disciplines" 34 (2009, P. 2).

34

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf

156

If we use this definition as a working definition, while acknowledging the many
caveats that accompany that definition, we can recognize many contradictions and ironies
in U.S. and GCC counterinsurgency strategies in the Middle East. The U.S.
counterinsurgency strategy in the Middle East, for instance, manifests a neglect of many
security threats. One painful outcome was the complete blindness of Western intelligence
elites to the upcoming Iranian Revolution in 1979. Before the Iranian Revolution, Iranian
security forces and the so called SAVAK (Organization of Intelligence and National
Security) were supposedly a part of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in the region, as
they were fighting against a wide range of leftist and nationalist movements in Iran. Part
of their strategy was to empower Islamist groups who were ideologically against
communism to balance the threat of a communist revolution in Iran. The result was an
Islamic Revolution that went under the radar of nearly every Western intelligence service.
A similar strategy seems to have been pursued in the GCC states. The GCC
counterinsurgency strategy focuses on repressing any local voice that can create a
nationally- oriented political economy. In other words, a nationalization of GCC political
economy would be viewed structurally opposed to the current GCC transnational space.
Therefore, counterinsurgency has appeared as a tool to maintain the status quo in which
the Western MNCs have safe and secure access to oil and other transnational practices in
the region. The following map is an illustration of the concentration of militarization
around Persian Gulf oil fields.
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Map 1: U.S military presence in the Persian Gulf region and some of the nearest oil fields
Source: http://www.theglobaleducationproject.org/mideast/info/maps/middle-eastmilitary-and- oil-map.jpg
The above map shows the United States military facilities by circles that
represent U.S. Air Force bases, U.S. Navy bases, U.S. Army bases.

To help better

understand the geostrategic significance of the U.S. military presence in the region, the
map also shows oil and gas resources with brown stains representing oil fields, and the blue
ones representing natural gas fields. The close proximity of U.S. military bases to the oil
and gas fields is no coincidence; and the fact that those fields are usually close to water
makes the placement of military bases in their vicinity more convenient, as access to the
high seas would basically create a suitable strategic location for a military base.
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In the case of the GCC, the security vacuum created by the U.S. counterinsurgency
strategy and its impact on counterterrorism produced a blend of corporate capitalism and
counterinsurgency:

"multinational

corporations

usually

become

involved

in

counterinsurgency when their corporate interests (financial interests, foreign based
personnel, or infrastructure, etc.) are threatened, or when a financial advantage is
perceived. COIN planners will not always have the ability to influence the activities of
multi-national corporations in an affected country, but may find that their interests
complement the COIN effort. In particular, firms in extractive sectors (oil, mining, etc.)
have large initial investment and long production cycles, which mean that withdrawal
from a country could result in significant financial cost. For such companies, investment
in local stabilization activities (from micro-loans to security sector reform activities)
makes economic sense"35 (2009, P. 34).
Connecting the long-term national counterinsurgency strategy of the most
powerful military in the world with divergent and often shorter-term interests of
multinational corporations in dealing with one of the most chaotic regions of the world
has obviously had far reaching consequences, including, but not limited to, the collapse of
Libya, Syria and Yemen and the dysfunctional state of the government of Iraq and arguably
that of Egypt today. However, the current counterinsurgency strategies that protect the
GCC royal families and TCC interests in the region are not simply a means to an end; the
counterstrategy itself is emerging as an industry - an end in and of itself, and therefore,
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yet another economic tie between the GCC and TCC. For instance, Vindell, which is
a private military corporation based in the U.S., has been in the business of training Saudi
Arabian National Guard (SANG) for decades now:
“In February 1975 Vinnell secured a US$77 million contract with King Fahd to
train the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), the military arm of the
House of al- Saud. Today, Vinnell’s advertising depicts the firm as ‘providing
a broad spectrum of professional and technical services to government clients in
multiple areas of management and training. Client requirements have led Vinnell
to a vast array of challenges, from Malaysia to Mexico to the Middle East, often
to the very heart of international conflict areas. Vinnell has subsidiary operations
in Egypt, Oman, and Turkey, but the key area of responsibility remains with
SANG. The contract for its one thousand-plus-strong team of advisors was
extended in January 1994 to the year 2000 at a cost of US $819 million." 36
GCC State Repression and Working Class
The reason for employing military forces internally is arguably to guard against
security threats to GCC elites’ interests, including their property interests. In other words,
there is an inherent linkage between the militarization of the GCC states, on the one hand,
and GCC’s “controlling” and “repressing” the region’s working class, on the other. The
repressive sociopolitical structures of the GCC find their parallels in there structuring of
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the transnational working class in the GCC. GCC elites have successfully restructured the
working class transnationally at the same time as these elites were expanding their
transnational class interests. In other words, the repressive political architecture benefits
both GCC regional interests and GCC/TCC transnational interests.
Prior to the emergence of the current transnational labor class, GCC states used
to witness frequent demonstrations within their societies, particularly instigated by
violation of labor rights. Just a few decades ago, a considerable percentage of the GCC
working class consisted of Arab laborers from other Arab states. Based on the Arab
background of most foreign laborers, it was difficult for the GCC elites to suppress them,
on the one hand, or to gain hegemonic power in the Arab World, on the other. The
demography of the GCC labor class has now changed, however, and a transnational labor
class has been created in which Arab laborers are but a small part-see the Table 15.

Table 15: Arab Share of Foreign Population in GCC
Source: Borrowed from here;
http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/EGM_Ittmig_Arab/P02_Kapiszewski.pdf, P.
9
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By reducing the use of foreign Arab laborers to diminish the pressure from the rest
of the Arab world, the militarization of GCC labor policy created a transnational working
class in the region that is largely unprotected. This was a welcome development for GCC
elites: the non-Arab foreign labors spared GCC states from having to repress Arab
people and allowing them to claim hegemonic power over the Arab World while, at the
same time the working conditions in their countries worsened. From the 1970s and 80s,
the GCC actively started to create a transnational labor class by opening its local labor
markets to global labor supplies. This shift is crucial for the purpose of understanding the
emergence of a transnational GCC capitalist class, which depended on restructuring of the
workforce to facilitate production and was backed up by aggressive militarization, which
amounted primarily to internal security measures against the working class.
Parallel to this policy, GCC states started to give generous social welfare to their
own nationals while marginalizing them from important economic activities. Therefore,
the violation of human rights and labor rights became irrelevant - or less visible - since
these states claim that the laborers who migrated to GCC states have freely chosen to
accept the difficult working conditions.
Today, the GCC elites/states are using a sophisticated combination of ideology,
military power, and transnational globalization to maintain their suppressive status quo.
Based on the data, some of which discussed in this chapter, the GCC transnational labor
class is a key target of GCC’s repressive structure. According to Human Rights Watch:
“. . .[p]olice and labor authorities [of the GCC] in 2014 continued a vigorous
campaign to arrest and deport foreign workers found in violation of existing labor
laws, targeting workers who did not have valid residency or work permits, or
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those found working for an employer other than his or her legal sponsor.
According to the International Organization on Migration (IOM), Saudi Arabia
deported 163,018 Ethiopians between November 2013 and March 2014, and
458,911 Yemenis between June 2013 and June 2014. There were reports that
prior to deportation some deportees were placed in overcrowded detention
conditions, denied adequate food and water, and physically abused by guards.
Between December and March 2014, Saudi Arabia deported 38,164 Somalis to
Mogadishu, including hundreds of women and children, without allowing any
to make refugee claims. Domestic workers, most of them women, frequently
endure a range of abuses including overwork, forced confinement, non-payment
of wages, food deprivation, and psychological, physical and sexual abuse without
the authorities holding their employers to account. Workers who attempted to
report employer abuses sometimes faced prosecution based on counterclaims of
theft or “sorcery.”" 37
Capital Accumulation via Arms Deals
The security shield for GCC transnational capital accumulation has linked to
another capitalist structure, the military industrial complex. The sale of weapons, which
protect the structure of the capital accumulation, is, in itself, a Western-based structure of
accumulation of capital, showing a rather unusual case of harmony among different
capitalist trends. For instance, Adnan Khashoggi, a wealthy Saudi businessman and a
generous donor to American universities, has been alleged to be a Saudi arms dealer. Mr.
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Kashoggi appears to have close ties with the Saudi royal family, as his father was the
personal physician to King Abdul Aziz Al-Saud. The allegations of arms dealing against
him are long-standing. In January 1987, for instance, Time magazine referred to him as
a “shadowy arms trader." The allegations go further to include old connections with the
bin Laden family. Peter Bergen writes "[during the 1950s] Mohammed bin Laden [the
father of Osama bin Laden] would [jump-start] the career of another Saudi billionaire,
Adnan Khashoggi, known in the West for his flamboyant spending, his walk-on part in the
Iran-contra scandal, and his nephew Dodi Fayed, who died along with Princess Diana in
the Paris car crash. In the early 1950s, Mohammed needed some trucks for his construction
business in a hurry. Khoshoggi was able to make a $500,000 purchase of trucks in the
United States, for which Mohammed paid him a commission of $50,000.

It was

Khashoggi's first business deal" (Bergen, 2002, P. 47). Khashoggi has also been linked
to other controversial cases such as money-laundering activities at India 38 and even
terrorism 39.
The GCC elites continue to play an important role in the global arms industry. This
role has been possible thanks to petrodollars. The GCC’s indigenous arms industries
remain weak as the thrust of military expansion in the GCC continues to be the importation
of advanced military weaponry and equipment while relying on foreign support and
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training. Military facilities that are mostly exported from the West to the GCC primarily
function as a security assurance for the status quo forces within the GCC. The basic
economic model can be described as using arms deals to recycle petrodollars. Therefore,
it would be oversimplification to view these arms deals merely as a result of security
concerns. Rather, in the process of decision making behind these deals lie important
personal and power group interests. For instance, the BBC reported in 2007 that "[t]he
UK's biggest arms dealer, BAE Systems, paid hundreds of millions of pounds to the exSaudi ambassador to the US, Prince Bandar bin Sultan" 40 while then-Prime Minister
Tony Blair prevented the investigation using a simple business logic: "I don’t believe the
investigation incidentally would have led anywhere, except to the complete wreckage of a
vital strategic relationship for our country.” 41
Military and Security Power as Tools of Maintaining the Hierarchy of Power
in the Arab World
One way to capture the class-based nature of the GCC’s military power is to analyze
the causes and implications of GCC policies and strategies on a wider regional level across
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Historically, Saudi Arabia has aspired to
become a leader in the MENA region. The modern history of MENA, on the other
hand, consists of constant, and at times chaotic, changes, including the 1979 Iranian
Revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, two Persian Gulf Wars, the Arab Spring and the collapse
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of Syria, Libya, Yemen and the rise of ISIS. This constantly changing and highly
unpredictable environment has made it quite difficult for Saudi Arabia to design a coherent
strategy that would secure its position as a regional superpower. Take the example of the
Arab Spring. During the Arab Spring, there manifested a series of tensions among different
ideologies in the Arab World, including the tension between secular and pre-secular
worldviews, as well as tensions between socialism and capitalism.
Despite these tensions, the social movements in the Arab World found it possible,
if only for a short but consequential period of time, to rally around some common causes
and challenge the ruling classes in their respective countries. In other words, the Arab
Spring arose from a deep collective desire to change the status quo and to create a new
class arrangement in parts of the Arab World. This desire and its result, the toppling of
one status quo regime after another, put Saudi Arabia, as a self-proclaimed leader of the
Arab world, in an extremely uncomfortable position. The main tenets of the Arab Spring
as a sociopolitical movement posed an existential threat for the economic and political
positions of the GCC elites/states.
One of the strategic concerns of the GCC elites has been the fear of a decentralization
or transformation of the current hierarchy of power via any new class arrangement in the
Arab World. This strategic concern manifested itself in direct and indirect interventions
of the GCC states to contain the Arab Spring in order to hinder any radical changes in
the class arrangement of the Arab World. The approach was not quite different from the
containment strategies the GCC states adopted in response to the Iranian Revolution some
three decades ago.
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Following the collapse of President Mubarak and unsuccessful external efforts-from
GCC and the United States to prevent a radical change in Egypt, the TCC seemed to
favor Mohamed El-Beradei, the former Director General of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), as the new leader of “democratic” Egypt, due to his international
statute and networks. El-Beradei was arguably the only leading figure who could transform
Egyptian political structure into a polyarchic system acceptable to the TCC. The GCC
states, however, had a different vision. It was in the strategic interest of the GCC to first
derail the Egyptian anti-status quo revolution, dismantle the social construct that led to the
revolution that consisted of mainly of leftists and nationalists, and finally restore a soft
form of military dictatorship that would be a reliable ruling class that would support the
interests of the current GCC elites/states and Arab capitalism.

The GCC scored a

significant victory in achieving all these goals, not through foreign intrusion but by
channeling the Egyptian people’s will to overthrow a democratically elected government
and then voting in a military general. There is little doubt that the current military
government could not have emerged without the support of Saudi Arabia, and without
continued U.S. support of the Egyptian military. The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other
hand, sowed the seeds for its fall from power by excluding and suppressing many social
groups. The government under the Muslim Brotherhood started changing the institutional
settings in favor of its own group interests (similar to indigenous capitalism that emerged
in Iran after 1979 Islamic Revolution); but any such governing structure would have been
a serious threat for TCC interests in Middle East, and importantly with respect to oil.
The Egyptian case indicates a possible new trend in the Middle East geopolitics
in which GCC has now adopted: a neo-imperialist regional foreign policy to lead or support
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their regional strategies. Saudi Arabia had indeed the general support of the United
States in the region. But more importantly, Saudis represented the essential interests of
global TCC, and hence powerful economic and financial powers that supported the
Saudis’ strategy for containing the Egyptian revolution. According to a Congressional
Research Service Report:
“Egypt’s economy and national budget are slowly stabilizing, due in large part to
the financial largesse of the Gulf Arab monarchies. Countries such as the United
Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia have injected billions of dollars into the
economy and treasury, providing cash grants, concessional loans, and fuel
imports. Since the ouster of former president Morsi in July2013, Gulf states have
provided government-to- government aid to Egypt possibly as high as $30billion,
31 with billions more coming in the form of private sector investment. This
assistance has bolstered the Sisi government and given it the confidence to enact
some unpopular but fiscally prudent measures, such as reducing fuel subsidies
by 30%.”42 (Sharp, 2015, P. 8)
The economic support of the GCC - mainly by Saudi Arabia - was followed by the
emergence of military-driven ties between GCC elites and the new dictatorship in Egypt.
The military and economic aid by the United States to Egypt was about $ 1.5 billion in
2013. 43 Egyptian military leaders received the bulk of this aid. Recently, however, a
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shift, or at least a parallel development, may be seen. In his 2015 visit to Egypt, Saudi
Defense Minister and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman negotiated with
President Sisi for creation of a "joint Arab military force." 44 In April 2015, according to
the Egyptian Presidential office, "[i]t was agreed [between President Sisi and Prince
Mohammed bin Salman] to form a joint military committee to discuss the implementation
of a major strategic maneuver in the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with
the participation of a joint Arab force which includes troops from Egypt, Saudi Arabia
and the [Persian] Gulf states." 45
For our purpose, the example of the Bahraini social movement that was part of the
Arab Spring is particularly relevant. Unlike many other Arab Spring countries, Bahrain is
a GCC state. It is perhaps no overstatement that to Saudi Arabia, protecting the status quo
in Bahrain was equivalent to protecting all the GCC states. While the Saudis reluctantly
accepted President Obama’s support for the fall of President Mubarak in Egypt, the Saudis
conveyed their clear objection to any similar transition in Bahrain, forcing the U.S. to turn
a blind eye on the fate of the Bahraini social movement. Albeit, in the case of Egypt, the
U.S. was hoping to limit and contain these changes by preserving the Egyptian military as
powerbroker while easing out Mubarak.

As the Bahraini protestors were brutally

suppressed by their government, Saudi troops were sent to protect the royal family of
Bahrain. The U.S. criticized the ruling family of Bahrain while calling for restraint.
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http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/saudi-arabia-egypt-sign-cairo-declaration150731005229377.html
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http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/14/us-yemen-security-egypt-saudiidUSKBN0N52CF20150414#3qv5LCZvw3VBU1ox.97
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President Obama considered it sufficient to call for “respecting the universal rights of the
people of Bahrain and reforms that meet the aspirations of all Bahrainis." The United
States did not follow up on this call for protection of human rights in any serious manner.
Similar to Egypt, this case also shows considerable cooperation and “give-and-take”
between Western TCC states and the GCC states, rather than just conflicting policies
between the two sides.
The GCC elites therefore, were successful in containing the anti-status quo
forces in Egypt and Bahrain, the two countries with strategic significance to the GCC.
Table 16 shows one index for “freedom” in Tunisia, Bahrain, and Egypt before,
during, and after the Arab Spring, indicating the relatively successful transition of Tunisia
to democracy, while in Bahrain and Egypt the status quo more or less survived the Arab
Spring. In addition to the absence of strong labor unions and civil society institutions in
Egypt and Bahrain, one key difference between these two and Tunisia was that Saudi
Arabia did not have a strategic interest in maintaining the status quo in Tunisia, as it did in
Egypt or Bahrain.
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Egypt Egypt Egypt Egypt Bahrain Bahrain Bahrain Bahrain Tunisia Tunisia Tunisia Tunisia
Year PR
CL Status Year PR
CL
Status Year PR
CL
Status
2000
6
5 NF
2000
7
6 NF
2000
6
5 NF
2001
6
6 NF
2001
6
5 NF
2001
6
5 NF
2002
6
6 NF
2002
5
5 PF
2002
6
5 NF
2003
6
6 NF
2003
5
5 PF
2003
6
5 NF
2004
6
5 NF
2004
5
5 PF
2004
6
5 NF
2005
6
5 NF
2005
5
5 PF
2005
6
5 NF
2006
6
5 NF
2006
5
5 PF
2006
6
5 NF
2007
6
5 NF
2007
5
5 PF
2007
7
5 NF
2008
6
5 NF
2008
5
5 PF
2008
7
5 NF
2009
6
5 NF
2009
6
5 NF
2009
7
5 NF
2010
6
5 NF
2010
6
5 NF
2010
7
5 NF
2011
6
5 NF
2011
6
6 NF
2011
3
4 PF
2012
5
5 PF
2012
6
6 NF
2012
3
4 PF
2013
6
5 NF
2013
6
6 NF
2013
3
3 PF
2014
6
5 NF
2014
7
6 NF
2014
1
3F
Table 16: Freedom Status in Egypt, Bahrain, and Tunisia
Source: Freedom House
More importantly, the labor unions in Tunisia functioned as a structural obstacle
against such external pressures as any potential GCC-backed intervention in two ways:
ideologically and institutionally. In terms of ideology, Tunisian labor forces managed
to mobilize the two competing trends within the Tunisian society, namely the secular and
the Islamic trends. In many other Arab Spring countries, the tension between these two
trends proved to be one of the main obstacles in the way of democratization, if not the main
obstacle. With respect to institutions, Tunisian labor unions provided important indigenous
institutional settings for sociopolitical activism, which in turn allowed the movement to go
deeper than a mere street movement. In the case of Tunisia, the former dictator Ben
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Ali fled to Saudi Arabia where he was granted protection. That being said, GCC
supported "Islamists that have gained power" (Colombo, 2012, P. 12).
Thus, GCC elites/states used their military and financial powers to protect the
current socioeconomic class arrangement in the Arab World. In case of Bahrain, they used
direct military power to suppress uprisings. In the case of Egypt, they empowered the
Egyptian military to take over the state in order to stop any kind of meaningful
democratization in Egypt at the expense of a weakened working class. In the case of
Tunisia, they failed to penetrate into the dynamics of the uprising and the changes that
were going on in the country because the Tunisian working class had sufficient institutional
power to resist the interests of the GCC, at least temporarily.
With respect to the Arab Spring, each intervention may be better understood in
terms of its importance to the GCC capitalist class. One important factor in analyzing
the Arab Spring is that there has been tension and conflict between the GCC
regional

interests

and

TCC transnational interests. Similar to the period of

nationalization, when the conflict between GCC and TCC resulted in a new arrangement,
in the case of the collective responses to Arab Spring the consequential strategic interests
are directly connected to the broader economic (class) interests of the GCC bloc, as
well as this bloc’s ties with the TCC.
Conclusion
A narrow segment of GCC society - royal families and merchant families - who
controlled the upstream oil sector after nationalization began to establish economic
ties with TCC business entities that were pushed to downstream sector (See Chapter 3).
Within the current phase of transnationalization of the global economy, GCC elites/states
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are deeply connected to the TCC. This transnationalization and the ensuing segmentation
imply a network of individual shareholders from different countries who control highly
centralized modes of capital accumulation in the global oil market. Today, the primary goal
of GCC militarization is protection of the GCC as an important part of this transnational
globalization.
The GCC/TCC ties regarding militarization is primarily geared towards the
interests of the GCC bourgeoisie in terms of the current mode of capital accumulation. As
discussed in this chapter, the GCC class-based militarization is characterized by a series of
challenges for the GCC bloc and TCC. One important reason for GCC militarization is the
non-hegemonic nature of the GCC transnational space and the highly exploited
transnational labor class in this region. A second reason is the external threats (mainly from
Arab Spring) that challenge the current hierarchy of power in this region. Third is the new
transnational ties via military deals that have empowered the GCC elites within TCC; this
militarization endures as continuation of military business between members of TCC. A
final reason can be found in the financial needs of Western military industrial
complexes to petrodollars.
The militarization of the GCC is among the functional components of the
current global mode of accumulation of capital. Structurally speaking, this militarization
suppresses weaker social classes while the deals strengthen the economic ties between
the GCC and TCC. The regional interventions of the GCC that manifest the same trend
in that the GCC's regional concerns are based more and more on the fear of any changes
in the hierarchy of power in the region affecting GCC/TCC corporate interests.
The GCC has internal domestic/regional interests and transnational interests that

173

sometimes, though not always, overlap. The GCC bourgeoisie has appeared as the most
reliable partner for the TCC in the Middle East. Securing the stability of the GCC, which
is a structurally fragile region, is crucial for the TCC to secure its economic activities in
that region. Despite the occasional tensions in cases such as nationalization and the Arab
Spring, the outcome protects the interests of both the GCC and TCC. This overall
harmony is the manifestation of the embeddedness of GCC elites/states within the TCC.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
In each chapter of this dissertation I focused on certain aspects of the GCC that,
while co- existing with each other, carried some degree of internal contradictions. The
cumulative result of these contradictions is a series of tensions, which in turn leads to
further contradictions. As David Harvey maintains, “[c]ontradictions have the nasty habit
of not being resolved but merely moved around” (Harvey, 2013, P.4). This pattern of fluid
contradictions and ebbs and flows of social tensions in essence summarizes the
socioeconomic dynamics of the GCC countries in the past several decades and provides us
with a sense of what to expect in the near future.
The nature of transnational elites, their relations, and their struggles within and
without their groups are related to the essential characteristics of today’s globalization.
This dissertation has examined the extent to which GCC elites have been integrated into
the TCC. It also discussed how this particular segment of the global structure of capital
accumulation depends on a repressive state apparatus. Generally speaking, and in order to
better understand the new patterns of global capitalism contextualized in the new
socioeconomic arrangement of contemporary globalization, it is crucial to explore the
critical, regional roles played by transnational elites.
The key contribution of this dissertation is to add to the expanding literature on the
far-reaching consequences of transnational elites in various regions of the world by
shedding some light on one of the important blocs of TCC’s global structure. Various
strands of argument here are primarily drawn from Neo-Gramscian schools of thought,
in particular, Robinson 2003, Robinson and Harris 2000, and Sklair 2001. Accordingly,
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the core inquiry has been to understand the dominant forces within GCC capitalism as
an extension of TCC’s global capitalism that comes at the expense of states.
With respect to the field of Middle Eastern studies, the methodology used in this
dissertation has been what is called the “process-tracing method.” (See Chapter 1.) For
reasons discussed earlier, this method allows us to better understand the embeddedness of
the GCC elites within the TCC based on historical narratives and direct data. Importantly,
this theory-oriented process-tracing method revealed no significant inconsistencies in the
notion of GCC transnational elites between that of Neo- Gramscianism and the findings of
this dissertation.
As discussed in the first chapter, this dissertation contributes an under-used mode
of analysis based on Neo-Gramcianism to Middle Eastern studies which typically
emphasizes understanding the institutional setting and arrangement of regime structure in
Middle Eastern monarchies. These settings and arrangements include state building and
the legacy of colonialism on various state institutions. (See, for instance; Fandy 1999,
Herb 1999, Kechichian 2001, Kostiner 2000, Massad 2001, Tetrault 2000, Lucas 2004,
Anderson 1986, Posusney & Angrist 2005).
Another significant part of Middle Eastern studies literature focuses on the notion
of rentierism. (See, for instance, Mahdavi, 1970 and Beblawi, 1987). However, the
heterodox approaches, such as historical structuralism that was partly used in this
dissertation are more or less based on classical class-based explanations (Hanieh 2011,
Prashad 2002). Following these latter approaches, this dissertation recognizes the
importance of class-based analysis; but it also applies it to a transnationally-oriented classbased context. In other words, this dissertation suggests that analyzing GCC transnational
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space and its actors should be the starting point for studying the political economy of
GCC. The embeddedness of GCC elites within the TCC also explains the repressive
state apparatus and the highly exploitive economic structure in which the GCC
transnational working class lives.
According to Robinson, on the global level, the TCC is “[a] class group that has
drawn in contingents from most countries around the world, North and South, and
has attempted to position itself as a global ruling class. This TCC is the hegemonic
fraction of capital on a world scale” (Robinson, 2014, P. 2). In order to avoid ambiguity
with Robinson's theory, it is important to clarify how the terms elite and capitalist are
employed in this analysis. Following Robinson, in this dissertation, in regards to the case
study, I have used the terms elites and capitalist class interchangeably. According to
Robinson:
“[B]y "elites" I mean dominant political, socioeconomic, and cultural strata and,
in particular, capitalists and landlords, along with top-level managers and
administrators of the state and other major social institutions and leadership
positions in the political system. Capitalists are elites who own or manage means
of production as capital. Elites who are not necessarily capitalists occupy key
decision-making positions in institutions, whether in private corporations, the
state, political parties, or culture industries”. (Robinson, 2014, pp. 43-45)
As I described in chapters 2 and 3, GCC states have always been dominated by the
ruling classes of the region. In the GCC the ruling and merchant families are by design
capitalists; but they are also elites who are well-educated and well-positioned in the
political system of GCC states. The core part of GCC capitalist class, including its elites,
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has been crystallized around family ties. In other words, in GCC the elites are necessarily
members of a capitalist class. The nature of ownership and capital accumulation, such
as activities conducted by these elites through SWFs and various GCC conglomerates
have, along with their Westernized cultural education and life style rendered the GCC
transnational elites “natural” members of the TCC.
Development of Capitalism and the Crisis of Freedom
As Robinson points out: “A 2011 analysis of the share ownerships of 43,000
transnational corporations undertaken by three systems theorists at the Swiss Federal
Institute of Technology identified a core of 1,318 TNCs with interlocking ownerships.
Each of these core TNCs had ties to two or more other companies, and on average they
were connected to twenty. Although they represented only 20 percent of global operating
revenues, these 1,318 TNCs appeared to own collectively through their shares the majority
of the world's largest blue chip and manufacturing firms, representing a further 60 percent
of global revenues - for a total of 80 percent of the world's revenue" (Robinson, 2014, P.
23).
Transnational globalization and the accompanying destruction of national and
local economic entities have, under the banner of "increasing economic freedom," led to
the rising power of oligarchs at the expense of weakening the working class. This
dissertation analyzes the GCC transnational space and its repressive state apparatus. The
repressive nature of politics that has emerged in the GCC is by no means limited only to
GCC transnational space. Generally speaking, the new mode of capital accumulation that
relies on transnational economic activities is based on an exploitive and inherently
unbalanced hierarchy of power on a global level. This transnational mode of accumulation
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functions through economic and political ties that exist among various capitalist classes
who, in turn, benefit from Western state institutions and a Western-oriented global
hegemonic order. Meanwhile, the societies in the global South are excluded and
controlled, in some cases, by economic statecraft and, in other cases, by brute military and
security power. This economic oligarchy on the global level is an integral part of the
structural power of TCC.
The highly exploitive nature of transnational activities requires, from time to
time, the use of force by capitalist classes to control the exploited working classes and
weaker states in the matrix of international relations. Force can be employed on different
levels and can take different forms. On the global level, for instance, force may be used via
an institutional setting against those states that are not willing to accept the new mode of
capital accumulation. On a domestic level in the global South force is simply employed as
naked authoritarianism. The rise of underlying authoritarian trends in the global South is
nothing more than the reverse image of current transnational globalization. In many
regions of the global South, such as Latin America or China, the structure of authoritarian
power is far more sophisticated than the authoritarian trends we observe in the GCC.
On the global level the underlying rise of authoritarian trends is based on the
use of force by economic statecraft and putting pressures on those states that are not willing
to open up their economies to neo-liberal entities. T he neo-Gramscian understanding of
the notion of hegemony reveals that the global North countries maintain a certain level of
mutual acceptance of the hierarchy of power. This acceptance extends to the interactions
and tensions between Nordic model and neo-liberalism, and it results from the fact that
use of military power is not the primary or strategic tool for the process of transnational
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globalization. On the other hand, the GCC has used its military and security powers as an
indispensable tool of its capitalist strategy against both domestic and regional anti-status
quo players.
While in periphery and semi-periphery countries the use of naked force may be
more visible, in countries with advanced economic powers the so-called "Kremlin Bailout
Technique" prevails. As Simon Johnson puts it, this technique is "[t]he assumption of
private debt obligations by government" in which ordinary taxpayers repay the debt of
corporations (Johnson, 2009) Economic recovery strategies in which governments bailout
large financial institutions and multinational corporations at the expense of working and
middle classes - often under the justification that they are "too big to fail" - are the familiar
future of the deregulated financial world of today. These strategies, in their very essence,
are nothing but oligarchic solutions for re-consolidation of neo-liberalism.
Another, somewhat similar authoritarian trend in advanced economies i s what is
sometimes called the Chinese development model. Through the engagement of foreign
corporate powers, China has assumed a central position in the “global supply chain”
facilitating further “transnational accumulation” (Cox, 2012, P. 31). At the same time, the
emerging Chinese market clearly reveals the impacts of neoliberal globalization. In
other words, China has used “authoritarian upgrading” in which an authoritarian regime
has tried to consolidate its power through economic reform within the “context of
contemporary globalization.” (Cox-2012). The result has been the deteriorating situation
of the labor class and rising inequalities that could eventually entail the use of force by the
state, hence rendering the Chinese model of development unsustainable.
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The historical economic development of the GCC has conflated economic and
social inequalities contextualized in the repressive presence of the state. To some extent,
this situation is similar to the pattern of development in China. In contrast to China,
however, the GCC transnationalization by and large ignores national infrastructures. While
Chinese authoritarian development relies on foreign investment in manufacturing with a
nationalistic theme, the GCC model has focused on transnational investments and its oil
industry. Despite the differences, the GCC is struggling, like China, to position itself at
the core part of the global supply chain.
The GCC Model

Figure 9: GCC Transnationalization
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The above figure shows the key analytical elements of this dissertation. The white
arrows indicate a more or less aligned relationship while the gray arrows indicate
some degree of tension between the elements. As discussed before, we believe that the
embeddedness of GCC elites is an extension of a broader evolution of global capitalism.
To oversimplify somewhat, this evolution, called the transnationalization of economic
practices, serves as a new mode of capital accumulation. In this part of the model, the TCC,
along with institutional agents of globalization (such as IMF) facilitated the growing
positions of GCC elites within the global economy. However, in terms of domestic GCC
politics there is a tension between TCC and GCC elites/states as the TCC's preference in
this region is a polyarchy different from the Saudi version of oligarchical/nepotism model
favored by the GCC elite. However, similar to the tensions between TCC and GCC elites
that arose throughout the processes of nationalization, the new arrangement has not
jeopardized the broader coalition of economic interests between the GCC and TCC. (See
chapter 4.)
The second part of the above model depicts the connection between the GCC elites'
embeddedness within TCC and certain domestic factors in the GCC. The predominant
structure of transnational rentier states that exist in the GCC has provided a considerable
level of welfare to the GCC rentier middle class. Ironically, however, the same structure
has also resulted in alienation of the middle class, who have been excluded from of the
process of decision making in their countries.
Furthermore, this paradoxical capitalist structure has also paved the way for antistatus-quo movements to gain currency. As the leftist and nationalist movements were
aggressively suppressed under the banner of "fighting against anti-Islamic" groups, the
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only opposition groups that remained active have been the transnational terrorist
organizations that follow the ideology of the Saudi royal family, namely Wahhabism.
This terrorist countermovement has two primary aspects. The first aspect is that
the ideology of Wahhabismin h a s different shades that appeal to people excluded from
the GCC mode of capital accumulation, as well as those who are members of the GCC
bourgeoisie but nevertheless have ideological sympathies with Wahhabism. The aspect is
that GCC capitalism uses the notion of "terrorism" to suppress almost any anti-status quo
voices, ranging from Islamic leftists to religious and ethnic minorities.

The global

condemnation of terrorism provides a comfortable context for GCC elites to demonize any
opposition by labeling it as terrorist. As a recent example, one may consider Saudi Arabia’s
execution of a Shia clergyman, Sheikh Nimr al-Namir, in 2016, which it justified as an act
of counterterrorism. Although Sheikh Namir, a relatively marginal Shi’a leader in Saudi
Arabia, was a staunch supporter of Iran’s model of theocratic political system and an
unequivocal opponent of the Saudi royal family, many observers raised doubt as to whether
classifying him as a terrorist was appropriate. The irony becomes somewhat more visible
when one considers that the underlying ideology of terrorism, Wahhabism, has from its
very early days positioned itself in opposition to Shi’a Islam, which Wahhabi leaders
continue to view as a heresy. M any reformers in Saudi Arabia have been arrested under
the pretext of the "anti-terror law." According to a report by Amnesty International,
"hundreds of people have been arrested for demonstrating, while the government has
drafted an anti-terror law that would effectively criminalize dissent as a "terrorist
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crime” and further strip away rights from those accused of such offences."46 The
skillful management of this second aspect of "terrorism" - the states’ use and misuse of the
concept - is one of the primary concerns of GCC states/elites. As discussed elsewhere, far
from trying to contain the spread of more radical strands of Wahhabism, the GCC has
been investing in “exporting” those extreme ideologies to the rest of the Muslim
World, supposedly under the assumption that by exporting extreme ideas and people to
other places, the ruling elites would have less to be worried about domestically. This
explains the last part of the model that depicts the real targets of the GCC security and
military powers: the working classes as well as a wide range of reformists voices.
While there are significant tensions and paradoxes between GCC societies and
Western societies, GCC transnational elites have established their ties in Western societies
through a sophisticated network of lobbyists as well as generous and strategic investments
in Western academia. That being said, the culture of GCC transnational elites, which has
been influenced by the culture of the TCC, is a Western-oriented culture in its roots. This
is despite the fact that important sections of the GCC societies still follow a pre-secular,
religious, and anti-Western traditions, some of which are espoused by Wahhabism. Again,
this severe tension between the elites’ worldview and that of the masses creates a fertile
ground for the rise of violent extremism.

46

https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2012/01/reform-activists-saudi-arabia-must-receivefair- appeal-hearings/
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The transnationalization has also increased the authoritarian tendencies in global
governance. On the one hand, the oppositions against this transnationalization has
justified the current and steady increase in militarization. On the other hand, the evidence
suggests that such militarization has failed to solve the root problem or even alleviate the
current human catastrophes in the Middle East caused by terrorism and transnational
crimes. More than a decade after 9/11 terrorist attacks, and after spending enormous
amounts of resources on counterterrorism, the blight of terrorism has consistently and
considerably increased in the region as the following chart shows.

Chart 6: Terror Attack, Annual Count by Region
Source: Borrowed from;
Https: //www.atkearney.com/gbpc/detail//asset_publisher/0cePdOWatojD/content/globaltrends-2015-2025-divergence-disruption-and-innovation/10192
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Final Note
The embeddedness of GCC elites within TCC came with the decentralization of
capital accumulation along with centralization of those who benefit from the current mode
of capital accumulation, i.e. the TCC. The GCC offers an important case study for
analyzing the structure and consequences o f the current phase of globalization. It
clearly shows the significant role of the TCC as a force in shaping the global economy.
The TCC’s impacts, however, may differ from one region to another. This dissertation is
a humble contribution to the larger assessment of the role played by transnational elites in
the GCC and of the regional and global consequences of their power struggles. The
findings suggest that the transnational elites of the GCC, as one of the important nodes of
global market economy, are members of the TCC, a group whose decisions have farreaching impacts on the regional and global economies. However, the current suppressive
mode in the GCC is an outcome and an essential part of GCC transnationalization. This is
partly due to the profitable military deals between members of the TCC, on the one hand,
and the level of violence in the Middle East, on the other. The Middle East, as one of the
most militarized regions in the world, is the only region where systemic violence has
been simultaneously, and at points paradoxically, directed against modernization,
Westernization, and globalization, because the GCC elites represent all three at the same
time.
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